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INTRODUCTION
This book is about the Next Steps initiative, the initiative which is currently 
transforming the British system of government. Next Steps was launched in 1988 
with a report from the Prime Minister’s Efficiency Unit.* The main aims of the 
initiative are to create durable improvements in management in government and 
to deliver services more efficiently and effectively within available resources for 
the benefit of customers, taxpayers and staff. One of the most distinguishing 
features of Next Steps is the structural change of creating executive agencies 
from the operational arms of government. By 5 April 1993,89 agencies had 
been established. Over 260,000 civil servants are working in agencies, this 
represents some 45 per cent of total civil servants. In addition, 19 further agency 
candidates have been announced covering over 25,000 more civil servants which 
will take the proportion of civil servants working in agencies to nearly 50 per 
cent. The aim is to have over 90 per cent of civil servants working in agencies by 
the end of 1995. Next Steps has implications for the nature, content and skills of 
civil servants’ jobs and for the organizational structures in which they operate but 
more importantly, Next Steps has much wider implications for the future of the 
civil service and for its constitutional role as the Executive.
In addition, Next Steps now has two important relatives which form a part of the 
package of current reforms - the Citizen’s Charter and the Competing for 
Quality initiative. The Citizen’s Charter was launched in July 1991 and aims to 
improve public services in order to respond better to the needs and wishes of 
customers and users; and to find more effective and efficient ways of organizing 
and delivering public services^. In central government the effect of the Citizen’s 
Charter has been to put more pressure on departments and agencies to prioritize 
their aim of bringing new and improved services to customers. The Competing 
for Quality initiative also acts to prioritize and direct the development of Next
2Steps. The Competing for Quality white paper was published in November 1991 
and sets out proposals requiring departments and agencies to open up many of 
their functions to competition from private sector or other public sector 
contractors^. In other words, the Competing for Quality initiative is about 
departments and agencies tendering for bids from contractors to run many of 
their functions.
Next Steps addresses the age old problem of how to run government. There is 
nothing new in the dilemmas raised by Next Steps. How do we divide policy and 
operational matters? How do we balance accountability and autonomy? How 
do we minimize transaction costs? These issues were raised in earlier moves to 
arm’s length government. Other features of Next Steps are also familiar from 
other areas of public policy. One of the main features of Next Steps is the 
development of contracts to manage operational activities to be carried out 
either by the public sector or increasingly, particularly as the Competing for 
Quality initiative matures, by the private sector. Next Steps is about the move to 
management by contract and the management of contracts. There are parallels 
with these developments and the current move to develop quasi markets in many 
areas of public sector service delivery including health, the personal social 
services and education.
In many ways the Next Steps solution is, as its name suggests, the next step in a 
programme of reforms. However, it combines this incremental ’next stepping’ 
with a new emphasis on business ideas and language. Many of the characteristics 
of Next Steps are old friends in new clothes. What is new about Next Steps is the 
particular combination of features coming together at the present time and the 
prevailing climate of belief that the public sector must learn from the private 
sector and indeed that the boundaries of public and private sectors should shift 
distinguishes Next Steps and its contemporaries from their predecessors. Britain
3is not unique in its present thinking and language about how to run central 
government. Other western democracies are also embracing similar language 
and thinking but there are some important differences in how these ideas are 
being translated into practice.
This aim of this book is therefore to use the case study of the Department of 
Social Security and its agencies to examine the development of Next Steps and to 
consider the implications of the Next Steps experiment for Whitehall, for the 
British system of government, for other countries involved in the decentralization 
of activity and for administrative theory. The case study of the Department of 
Social Security provides a detailed examination of the experiences of one 
department whilst also raising issues of wider relevance. The Department of 
Social Security is particularly suitable for this kind of exercise because its 
agencies represent most ’types’ of new arrangements.
The book is founded on material generated by a three year study funded by the 
Leverhulme Trust. The study was based on documentary analysis and interviews 
conducted on lobby terms with some of the main players in the Next Steps arena: 
ministers, parliamentarians, Department of Social Security senior officials, senior 
Treasury and Office to the Minister for the Civil Service (now Office for the 
Public Service and Science) officials, agency chief executives and senior agency 
officials, select committee officials, National Audit Office directors and senior 
Canadian and New Zealand public servants. The text attributes beliefs, ideas and 
quotations to the appropriate people wherever possible but does not attribute 
where this may cause embarrassment to the individual concerned.
Chapters 1 and 2 set out the wider issues and put the initiative into a historical 
and theoretical context. Chapter 1 outlines the similarities and differences in the 
features and the theoretical concerns raised by Next Steps and by earlier
4initiatives. It then considers how administrative theory can help to explain other 
features of Next Steps and can help us to analyse its progress. Chapter 2 asks 
what is so different about Next Steps to make it revolutionary rather than 
evolutionary and why it should come now.
Chapters 3 to 6 analyse the process of developing Next Steps drawing on the case 
study of the Department of Social Security and its agencies. Chapter 3 
introduces the Department of Social Security and its agencies. It outlines how 
the department’s agencies range across the spectrum of agency types and 
therefore raise issues of wider relevance and it identifies other features which 
may affect the development of agencies. Chapter 4 introduces the main 
organizational actors involved with Next Steps, outlines their positions in the 
Next Steps arena and examines the changing roles and relationships between 
these bodies in shaping the development of Next Steps. Chapter 5 focuses on the 
move to ’contract government’. It examines the processes of developing the 
contracts, the content of the contracts and evaluates their success in allowing 
greater autonomy within a framework of accountability. Chapter 6 again draws 
on the main themes of accountability versus autonomy and the distinction 
between policy and operational issues in examining the effect of Next Steps on 
parliamentary accountability.
Chapters 7 to 9 evaluate the effect of Next Steps. Chapter 7 examines the 
fundamental changes to the organization, size and culture of the civil service and 
the wider implications of these changes for the future of the civil service and for 
its constitutional role. Chapter 8 draws on interviews conducted in two countries 
based on the Westminster model, New Zealand and Canada, to ask whether 
Next Steps is a British eccentricity or whether it is a part of something more 
general. Chapter 9 provides an overall evaluation of the success of Next Steps in 
achieving its aims of improving efficiency and quality of service and from the
5point of view of customers, staff and parliamentarians. It also asks whether Next 
Steps has outlined useful lessons either for future British reforms or for those of 
other countries and whether it has been a success in terms of its contribution to 
administrative theory.
I am indebted to the many people who made this book possible. I wish to thank 
the many officials in Britain, Canada and New Zealand who by convention must 
remain nameless but who were most generous with their valuable time and 
insights. I also wish to thank the Leverhulme Trust for funding the research. My 
particular thanks goes to Rudolf Klein for talking me into employment as a 
researcher at Bath and for reading and providing productive comments on draft 
chapters. Finally, my personal thanks goes to all who kept me relatively sane 
throughout the project - my friends and colleagues and my horses, Shiraz and 
Octavius.
1. Efficiency Unit (1988) Improving Management in 
Government: The Next Steps. London, HMSO.
2. The Citizen/s Charter: Raising the Standard. Cm 1599. 
London, HMSO.




The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are 
right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly 
understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else....Madmen in 
authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some 
academic scribbler a few years back.
(Keynes)^
Next Steps aims to precipitate action not thought or debate. It claims to be a 
pragmatic initiative rooted in action rather than in history or in theory and yet 
neither the features of Next Steps nor the issues they raise are new. Despite this 
claim this chapter shows that Next Steps is, albeit unconsciously, rooted in both 
history and theory. Many of the characteristics of Next Steps are old friends in 
new clothes. There is nothing new about arm’s length government, the emphasis 
on a more specialist civil service, the shift in emphasis from policy to 
management, the focus on efficiency and costs of service delivery, the emphasis 
on performance measurement or the shift in emphasis from inputs and process to 
outputs.
Similarly, there is very little that is new about the questions and dilemmas raised 
by Next Steps. Next Steps addresses the age old problems of how to run 
government. How do we make the public service more efficient and effective 
when there is no profit motive? How do we ensure that managers have sufficient 
autonomy to get on with the job whilst ensuring that those managers are 
accountable for their actions? How do we allow public servants autonomy when 
ministers are ultimately accountable for what those public servants do? What is 
the appropriate relationship between a minister and his or her departmental 
advisers and the operational arms of a department? How do we distinguish 
between policy and operational issues? The issues have been repeatedly raised
7with past attempts to reform government and have been comprehensively 
addressed by administrative theory.
The aim of this chapter is therefore to consider the Efficiency Unit report which 
launched Next Steps and to outline what Next Steps has drawn and learnt from 
earlier practical and theoretical attempts to reform government. The chapter 
then considers what theory can tell us about the future development of Next 
Steps.
The Efficiency Unit Report
The report launching the initiative from the Prime Minister’s Efficiency Unit, 
’Improving Management in Government: The Next Steps’, is more like a report 
from a management consultancy firm than a traditional civil service review. It is 
glossy, bold and evangelical. The traditional mandarin style of drafting to avoid 
commitment has been replaced by a fresh passion for revitalization and change. 
The style and thrust of the report reflects the views and skills of its relatively 
youthful authors. The Next Steps report was written by a new breed of civil 
servants. It is predicated on the belief that there is an important discipline of 
’management’ which has been traditionally and mistakenly overlooked by the 
civil service in favour of traditional ’policy skills’.
Next Steps professes to be all about ’improving management in government’.
The aims are ’to leave managers free to manage’, ’to ensure that senior managers 
have experience of the skills and practical reality of management’, for 
departments ’to develop specialised management skills’. The expectation is that 
improving management is the key to improving overall organizational 
performance.
8Fulton
This belief in management is not new. Over 20 years ago the Fulton committee, 
set up by a Labour Government, also saw management as a key issue in civil 
service reform; they identified two definitions of ’management’. The first was an 
all embracing definition:
Management, as we understand it, consists of the formulation and 
operation of the policy of the enterprise. This can be seen as a continuum 
ranging from first line supervision through a hierarchy of line managers to 
the board of directors. At each level assets - whether human, financial or 
material - have to be deployed in the manner best calculated to achieve 
particular objectives which contribute to the overall policy objectives 
formulated by the board.
The second definition devised by the committee took account of the added 
’political’ dimension to the work of the civil service which manifests itself in 
public accountability and ultimate political direction. Within this context, the 
committee distinguished four aspects which make up the total management task 
of the civil service:
* formulation of a policy under political direction;
* creating the ’machinery’ for implementation of policy;
* operation of the administrative machine;
* Accountability to Parliament and the public.^
The Fulton committee identified some important differences between the 
managerial environment of the civil service and of industry and commerce. One 
major difference the committee identified was that in big firms top management 
are primarily concerned with the evaluation of different courses of action based
9on research whereas in the civil service, top management is largely preoccupied 
with reacting to such immediate pressures as ministers’ cases, parliamentary 
debates and questions, reports of parliamentary committees and deputations^. 
Despite these major differences the Fulton committee concluded that 
management in the civil service has much in common with management in 
industry:
Both are concerned with the formulation of policy and its 
implementation. Though most of the Civil Service cannot qualify its 
performance in terms of the financial return on resources, both it and 
industry are concerned with meeting objectives at the lowest possible cost. 
They are both concerned with making the best use of the scarce resources 
of skilled manpower for which they compete/
The planting of these ideas as seeds over 20 years ago has paved the way for 
them now to be harvested. It is however interesting to note how the assumptions 
have changed in what civil service costs can and should be measured. Like Next 
Steps, Fulton emphasized the importance of knowing the unit costs of services 
and functions but, as the above extract illustrates, assumed that the extent to 
which this mode of performance measurement was limited because of the very 
nature of the civil service.
Public good: Private bad
A related assumption which underpins the Next Steps report is that the private 
sector is more efficient and effective than the public sector. Next Steps promotes 
the idea that public sector managers have much to learn from their private sector 
counterparts. Accordingly, many of the private sector management techniques 
and much of the private sector language is increasingly being adopted to become 
common parlance within the civil service.
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Again, the foundations for this assumption lie in the history of public 
administration. The Fulton report also declared that the public sector had much 
to learn from the private sector and that the ideas and techniques are 
transferable.
The ’amateur generalist’ versus a ’specialist’ civil service 
The Next Steps emphasis on creating a more specialist and focused civil service 
which promotes 'directed training and career development' is also not new. This 
push to training people for particular areas of work rather than providing them 
with generalist civil service training again has the familiar tone of the Fulton 
report. Fulton recommended a break from the 'amateur generalist'. The 
committee found that generalist administrators tended to lack expertise in any 
particular area, and that this consequently inhibited effective policy making, 
prevented fundamental policy evaluation, and led to inadequate relationships 
with outside organizations. The Fulton committee therefore recommended an 
integration of the grading structure for specialists and generalists and more 
training for specialists in management. The committee also recommended more 
flexibility and movement in and out of the civil service.
Clearly the diagnosis is similar to that of Next Steps even if there are some 
differences in the recommended cures. The recommendation of more 
movement in and out of the public service clearly fits with the Next Steps notion 
of short term contracts.
So, it seems that the authors of the Next Steps report who began their careers in 
the post Fulton environment carried with them a number of assumptions which 
directed the report’s style, content and recommendations. These assumptions 
are founded in Fulton but are now possibly more powerful as they are being
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raised in an environment where the ideas have become familiar to rising 
administrators and possibly therefore more palatable.
The New Public Management
The evangelical style of the Next Steps report suggests that it is a document 
independent of history or theory. The very raison d’etre of the report was the 
fact that earlier initiatives had not been successful in achieving all their aims. 
Next Steps is, as its name suggests, the latest step in a line of reforms which have 
been variously labelled but which have come to be commonly known as the "new 
public management"^. The features of the new public management has been 
broadly categorized by Aucoin 1990, Hood 1990, Hood and Jackson 1991  ^and 
others as featuring:
* a shift to disaggregation in public service organization;
* a preference for limited term contract employment of senior staff over 
traditional career tenure; wholly monetized incentives rather than the 
traditional structure of control in the public sector through a mix of non­
monetary factors (ethos, status, culture) and uniform fixed salaries; top 
managerial ’freedom to manage’ over a network of constraints (notably by 
central personnel agencies) on action by line management.
* a divorce of provision from production (or delivery) in public service;
* an emphasis on cost cutting;
* a shift from policy to management with the focus primarily on efficiency 
and costs of service delivery - leading to an emphasis on quantifiable 
methods of performance and investment appraisal and efficiency criteria;
* a shift from process to outputs in controls and accountability 
mechanisms^.
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The Financial Management Initiative. Ravner and MINIS 
The immediate predecessor to Next Steps was the financial management 
initiative (FMI), launched in May 1982. But once more the FMI was an 
incremental step building on work which was already underway in individual 
departments. Next Steps would not have been a possible goal within the British 
traditions of parliamentary accountability without a certain degree of 
sophistication in information systems and performance reporting. The 
backbones of the required structures were mainly established by the series of 
reforms which spanned the 1970s and 1980s.
The Rayner scrutinies have been involved with small teams focusing on 
particular aspects of their departments’ work and reviewing whether it is being 
conducted in the most cost efficient manner. Departments also developed 
arrangements for providing ministers and top officials with better information. 
One such system was Michael Hesletine’s Management Information Systems for 
Ministers (MINIS) which was developed first in the Department of Environment 
since 1979 and was then adopted by the Ministry of Defence. The aim of MINIS 
was to inform ministers and top management of activities, costs and performance 
within individual management areas. The aim was also that departmental 
managers would derive the information necessary to do their jobs from MINIS.
The aim of the financial management initiative was to develop these individual 
department initiatives and to promote in each department an organization and a 
system in which managers at all levels would have:
1. a clear view of their objectives; and means to assess, and wherever
possible measure, outputs or performance in relation to those objectives;
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2. well-defined responsibility for making the best use of their resources, 
including a critical scrutiny of output and value for money; and
3. the information (particularly about costs), the training and the access to 
expert advice that they needed to exercise their responsibilities 
effectively.^
The Financial Management Initiative did not entirely succeed in achieving these 
aims. Indeed, departments* progress in implementing the initiative was 
examined and criticized by the Committee of Public Accounts of Session 1986- 
87. The committee concluded that a major effort was needed to speed up 
implementation and emphasized the need for clear and preferably quantified 
objectives in all areas, with yardsticks against which to measure performance; 
and that high priority should be given to examining how line managers could be 
delegated more effective responsibility for the resources they controlled, 
including more flexibility on staffing matters.^ In other words, the committee 
was stressing the need for a *Next Steps*.
The Financial Management initiative did however establish the cornerstones for 
Next Steps. It succeeded in ensuring that departments were more aware of the 
importance of cost consciousness and performance measurement. It also 
resulted in the development of a prolific number of performance measures and 
in departmental management and financial management information systems. 
This regime of cost consciousness and reporting provided the base on which the 
notion of ’management by contract* could be constructed. The idea of 
contracting agencies and, in particular, key agency staff, to achieve certain ends 
within specified resources would not have been possible without the faith of 
central departments in existing and future tools for measuring and reporting 
agency performance. Chapter 5 outlines how and why these tools have been
14
undergoing extensive review and refinement but what is important here is that it 
is the evolution of these tools which has resulted in one of the most radical 
elements of Next Steps.
The structural change
Again, one of the most distinguishing features of Next Steps, the structural 
reform of creating semi-autonomous agencies from the operational arms of 
government, is not unprecedented. The issues are also familiar. How do we 
achieve the balance of ensuring that the arm’s length agency has sufficient 
autonomy to perform its task effectively whilst ensuring that the agency remains 
accountable for their actions to central departments, to ministers and possibly 
directly to Parliament? How do we decide on the appropriate division of 
responsibilities between the agency and central departments? What is the 
appropriate role of the agency in ’policy’ issues? and how far should ministers 
and central departments become involved in the day to day operations of the 
agency? How do we draw the line between these ’policy’ and ’operational’ 
issues? In this respect Next Steps is again an incremental step developing earlier 
forms of arm’s length arrangements.
These issues have consistently arisen throughout the history of arm’s length 
government whose origins stem back to the origins of government. Arm’s length 
government covers a whole spectrum of arrangements from central legislation 
with local administration to central legislation with legislation and 
administration by a private body.
Balancing local autonomy and central control in the case of social security
Social security provides a continuing example of attempts to balance autonomy 
and control which have continued from the time of the Poor Law right through 
to the present day. The Poor Law Act of 1601 laid the foundations for a system
15
of poor law relief administered within each parish by people appointed by 
magistrates. The failure of the centre to regulate the local relief resulted in vast 
differences in the ways in which the local schemes were being administered and 
in the relief available. The Poor Law Commission, appointed in 1832 to review 
the existing system of relief, concluded that local discretion had opened the way 
to corruption, intimidation and inconsistency. The report therefore 
recommended a central board to administer to the Poor Law with powers to 
control local practices. The board was attempting to reassert uniformity to 
existing practices through tightening up the existing arrangements for arm’s 
length control - equipping local parishes with the legislation and letting them get 
on with it.
Similar difficulties of controlling local discretion whilst allowing sufficient 
autonomy to meet local and individual needs have continued to emerge within 
our modem social security system. An example is the appropriate method for 
making payments to people on benefits to meet exceptional needs which they are 
unable to meet out of their weekly benefit payments such as for cookers, baby 
items or furniture. Before 1980 the solution was to allow local office staff 
considerable discretion to make such payments within a limited set of guide­
lines. The incidence and costs of these payments rose considerably and in 1980 
attempts were made to minimize local office staff discretion. The result was a 
long set of regulations controlling the circumstances under which these 
exceptional needs payments must be awarded. The number of payments was 
reduced at first but then rose as claimants, welfare rights workers and staff learnt 
their way around these regulations. A further attempt to impose arm’s length 
control on this area came with the introduction of the Social Fund in 1988.
Under the Social Fund, local offices have annual cash limits on the amounts they 
can pay in these special needs payments and in most cases the payments are now 
loans, that is, recipients must repay any loans out of their weekly benefits.
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Evidence is emerging that again, there are considerable differences in practices 
between local offices but the Social Fund has also been criticized for being too 
inflexible to meet individual needs!
Balancing autonomy and control in the British corporations, nationalized 
industries and non departmental public bodies
Further down the spectrum of arm’s length government and possibly closer to the 
case of executive agencies fall the British corporations such as the BBC and 
Imperial Airways which were created in the 1920s. Then there are the 
nationalized industries such as the National Coal Board and the Post Office 
which were acquired mainly from the private sector to operate as trading 
corporations under the command of government. Third, there are the non- 
departmental public bodies (NDPBs). The Cabinet Office and Treasury Guide 
to Departments on NDPBs defines them as: ’a body which has a role in the 
processes of national government, but is not a government department, and 
accordingly operates to a greater or lesser extent at arms length from 
Ministers.’^
The guide then goes on to distinguish three categories of NDPB:
1. bodies with executive, administrative, regulatory or commercial 
functions;
2. advisory committees and commissions;
3. tribunals and other judicial bodies.
Whatever the type of body or the category of NDPB, once again the issues have 
that familiar ring. How do you allow the necessary freedoms and at the same 
time ensure that these bodies remain accountable both to Parliament and to the 
public? How do you ensure continued ministerial control? How do you
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separate the responsibilities for ’policy’ and ’operations’ between the body and 
its guardian department and/or minister? The Select Committee on 
Nationalized Industries reported on ministerial control in the Nationalized 
Industries in 1968 finding that,
What is worrying is the recurring revelation in the Committee evidence of 
confusion between Chairmen and Ministers about the nature and 
purposes of the government’s policies, about how policies should be 
prepared and, in particular, about the purposes and desirable methods of 
Ministerial control itself....An industry’s programme is considered, to 
some degree or another, by the Department, by the Department of 
Exchequer and Audit (now National Audit Office) and by the Treasury. 
But what their respective contributions are - or are meant to be - appears 
to be far from clear..
Similarly on the issue of departmental bodies the Pliatzky report stated,
It is clearly not always easy to get the right balance between 
disengagement from detail and reserved powers of supervision or 
intervention, while great care has to be taken if the objective in principle 
of creating an accountable unit of management is not to be frustrated by 
the difficulties in practice in making effective arrangements to secure 
accountability for p e r f o r m a n c e .^
The committee went on to conclude that there are both advantages and 
disadvantages in hiving off activities to arm’s length from government and that in 
view of this, ’we should not think in terms of a further considerable extension of 
"hiving off'...as an instrument for securing improved efficiency and economy 
across a wide range of public activities’.
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This recommendation came 12 years after the 1968 Fulton report which had 
called for an examination of the possibility of a considerable extension of 'hiving 
off especially in areas where government is in the business of providing a service 
or services to the public - to areas closer to the core of government. The Fulton 
committee had reported:
It has been put to us that accountable management is most effectively
introduced when an activity is separately established outside any
government department, and that this solution should be adopted for
many executive activities, especially the provision of services to the 
ncommunity.
So why the divergence in opinion between the Fulton and Pliatzky committees? 
And why, in view of the similarities in the findings of the Pliatzky committee and 
the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries, should Next Steps be pursuing 
the Fulton recommendation of extending the 'hiving off of government 
functions?
This is partly explained by the fact that Next Steps does differ from earlier 
attempts at arm’s length government in some important ways. Next Steps has 
learnt from these earlier experiences and has sought solutions to the dilemmas 
by, albeit unconsciously, drawing on theory. Next Steps has learnt that there 
must be clearer divisions of responsibility and accountability than have been 
evident in earlier experiences of arm's length government and has looked to 
administrative theory in its attempt to avoid the ambiguity, uncertainty and 
distortion which resulted from earlier arm’s length arrangements.
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The move to contract government
The solution which Next Steps has adopted in its attempt to resolve the age old 
problems of arms length government - of balancing autonomy and accountability 
and of clearly distinguishing between the appropriate responsibilities of the 
various actors - is to regulate relationships and responsibilities through the use of 
contracts. Next Steps is about creating a series of clearly specified 
client/contractor relationships. This step is again not entirely new. Contract 
government is now well ingrained into the culture of many areas of public sector 
service delivery including health, personal social services, education, housing and 
a number of local government services such as refuse collection.
At the most basic level agencies have framework documents which, along with 
the annual business plans and the five yearly corporate plans, establish the 
framework in which agencies must operate. For example, amongst other things, 
the framework documents aim to define the respective roles of the various 
players; ministers, the Treasury, departments and agencies. Chief executives and 
agency key designated staff are also individually contracted to meet with business 
plan specifications and have sizeable proportions of their pay contingent on their 
success. At a more detailed level, agencies contract agencies through service 
level agreements to perform certain functions. In other words, the ’contractor’ 
becomes a client which must manage its dealings with other ’contractor’ 
agencies.
Again following other areas of public policy delivery, Next Steps and its related 
Competing for Quality initiative have taken this move to management fey 
contract one step further. Increasingly the move is also to management of  
contract as more of agency responsibilities are contracted out to the private 
sector. This move to ’contract’ government as a solution to earlier difficulties
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with ambiguities in responsibilities and relationships draws directly from a 
branch of micro economics - agency theory.
Agency theory
Agency theory is basically the study of exchanges between two parties called the 
principal and the agent in situations where the pure market organisation does 
not apply^. It is based on the proposition that social and political life can be 
understood as a series of ’contracts’ in which one party, referred to as the 
principal, enters into exchanges with another party, referred to as the agent^.
Agency theory assumes that individuals are out to pursue their self interests 
possibly at the expense of the interests of others. The assumption is that the 
interests of principals and agents are likely to conflict. The important issue in 
agency theory is therefore how principals are to control agents and to ensure that 
the agents’ self interest is in meeting the principals’ objectives. Agency theory 
sees that objectives must be clarified and agreed and that both/all parties should 
be held accountable for the achievement of those objectives.
Next Steps goes down this contractual path as a means of ensuring that ’agents’ 
act in the interests of their ’principals’. These contracts, with their performance 
measures and targets, also allow the ’principals’ to monitor the activities of 
’agents’ in meeting the required ends. The operational arms of government will 
enter into a number of contractual relations in which they may be acting as both 
principals and agents. For example, an agency may be the agent of its parent 
department and also the principal in agreements with other bodies who are 
contracted to produce goods or services for the agency.
As an aside, a point that is worth mentioning here but to which we return in 
detail in Chapter 4 is the degree of ambiguity in the Next Steps arrangements
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about precisely who is the principal and who is the agent. Taking as an example 
the agency business plans, are they contracts between parent departments and 
agencies? Ministers and agencies? Treasury and agencies? The Office for the 
Public Service and Science and agencies? Are chief executives’ contracts 
between themselves and the permanent secretary? Themselves and their 
minister? No matter how tightly defined the contracts, this ambiguity will clearly 
lead to some confusion over respective responsibilities.
Asymmetric Information
The issue of a controlling b is complicated by the what agency theorists have 
termed ’asymmetric information’. This situation occurs where for one reason or 
another the principal is unable to observe the actions of the agent and the agent 
has more information on what he or she plans and is doing than he or she may 
wish to tell the principal. This difficulty was identified by Spremann who saw 
that,’ the agent could make any promise with respect to his action and depart 
from it later on just because the principal is unable to control or to monitor the 
agent’s decision m a k in g ’. ^
Heymann identifies a number of ways in which principals can try to ensure that 
agents’ interests and actions are aligned with their own interests. They can use 
various kinds of incentives and sanctions to align the agents’ interests to their 
own; they can closely monitor the behaviour of the agent; or they can enter into a 
bonding arrangement whereby the agent gives a guarantee to act in line with the 
principals’ interests or provide compensation if the contract is breached/^.
In line with this theory Next Steps encourages the development of control 
mechanisms to ensure the alignment of interests. The sanctions for agencies not 
meeting their targets or fulfilling the principals’ interests include possible 
dismissal for agency chief executives who are appointed on short term contracts
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and the withholding of group performance pay (which may be paid to all agency 
staff if the annual targets are met) and of individual performance related pay, in 
particular to senior agency staff for whom the sums in question can be up to 12 
per cent of salary.
Public choice theory
The related strand of micro economic theory on which Next Steps draws 
(although again possibly unconsciously) is public choice theory. Public choice 
theory is epitomized by the work of Niskanen (1971,1973), Downs (1957,1967) 
and Tullock (1965)/^ It is essentially an American based school of thought with 
three main strands which evolved in three different areas - Virginia, Rochester 
and Bloomington^. The development of public choice theory marked the 
beginnings of the application of the discipline of economics to aspects of 
everyday life. The application of public choice theory to bureaucracies added a 
totally new dimension to existing theories on the nature of bureaucracies.
The term 'bureaucracy* and the study of bureaucracy originated in France in the 
late eighteenth century From this time Max Weber's work described and 
~~ evaluated the structures and main features of bureaucracies. Weber’s basic 
premiss was that bureaucracy is a good thing. He saw bureaucratic organization 
as technically superior to any other form of organization. Essentially he saw that 
in every bureaucracy there are formal and informal goals, hierarchies and 
communications networks and that these all work towards the achievement of 
the organization’s formal goals.
By contrast, the application of economics to the study of bureaucracy by 
those who have come to be known as the public choice theorists, began 
with the premiss that all individuals are self interested and will pursue 
their own goals. This is summarized by Mueller who states that, 'the basic
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behavioural postulate of public choice, as for economics, is that man is an
01egoistic, rational, utility maximiser. 1
The essential theory is that the self interest of bureaucrats has resulted in a 
distortion of the ’market’ of supply and demand of public goods and services.
Figure 1.1: Supply and Demand Curve
Most of the attention of public choice writers has been on the supply curve, as 
shown in Figure 1.1. The argument is that bureaux maximize their budgets but 
because they are, to a certain extent, limited by demand in the extent to which 
they can increase supply, the result of any increase in budgets is that unit costs of 
goods or services increase. On the issue of demand public choice theorists are 
divided; most public choice theorists assume that the government is prepared to 
pay for more bureau services than the electorate would choose if they could buy 
them themselves^. By contrast, Downs argues that governments under supply 
public goods and services because they achieve more kudos from the electorate 
by pandering to the wishes of special interest groups^. For the purposes of this 
chapter what is important is that the Public Choice premiss of self interested 
bureaucrats increasing their budgets and distorting an efficient market is the 
rationale behind Next Steps.
Next Steps is being introduced by a government with the aim of reducing the role 
and size of the civil service. Next Steps develops the concept of a ’market’ for 














this market. In essence and in public choice/economists terminology, Next Steps 
is aiming to move supply back to the point of equilibrium and to ensure that the 
unit costs of supplying goods and services are not artificially inflated by 
bureaucrats’ self interest.
Next Steps is adopting a series of strategies in attempting to create this efficient 
market. The first of these is directly lifted from the public choice school which 
states that one way of controlling bureaucratic self interest is to separate 
advisory, regulatory and delivery functions which, it says, should be undertaken 
by different agencies and wherever possible, contracted out. One of the most 
distinguishing features of Next Steps is its move to separate advisory, regulatory 
and delivery functions. Executive agencies are being established to perform the 
administrative and regulatory functions of government at arm’s length from 
government.
This separation of functions has become practicable with the development of 
technology. The notion of central departments controlling agencies from arm’s 
length whilst remaining ultimately accountable for their actions requires good 
management and financial information systems.
Further strategies to ensure the re-establishment of an efficient market for 
public goods and services include the introduction of competition between the 
public and private sectors for some executive functions and the contracting out to 
the private sector of some of these functions (even where this may not be 
immediately justifiable in terms of value for money). In addition, Next Steps’ 
introduction of group pay bonuses, individual performance related pay and the 
increased freedoms for agency staff are all grounded in public choice theory 
which advocates ’buying’ self interest through the provision of such incentives^.
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Contrary to popular belief, it seems that Keynes was right about his academic 
scribblers; Next Steps is, albeit unconsciously, grounded in history and in theory. 
The ideas behind Next Steps, albeit unconsciously, clearly draw on micro 
economics’ agency and public choice theories. Next Steps is also not the first 
initiative to apply these micro economic theories to government. The reforms 
over the last 25 years are also, albeit to a lesser extent, fundamentally grounded 
in public choice and agency theory and have paved the way for Next Steps by 
developing the tools and structures required for it and by making the 
environment more amenable to change. However, the fact that earlier theories 
tell us where many of Next Steps ideas come from is interesting but probably not 
very useful. Theory is most useful when it informs us about the future and an 
increasingly popular branch of agency theory, transaction cost analysis, does 
precisely that: it inform us about the future development of Next Steps.
Transaction cost analysis
Transaction costs analysis focuses on the costs involved in principals’ contracting 
to and monitoring and controlling agents^. This body of literature reveals some 
of the costs involved in establishing executive agencies and also tells us about the 
future costs of executive agencies. In turn, Next Steps adds a new dimension to 
the existing literature on transaction costs.
Transaction cost analysis was originally developed to explain the growth of large 
firms in capitalist society^*. Oliver Williamson saw transaction costs as the costs 
of a principal controlling and monitoring an agent and ensuring that the agent 
fulfils the formal goals of the principal. Williamson’s premiss was that firms will 
aim to minimise their transaction costs and that when certain conditions prevail 
and contract costs are high, firms integrate either vertically, that is, merge with 
their supplier and/or purchaser, or horizontally, that is, merge with similar 
companies competing in the same markets.
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Next Steps establishes executive agencies which are to be controlled at arm’s 
length from government and Williamson’s analysis highlights that this structural 
change will inevitably involve additional transaction costs. There are three types 
of costs involved in establishing and running executive agencies. There are the 
initial costs of establishing the agencies, the recurring costs of revising structures 
and frameworks and the additional running costs incurred for example, in 
monitoring and controlling the agencies. The experience of Next Steps shows 
that there are three groups of transaction costs:
1. Transitional transaction costs
2. Periodic transaction costs
3. Permanent transaction costs
Transitional transaction costs are the costs of setting up the agency - for example, 
the costs of establishing the necessary financial and management information 
systems, the costs of consultants advising on issues such as personnel structures 
and arrangements, the costs of relocating functions. Periodic transaction costs 
are recurring costs such as developing and revising framework documents, 
business and corporate plans. The permanent transaction costs are the ongoing 
costs of delegating certain responsibilities to agencies and possibly forfeiting the 
benefits of economies of scale, for example, in carrying out personnel and 
finance work centrally rather than in each agency and in departmental 
headquarters. This revelation that different time periods incur different types of 
transaction costs adds a new dimension to the existing body of transaction costs 
theory.
The conditions which Williamson identified as increasing contract costs are:
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uncertainty - the inability to foresee or control environmental changes; 
Small Numbers Bargaining - when there are few players for contracts; 
Asset Specificity - when specific skills are required which may be difficult 
to replace from elsewhere;
Bounded Rationality - where individuals have limited information or 
cognitive capacity;
Opportunism - where officials have the tendency to pursue their own 
interests.
One of the key determinants of an agency’s development must be the nature of 
its business and whether or not it raises money from its services or products. 
Clearly those agencies raising revenue from receipts and competing for the 
’markets’ have more scope to develop as autonomous arms of government than 
those agencies which are entirely dependent on vote funding and provide a 
monopoly service close to the core of government. Figure 1.2 outlines a model 
for thinking about the different types of agencies and their potential for 
development.
Figure 1.2: Topology of agencies
Using this typology we can consider the extent to which the Williamson 
conditions apply to each of the agency ’types’.
Figure 13: Applying Williamson’s categories to the typology of agencies.
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Figure 1.3 shows that the conditions which Williamson identifies as increasing 
contracting costs are present primarily in those agencies most likely to develop 
furthest as autonomous business enterprises, perhaps to the extent of full 
privatization.
First, there is greater uncertainty in contracts with those agencies who are 
revenue raising non-monopolies. Examples of such agencies include the Central 
Office of Information, the Civil Service College, the Queen Elizabeth II 
Conference Centre Executive Agency and the Department of Social Security’s 
Information Technology Services Agency. These agencies operate in more 
uncertain markets than any of the other types of agencies in that they are less 
likely to know what future demand for their services will be. In addition, these 
agencies are facing increasingly uncertain future markets as they are now having 
to compete for much of their work with the private sector. As an aside, these 
agencies are themselves the amongst the most likely candidates for privatisation.
The second of Williamson’s principles is small numbers bargaining. Clearly, all 
the monopoly agencies are in the position of having fewer people to compete 
with for their services. However, the Treasury dependent monopoly agencies 
such as the Resettlement Agency and the Employment Service are mainly 
involved in areas where it would be, and is in fact proving to be, relatively easy to 
generate alternative suppliers. By contrast, the revenue raising monopoly 
agencies such as Vehicle Inspectorate, the National Weights and Measures 
Laboratory, Land Registry and the Insolvency Service are all involved in 
specialist areas where it would be difficult to generate competitive sources of 
supply. The revenue raising monopoly agencies are therefore more unequivocal 
monopolies.
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The third of Williamson’s principles is ’asset specificity’, that is where specific 
skills are required. Specialist skills are clearly more prevalent in the revenue 
raising agencies in general but it seems that they are marginally more evident in 
the monopoly revenue raising agencies which includes agencies such as the 
Hydrographic Office, the National Physical Laboratory and the Intervention 
Board.
The last two of Williamson’s principles are ’bounded rationality’, that is, where 
individuals have limited information or cognitive capacity and ’opportunism’, 
where officials have the tendency to pursue their own interests. These situations 
are equally likely to arise in all the types of agencies.
Application of Williamson’s principles to Next Steps shows that Williamson’s 
hypothesis would be that contract costs are higher for those agencies falling into 
boxes 1 and 2, that is for those agencies which are most likely to develop furthest 
as autonomous business units. These agencies are more likely to be involved in 
specialist functions with specific skills and are less likely to have equivalent 
organizations who could compete for their work. Application of the Williamson 
principles identifies these agencies as being in a strong bargaining position in 
negotiating their framework documents and business plans. Does this mean 
however that the costs of negotiations are likely to be higher or are other factors 
such as the interaction of the key personalities responsible for agreeing the 
’contracts’ more important? These are questions to which we return in Chapter 
4.
Conclusions
Despite the fact that Next Steps appears to be a pragmatic initiative rooted more 
in getting the job done than in history or theory, this chapter has shown that 
history and theory have played a large part in shaping the development of Next
Steps. In many ways then, the development of Next Steps has largely been an 
incremental process building on past tools, structures and experiences.
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Slowly, quietly, far from thepublic spotlight, new kinds of public 
institutions are emerging. They are lean, decentralized, and innovative. 
They are flexible adaptable, quick to learn new ways when conditions 
change. They use competition, customer choice, and other non 
bureaucratic mechanisms to get things done as creatively and effectively 
as possible. And they are our future/
Although on the face of it, as Chapter 1 has shown, Next Steps is but another in 
a long line of initiatives aiming to make the executive achieve more for less, 
there is something more radical about Next Steps which has yet to be explained. 
Next Steps is more than a repackaging of what has gone before. The Treasury 
and Civil Service Select Committee heralded Next Steps as, ’the most ambitious 
attempt at civil service reform in the twentieth century’. William Waldegrave, 
the minister responsible for Next Steps called it, ’the quiet revolution’. Next 
Steps is a powerful initiative that is irrevocably transforming the face of the civil 
service and its relations with Parliament. This chapter explores what is so special 
about Next Steps to make it ’revolutionary’ when, as we have seen in chapter 1, it 
is essentially a repackaging of earlier ideas and characteristics and why this 
’revolution’ should be an international phenomenon coming at this particular 
time.
What is so special about Next Steps?
Next Steps is special because it is achieving what earlier reforms have failed to 
achieve and is transforming the face of Whitehall. It is not just another initiative 
requiring civil servants to perform certain tasks or collect particular information, 
it cuts right to the roots questioning the roles of, need for and practices of civil 
servants in all areas of government - both within agencies and within central
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departments. Next Steps also has wider implications and is transforming 
Whitehall’s relations with Parliament.
Hardly surprisingly, Next Steps has stirred intense emotions within Whitehall. It 
has its champions and opponents but few who sit on the fence in apathy. Next 
Steps has raised expectations and in some cases fear - the expectations of 
operational managers for delegated powers and the fear of central mandarins for 
loss of power. Perhaps what gives Next Steps its intensity and strength is not its 
particular features which, as already noted, are familiar from earlier attempts at 
reform but rather how these are being applied and their distinctive combination 
coming together at this particular time.
Next Steps’ use of old tools
As we have seen, there is nothing unique about any of the features of Next Steps 
or the dilemmas which these raise, what is new is the particular combination of 
these features and the ways in which they are being applied to the civil service.
Separating ’steering from rowing’
There is nothing new about the either the idea or the practice of separating 
’policy’ functions from ’operational’ functions, or, ’steering from rowing’.  ^ The 
idea is a central core of public choice theory which states that one way of 
controlling bureaucratic self interest is to separate advisory, regulatory and 
delivery functions which should be carried out by different agencies. Equally, 
similar lines of argument have been developed within the management 
literature. Fifteen years ago Drucker argued for operations to be separated from 
top management in an arrangement which he termed ’federal decentralization’ 
as it ’makes for strong and effective top managements. It frees top management 
for the top management tasks’.  ^ Drucker saw ’federal decentralization’ as an
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ideal organizational form but one which is only applicable where an organisation 
can truly be divided into a number of ’genuine businesses’.
As the previous chapter has shown, Drucker’s ideas of ’federal decentralization’ 
have been applied in government. So, again, there is nothing new about the 
move to arm’s length government and, as the previous chapter has outlined, 
there is nothing new about the dilemmas it raises of where to draw the line in 
order to decide on the division of responsibilities, between ’policy’ and 
’operational’ issues and of how to balance the autonomy and accountability of 
the operational arms to central departments and to Parliament. There is 
however something new about the ways in which Next Steps is applying the ideas 
of ’federal decentralization’. The first is its avid application to activities so close 
to what could, and have, been considered as integral government functions - 
defence, employment and social security. The second is the use of ’contracts’ to 
structure the new relationships.
Removing core government functions to semi autonomous units
The earlier moves to create semi autonomous agencies in the form of the non 
departmental public bodies and public corporations involved functions which on 
the whole were not core government functions but were more freestanding 
agencies with clearly definable roles, for example, regulatory bodies and agencies 
which could function in the same way as a business with their results being 
determined through market performance.
The typology of executive agencies outlined in Chapter 1 shows that some of the 
Next Steps agencies are also reasonably freestanding agencies, either providing 
regulatory roles or raising revenues by charging for their goods or services. 
However, the typology also shows that Next Steps is being applied to parts of the 
civil service which are politically sensitive, totally dependent on Treasury funding
35
and in some cases also monopoly suppliers. Executive agencies such as the 
Social Security Benefits Agency can never be a ’business’ in the same way as an 
agency such as Central Office of Information. The Central Office of Information 
competes with private bodies for the role of providing information services to 
government departments and it charges for those services to cover its costs. The 
blueprint for what to do with those agencies which can never really act as a true 
business with the market controlling their performance is outlined by Drucker:
We have learned that a great many large companies cannot be divided 
into genuine businesses... simulated decentralization forms units which 
are not businesses but which are still set up as if they were businesses, 
with as much autonomy as possible, with their own management and with 
at least a ’simulation’ of profit and loss responsibility. They buy from and 
sell to each other using ’transfer prices’ determined internally rather than 
by an outside market.^
Interestingly, Drucker also outlines some of the shortcomings of ’simulated 
decentralization’ which are that
a tremendous amount of managerial time and energy will be spent 
working out the lines between different units that supposedly are 
autonomous; making sure that they cooperate; mediating between them. 
The smallest adjustment becomes a top-management decision, a trial of 
strength, and a matter of honour and sacred principle.^
In other words, Drucker’s prognosis is that for those agencies closest to the core 
of government for whom Next Steps is an exercise in ’simulated 
decentralization’ rather than ’federal decentralization’; it will be more
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problematic to distinguish between ’policy’ and ’operational’ issues and to allow 
the agencies sufficient autonomy.
The move to contract government
The second feature of Next Steps which is a new departure is the use of contracts 
to structure the relationships between civil servants. Although the use of 
contracts and the introduction of the client versus provider divide is now a 
familiar feature of a number of areas of public policy, the idea has not before 
been applied to Whitehall.
As Chapter 4 will explore, Next Steps is using contracts to structure the relations: 
between ministers, central departments and agencies; between agency and 
agency; and between departments or agencies and the ’outside’ supplier.
Osborne and Gaebler, the popularizers of the new public management, do not 
favour contracts within government as ’contracting is one of the most difficult 
methods a public organisation can choose, because writing and monitoring 
contracts require so much skill’.  ^ They also comment on the high transaction 
costs that can be involved in any contract arrangement: ’To do it right, cities 
often spend 20 percent of the cost of the service on contract management. When 
they keep services in-house they also have management costs’/
Next Steps is using well tried tools but with two main differences in the ways in 
which they are being applied. Drucker and Osborne and Gaebler outlined some 
potential pitfalls in the Next Steps arrangements which, as Chapters 5 and 6 will 
illustrate, have indeed raised some practical difficulties.
The potency of Next Steps’ combination of tools
In addition to the innovative ways in which old tools are being applied, a further 
factor in the Next Steps arrangements which makes the initiative so special is its
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inbuilt defences against any resistance to its changes. The first of these defences 
is the structural change of creating executive agencies within a contractual 
framework. This structural change makes the respective roles of central 
departments and agencies not only more explicit, but also more visible. This 
means that if, for example, the Treasury were not playing the Next Steps game 
and delegating agencies with additional ’freedoms’, then this failure to play by 
the Next Steps rules would be blatantly obvious through the published agency 
framework documents and business plans which outline the boundaries in which 
agencies must operate. This structural change is an important defence because 
as we have seen the Financial Management Initiative promoted similar notions 
of delegation within a framework of accountability but these notions were never 
achieved because of the reluctance of the Treasury and other central 
departments to relinquish any authority.
The second related defence against Next Steps sabotage is the appointment of 
Next Steps’ ’champions’ in the form of the then Office to the Minister of the Civil 
Service (which has subsequently been subsumed into the new Office for the 
Public Service and Science) headed by a permanent secretary and now a minister 
who have the job of ensuring that Next Steps is fully implemented. The first 
Next Steps champion, the former head of the Next Steps unit, Sir Peter Kemp, 
was an enigmatic character who was not out of the traditional mandarin mould. 
The initial success of Next Steps in actually getting off the ground and in seeing 
the establishment of so many executive agencies was frequently attributed to 
Kemp’s drive for change. Kemp has recently been replaced by a more 
traditional civil servant from the Ministiy of Defence, Sir Richard Mottram, but 
this replacement took place after Next Steps had been well started and had 
gained its own momentum.
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In summary then, Next Steps is both evolutionary and revolutionary. Its is 
evolutionary because many of its characteristics and tools are not new and are 
developments of earlier ideas but it is also revolutionary in the ways in which 
earlier tools are being combined and applied. But why has all this happened 
now? What has prompted the Next Steps ideas to come to fruition?
Whv Next Steps now?
This section considers environmental factors which prompted public service 
reforms as an international phenomenon and Next Steps in Britain. It then 
considers why a number of countries have adopted the new public management 
solutions as their reform strategies.
Political push
The simplistic answer to why Next Steps should have come when it did, with the 
aims that it did and in the form it did is because of the political push from Mrs 
(now Lady) Thatcher. The Conservative Government and in particular, the now 
former Prime Minister, Lady Thatcher, has never been a close ally of the civil 
service. Now that the Conservative Government is embarking on its fourth term 
in office (under the leadership of John Major), this antipathy is more deeply 
ingrained and widely sown than was ever previously the case. Surely this is 
enough to have prompted a major reform of the executive?
Political push is clearly a part of the explanation but does not fully suffice. Next 
Steps is not unique to Britain. Other western democracies are adopting similar 
strategies of reform. For example, there are many similarities (and some 
important differences) in the experiences of Britain, New Zealand and Canada - 
countries with similar structures. The experiences of New Zealand and Canada 
and how these compare with Britain will be explored in more detail in chapter 8. 
What is important to note here is that Britain, New Zealand and Canada (among
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other countries) have adopted reform strategies which include a new emphasis 
on delegation of responsibility and the accompanying shift of emphasis from 
detailed input controls to output measures. Equally many countries have 
experienced the new emphasis on performance agreements for unit heads to 
achieve within a specified level of resources (only in Britain and New Zealand 
has all this been accompanied by a delegation of accountability to Parliament 
responsibilities). The emphasis on contracting out and contestability in the 
provision of public services is also common to other countries. In New Zealand 
the reforms were introduced under a Labour Government which was elected 
after the collapse of the previous more right wing government because of the 
considerable fiscal deficit.
In Britain, Next Steps is also not a ’right wing’ phenomenon. There is all party 
agreement on Next Steps’ principles and indeed, the ideas which as we have seen 
were originally enshrined in the Fulton report, were endorsed and promoted in 
the early 1970s by Labour members such as John Garret MP.
So, although political push has clearly helped in initiating and driving Next Steps 
and other countries’ new public management reforms, it does not fully explain 
what actually prompted the reforms. It also does not explain why nothing 
happened 20 years ago when the ideas were being advanced by the likes of John 
Garret.
The tools needed for the New Public Management reforms 
The obvious explanation for why the reforms did not happen 20 years ago when 
the ideas were first discussed is because the necessary tools and structures were 
not in place 20 years ago to make the ideas easily workable. The evolution of 
ideas and structures as outlined in the previous chapter combined with 
technological developments have enabled the refinement of the tools such as the
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information systems to make the new public management principles more 
workable.
Development of information technology
Refined information systems are pivotal to the success of the ’new public 
management^ principle of devolution of autonomy but greater accountability for 
achieving specified ends. In order to decentralize and at the same time ensure 
greater accountability it is important to have confidence in (centrally) reported 
performance information.
Taking the example of the Department of Social Security, it certainly did not 
have the necessary information systems to allow for greater delegation within the 
existing framework of accountability. However, the comprehensive 
computerization of social security benefits under the operational strategy 
coupled with the incremental development of its management and financial 
management information systems have made the Next Steps principles more 
implementable within the Department of Social Security.
So, the political push helped the reforms on their way and the tools and 
structures were vital ingredients to make the reforms workable but this still does 
not explain what actually catalysed the changes and why there is a degree of 
international uniformity in the chosen direction of change.
Fiscal crisis
All the countries going down the ’new public management’ route are concerned 
about the balance of payments, the size of public expenditure and the cost of 
state services. A crucial factor in the decision for countries to adopt the ’new 
public management reforms’ therefore appears to be the financial crisis currently
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being experienced by most developed countries. Common to all the countries is 
also a crisis of confidence in the image of public services.
In Britain, despite periodic declarations of ’green shoots’ , in the summer of 1993 
we essentially remain in deep economic recession and have a government which 
believes that the way out of this recession is to reduce public expenditure and 
control inflation. This has inevitably focused attention on the public expenditure 
programmes, the cost of administering those programmes and on the economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness of the executive themselves. It has also provided a 
rationale for marketing public sector cuts and redundancies. We have all heard 
the rationalization, ’The recession has bitten deep in the private sector and it 
would be unrealistic for public sector workers that they could ride through 
without also being affected’. Similarly, the public sector reforms of New Zealand 
and Canada arose from concern about budget deficits and public sector 
spending. These concerns are detailed in Chapter 8. A perception of fiscal crisis 
therefore appears to be a common factor to those countries looking to new 
public management ideas to reform their public services. There are two 
explanations for the fact that a number of countries have adopted similar 
strategies for public sector reform in response to their fiscal crisis.
Improved communications
As communications have developed the world has shrunk and there is an 
extensive international exchange of ideas between ministers, senior public 
servants, academics and government advisers. Consequently, there is a greater 
awareness about what other countries are doing and a keenness to learn from 
each others’ experiences. Academics are travelling the globe talking about the 
reforms in their own and possibly also in other countries. Public sector officials 
are also travelling and teams may be sent to look at how well certain ideas are 
operating in other countries.
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Officials are also talking more to each other. An example is the regular ’Five 
Countries Meeting’ (now six countries) where each year, senior civil servants 
from five countries - Britain, New Zealand, Canada, America, Australia and now 
Ireland - meet to discuss the progress of their countries’ public service reforms, 
what is working and what is not working and any issues arising. Improved 
communications therefore, at least in part, explain why different countries are 
adopting similar strategies of public service reform.
Role of Management Consultants
A further factor explaining the degree of convergence in ideas and strategies of 
reform being adopted by various developed countries is the growth of large 
international firms of management consultants. They have clearly played an 
important role in packaging, selling and implementing the ’new public 
management’ reforms. Management consultancy has become big business. The 
large accountancy based firms have developed into multinational giants which 
have deeply vested interests in terms of future work, in selling the ideas, 
language and methods of new public management. The consultancy firms have 
highly developed international networks through which many of these profitable 
ideas have been transmitted and translated. The consultancy firms’ important 
role, coupled with the improved direct communications and exchange of ideas 
between interested parties in various countries, helps to explain not only the 
uniformity of ideas and principles but also the uniformity of language and 
practices.
Conclusions
Tracing the historical development of Next Steps’ main characteristics elucidates 
that Next Steps is both evolutionary and revolutionary. It is evolutionary 





















































































ideas. It is also revolutionary, however, because of the unique combination of 
these characteristics and that fact that they have come together at this particular 
time. Figure 2.1 explores why the ideas have come together at this particular 
time and why there is a degree of international uniformity in the reform 
strategies.
Figure 2.1: The Factors influencing the development of New Public 
Management reforms and in particular, Next Steps.
Figure 2.1 shows that the relationship between the different factors is by no 
means straight forward but that there is a pattern of relationships. The fiscal 
crisis has most likely acted as a catalyst for embracing the laissez faire approach 
and accordingly, the public choice and agency theories. In this climate 
managerialism grew (which has prompted the growth of large consulting firms 
who, in turn, have reinforced the growth in managerialism) and then resulted in 
the development of the new public management.
1. D. Osbourne and T. Gaebler (1993) Reinventing 
Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is 
Transforming the Public Sector. Reading MA, Addison- 
Wesley.
2. Ibid., p. 34.
3. Peter Drucker (1977) Management. London, Pan Books.
4. Ibid., p. 490.
5. Ibid., p. 493.
6. D. Osbourne and T. Gaebler (1993), op. cit., p. 87.
7. Ibid.
8 Such reforms have been variously labelled but are most 
commonly referred to as the New Public Management. See 
C. Hood (1991), 'Beyond the Public Bureaucracy State? 
Public Administration in the 1990s', Inaugural lecture,
London School of Economics, 16 January, for an outline of 
the main features of new public management.
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CHAPTER 3
INTRODUCING THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND ITS 
AGENCIES
In many ways the Department of Social Security is a microcosm of Whitehall as a 
whole. Examining the evolution of Next Steps within the Department of Social 
Security therefore enables this book to provide a detailed exploration of the 
development of Next Steps within a major department whilst also raising issues 
of wider relevance. As well as being a microcosm, the Department of Social 
Security presents a major test to the Next Steps principles because it has a high 
political profile, is a big spender, a large employer and services the whole 
population at some point in their lives. It is by far the most important 
Department in expenditure terms with a programme expenditure of some £75 
billion a year (about a third of all public expenditure) and running costs of nearly 
£4 billion a year^. It has a total staff of around 87,000, a sixth of the entire civil 
service. Every citizen has at least some contact with the department in their 
lifetime and the department has the highest public and parliamentary profile - 
there are more parliamentary questions on social security than on any other 
subject.
The transformation of the department as a result of Next Steps has been 
extraordinarily dramatic. Over 98 per cent of the Department of Social 
Security’s staff now work in agencies. The department has so far established five 
agencies; the Benefits Agency, the Contributions Agency, the Information 
Technology Services Agency, the Resettlement Agency and the Child Support 
Agency. In addition, the War Pensions Agency is due to be launched in April 
1994. This chapter introduces the Department of Social Security and its agencies 
and examines the depth of the initial assertion that the Department of Social 
Security is a microcosm of Whitehall.
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Developing Next Steps within the Department of Social Security
What is interesting about the Department of Social Security is that this major
administrative change is coming at a time of policy turmoil with the main
functions of the department remaining under constant review. What better place
to examine the success of the Next Steps principles of dividing responsibility for
policy and operational issues and of increasing both autonomy and
accountability?
To mention but some of the recent major changes, the department separated 
from the Department of Health in 1987. 1988 saw the introduction of the new 
social security regime following ’the most substantial review of the social security 
since Beveridge’. This review resulted in the introduction of new benefits 
including income support to replace supplementary benefit and the social fund to 
replace exceptional needs payments and changes in the eligibility criteria and 
allowances of existing benefits.
Subsequently, the disablement living allowance has replaced attendance 
allowance and invalid care allowance for those below pensionable age and there 
have been other organizational changes such as the establishment of Social 
Security Centres to take inner city office case work to centres based in areas 
where there are fewer staffing problems. The department has just handed over 
responsibility to local authorities for funding people in residential care homes 
and will also be passing over responsibility for those currently receiving payments 
from the independent living fund.
The story by no means stops here however; social security spending is currently a 
main topic for discussion with ’leading experts’ meeting for weekend retreats to 
discuss with ministers issues such as the possibilities of extending the incentives
47
to encourage more people to opt out of the state earnings related pension 
scheme to take a personal pension and the possibilities of extending employers 
responsibilities in welfare provision, for example, by making them responsible 
for the payment of invalidity benefit.
It was against this background of change that the Efficiency Unit report 
Improving Management in Government: The Next Steps was published and its 
recommendations accepted by the government. Departments were then tasked 
with identifying likely candidates for executive agency status. The first candidate 
was relatively easy. The Department of Social Security quickly announced (in 
February 1988) a small part of its business, the resettlement units, as a candidate 
for agency status. Identifying other candidates was not quite so easy.
Two internal studies were launched. A report on the Department's computer 
services was carried out by Eric Caines who was then the under secretary with 
overall responsibility for these services and on 20 July 1988 the Secretary of State 
announced an internal study (which became commonly known as the Hickey 
report - named after the report team leader) conducted with the help of 
management consultants, with the following terms of reference:
Taking account of the recommendations in the ’Business of Service’ 
report and the consideration being given to a computer services agency, to 
examine the organisation of social security operations and the 
opportunities for improving service to the public and value to the taxpayer 
by creating an executive agency or agencies within the Department of 
Social Security, along the lines recommended in the ’Next Steps’ report; 
and to make recommendations.^
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Neither of these studies were straight-forward or led to unanimously supported 
conclusions. With regard to the first of the studies, there were arguments for and 
against the computing services being established as a separate agency. The 
argument against was that computing services are an integral part of the 
Department of Social Security. This objection was however overridden by Eric 
Caines who was the main drive behind the decision for computing services to be 
established as an agency. Eric Caines argued that the computer services division 
employed different types of people from other parts of the Department of Social 
Security and consequently that existing uniform civil service pay and conditions 
were inappropriate.
As regards the second study, the Hickey report, its conclusions were also not 
uncontentious. The Hickey report concentrated on the core social security 
functions of paying benefits and collecting social security contributions. It first 
considered alternatives to agency status such as full scale contracting out or 
privatization but concluded that agency status would offer the right framework 
within which to pursue better service and improved efficiency for social security 
operations. Ministers* objections to privatization at this stage were political 
accountability and sensitivity, confidentiality of personal information, propriety 
of public adjudication and lack of suitable outside operators on the scale 
required.^
The Hickey team tried various models of cutting up social security operations 
including by client group but they could not find a clear model. The team 
therefore argued that social security is a unified business which is ’in a real sense, 
one business, not a multiplicity of businesses*  ^which cannot be viewed in 
isolation from the political dimension. Indeed, it argued that because the 
delivery of social security benefits is in itself subject to close scrutiny by the 
media and Parliament, operational managers therefore need to be sensitive to
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this political and public dimension. The main thrust of the Hickey report’s 
recommendations were to recommend a single agency with a chief executive 
responsible for the overall management of service delivery and within this to 
delegate responsibility to operating units (local offices and individual benefit 
units). It recommended that the issue of whether contributions or compliance 
work should become a discrete agency should be an issue for future 
consideration.
Despite the Hickey study’s recommendation of a single large agency the final 
decision was for the Department of Social Security to establish a separate 
Contributions and Benefits Agency. This idea of separating contributions and 
benefits was advocated by the permanent secretary, Sir Michael Partridge. A 
flavour of his strength of feeling on the issues comes through from his paper on 
the experiences of the Department of Social Security,
Having some experience of contributions policy and operations I know 
there was no target for collecting contributions and nobody was 
responsible for setting one. When and where there were staff for the 
work, they simply applied the law. The policy branch at HQ advised 
Ministers on policy and prepared legislation. Newcastle Central Office 
maintained contribution records and sent out deficiency notices to local 
offices for arrears to be collected. And local office staff did their best to 
collect what arrears they could This business was ripe for overhaul/
This has brought us to the situation where the Department of Social Security 
appeared to be diving head first into Next Steps with four executive agencies to 
be established: the Resettlement Agency, the Information Technology Services 
Agency, the Benefits Agency and the Contributions Agency, covering over 90 per 
cent of the department’s work.
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Two further candidates were to follow; the Child Support Agency stemming from 
the Child Support Act which was enacted to change the system of maintenance 
for children and the War Pensions Agency which was first announced as an 
agency candidate in the Conservative party 1992 election manifesto. Table 3.1 
outlines the main functions of the six Department of Social Security’s agencies 
which have been established or announced so far.
Table 3.1: The Department of Social Security’s agencies
The Benefits Agency
The Benefits Agency is the benefits paying arm of the Department of 
Social Security and is responsible for paying a wide range of benefits from 
income support and social fund payments through to child benefit, family 
credit, pensions, war and widows’ pensions, industrial injuries benefits and 
disability benefits. The Benefits Agency is also responsible for providing 
relevant information to other bodies to assist in determining entitlement 
to other benefits such as statutory maternity pay and statutory sick pay, 
unemployment benefit, housing benefit and legal aid.
The Contributions Agency
The Contributions Agency has two main roles; to ensure that individuals 
and employers pay the due National Insurance Contributions and to 
maintain the National Insurance Contribution records, making this 
information available to the Benefits Agency or the Employment Service 
when claims are made for contributory benefits such as retirement
gensions, unemployment benefits and invalidity benefit. The Inland Revenue collect the bulk of National Insurance Contributions on behalf of the Contributions Agency.
The Information Technology Services Agency 
The Information Technology Services Agency provides a wide range of 
information technology services to the Department of Social Security and 
to others. Its main aims are to maintain and operate existing systems, to 
develop new systems and provide consultancy services to the Department 
of Social Security and its agencies.
The Resettlement Agency
The Resettlement Agency was established to fulfil two apparently 
conflicting purposes: to manage the facilities for temporary board and 
lodging provided by the Secretary of State for people without a settled 
way of life with the aim of influencing them to lead a more settled life and 
to implement the government’s policy of closing Resettlement Units and 
handling over responsibility for providing alternative facilities to local 
authorities and voluntary organizations. In effect the agency has the role 
of running itself down - once it has succeeded in closing down all the 
resettlement units it ceases to exist.
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The Child Support Agency
The Child Support Agency is responsible for implementing the collection 
of maintenance from all liable relatives in accordance with the new 
legislation. It provides a legally based service for the assessment, 
collection and enforcement of maintenance payments in cases where the 
child’s parents are not living together as a family.
The War Pensions Agency
The War Pensions Agency will be established from the Blackpool branch 
of the Benefits Agency currently responsible for administering war 
pensions. The agency is to be established from April 1994 but has been 
running as a unit since the beginning of April 1993. Its main functions are 
to assess and pay war pensions and allowances, to provide welfare 
assistance to war pensioners, war widows and their carers and to manage 
the Ilford Park Polish Home.
Clearly the agencies have different although interrelated aims but more 
importantly they differ in other respects. It is precisely these differences which 
enable us to test the Next Steps principles in a variety of settings. The 
Department of Social Security is a useful laboratory to investigate the influence 
of various factors on the development of agencies more generally. The 
Department of Social Security’s agencies differ in their stages of development, in 
size, in amount of expenditure and administrative costs, in whether or not their 
’business’ generates revenue, in their financial regimes and in the personalities 
involved - some are headed by chief executives who have come from outside the 
civil service. Table 3.2 summarizes the main features of the Department of 
Social Security’s agencies. It outlines the main differences between the agencies 
which enable us to draw wider conclusions about the development of Next Steps 
in general. The table also includes information on the departmental 
headquarters which we will come to discuss later in the chapter.
Table 32: Features of the Department of Social Security’s Agencies
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1992/93 figures from Social Security Departmental Report : The Government's expenditure plans 1993-94 to 1995-96*
Notes 1. costs of War Pensions Unit running costs 1992-93
2. includes £521 M administered centrally by the Department and not by a particular agency
3. plans to move to net cost controls







An agency’s stage of development is an important factor in any examination of 
the progress of Next Steps. Agencies cannot be set up over-night. The first step 
is the structural change of actually creating the agency and establishing the 
management and organizational structures. The second step is the development 
and refinement of the internal supporting structures including the management 
and financial management information systems. Clearly the issues facing an 
agency in its early stages of development are different from those facing a 
mature agency. The Department of Social Security’s agencies provide a useful 
cross section of agencies in various stages of development. First, as table 3.2 
shows, the Department of Social Security’s agencies were established over a 
period of five years from May 1989 to April 1994. Second, even on becoming an 
agency they are all at very different stages of development. In this respect the 
case study of the Department of Social Security and its agencies will therefore 
not be atypical overall even if it is so at the extreme ends of its spectrum of 
agencies.
At the one end of the spectrum lies the Child Support Agency which is an 
extreme example of an agency with a lot of work to do. In effect the agency is 
starting almost from scratch and unlike most other agencies is not inheriting 
existing organizational structures, people and ways of doing things. It inherited 
an Act of Parliament. The Department of Social Security and subsequently the 
Benefits Agency did hold responsibility for collecting maintenance from the 
liable relatives of those claiming benefit but this will only be one aspect of the 
new agency’s work.
At the other extreme of the spectrum lies the Benefits Agency which, on face, 
would appear relatively advanced as it inherited existing organizational
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structures and much of the existing departmental management and financial 
management information which related particularly to areas of work which 
became the responsibility of the Benefits Agency. However, despite 
appearances, the Benefits Agency has also had considerable work in reorganizing 
itself to best suit its ’business needs’ and in establishing the necessary structures 
and information systems. For example, when the Benefits Agency was created, 
the seven remaining regional offices were abolished and the central office and 
local office structures were integrated under a unified command. As the agency 
developed, structural change continued. Only recently were there some changes 
to the structure and role of the Benefits Agency management board. The 
changes were made to create a smaller board with the aim of bridging the divide 
between the agency’s headquarters and field operations. Also, as chapter 4 will 
demonstrate, despite appearances, the Benefits Agency had considerable work to 
do in developing its management and financial management information.
In between, we have the Contributions Agency. Contributions work used to be 
dispersed throughout the country with staff based in social security local offices. 
Contributions staff used to form a part of the organizational hierarchy of the 
offices in which they were based. One of the first tasks in planning the 
Contributions Agency was therefore to establish an organizational hierarchy.
This was aided by the centralisation of those contributions staff who used to be 
based throughout the local office network. Most of the staff now work in the 
central Newcastle upon Tyne site.
The department’s computing division also used to be dispersed throughout the 
country and did not have its own organizational hierarchy. However, even prior 
to Next Steps, the Information Technology Services Directorate was formed 
which was a distinct computing unit within the department. The Information 
Technology Services Directorate was also already competing for some of its work
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with outside contractors. However, as chapter 4 will show, considerable work 
was necessary to develop appropriate information systems to meet with Next 
Steps* requirements. Indeed, the Information Technology Services Division was 
nearly not launched as an agency because of Treasury concerns about the quality 
of the available financial information and the fact that there was no means of 
measuring improvements in efficiency.
The Resettlement Agency was also a relatively developed agency in the sense 
that the agency functions were already operating as a distinct division within the 
department. However, there was considerable work to be done mainly because 
of a lack of adequate management information. As the department’s Permanent 
Secretary put it,
Defining its [the Resettlement Agency’s] objectives and writing its 
framework document of responsibilities and its first annual business plan 
proved a major task, since it brought out starkly the inconsistencies in 
policies and practices with which it had been operating for many years. If 
the main objective was to resettle its ’customers’ back into society, where 
were the targets or the information on how many had been successfully 
resettled? What counted as ’successful’ resettlement? Not returning to 
one of our resettlement centres within a specified period? For how 
long?**
Size
Figure 3.1 also shows that the Department of Social Security’s agencies vary 
considerably by size. The Benefits Agency is by far the largest of all the 
executive agencies and employs some 70,000 staff. Its annual programme 
expenditures stand at some £74 billion and it has annual operative cost of nearly 
£1.5 billion. The Contributions Agency is also a relatively large agency
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employing some 9,500 staff and having annual operative costs of £137 million. 
By contrast the Resettlement Agency employs just over 500 staff and has annual 
operative costs of less that £30 million. These contrasts in the sizes of the 
Department of Social Security’s agencies enable us to explore whether size 
makes any difference.
Financial regime and whether the ’business* generates revenue 
Figure 3.1 illustrates how the Department of Social Security’s agencies range 
across the spectrum of agencies types and again therefore as a case study, raise 
issues of wider relevance.
Figure 3.1: Topology of Department of Social Security Agencies
Box A, Treasury dependent monopoly agencies
There are two distinct categories of agencies in box A both of which are clearly 
core government functions, those that spend exchequer money and those that 
collect exchequer revenues. The Benefits Agency and the future War Pensions 
Agency fall into the first of these categories. There are limitations in the extent 
to which these agencies can become ’businesses’ as they provide fundamental 
public services and are entirely dependent on exchequer funding. The nature of 
the agencies in these categories does not however mean that they cannot adopt 















































does mean that they are limited in the extent to which they can go down the road 
of concentrating on bottom line balance sheets. For example, although the main 
business of the Benefits Agency is paying out social security benefits, the agency 
is thinking about ways it can generate revenue from other subsidiary functions. 
For example, it is thinking about how it can generate income from the medical 
examinations which it carries out for people going abroad and from selling its 
training courses for staff in local offices, such as one on how to deal with violent 
people, to local authorities. The fact that these agencies are almost entirely on 
exchequer funding is also likely to affect their degree of autonomy from Treasury 
and departmental headquarters financial and management controls as the 
Treasury will be reluctant to allow additional freedoms which may result in 
increases in public expenditure. As an important aside, these agencies are also 
those which attract a high degree of media, public and political interest which 
again is likely to restrict their ability to develop as semi-autonomous units.
Some of the same issues apply to the other agencies in box A, the revenue 
raisers. In the case of the Department of Social Security we have two agencies in 
this category, the Contributions Agency and the Child Support Agency. Again 
the revenue raisers are core government functions but there would possibly be 
less difficulty with contracting out large parts of their functions such as the 
collection of national insurance contributions from the self employed.
Box B, Vote funded non monopoly agencies
Across the board of all the Next Steps agencies there are few agencies in the box 
B category in general and returning to our case study of the Department of 
Social Security, there is only one agency in this category - the Resettlement 
Agency. The agencies in this category are non-essential (as there are others in 
their line of business) but mostly government funded activities. This 
dispensibility explains why the present drive to reduce the size of government
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falls heavily on agencies in this category. Turned around, we are saying that 
agencies in this category are unlikely to continue as arms of government. 
Accordingly, the Resettlement Agency has the aim,
to disengage the Government from the direct management of the hostels 
either by replacing them with more appropriate facilities or by making 
capital and revenue grants available to voluntary organisations and local 
authorities who may wish to purchase them and provide similar 
resettlement services/
In other words, one of the main aims of the Resettlement Agency is to close 
itself down and hand over responsibilities for its functions (and possibly its 
buildings) to local authorities or to voluntary organizations.
Box C, Revenue raising non monopoly agencies
In some ways the agencies in this category are potentially the most interesting so 
far as the development of Next Steps is concerned, particularly when it is also 
considered in the light of the current ’Competing for Markets’ initiative which 
may result in the contracting-out of large parts of existing government functions. 
These are the agencies which generate revenue from their services, possibly to 
the extent of covering all of their costs, and who have other bodies working in the 
same field who may be contracted to carry out large parts or possibly all of the 
agencies’ existing functions.
As far as our case study of the Department of Social Security is concerned, in this 
category we have the Information Technology Services Agency. The main issues 
facing the Information Technology Services Agency are that it has had to 
develop the information systems to find out the unit costs of its services so it can 
charge to cover the costs of its services. There are plans for it to move to a net
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cost accounting system which will mean that it will have more financial freedoms. 
However, more importantly, it is increasingly having to compete for much of its 
work with other contractors. Indeed, there are plans for the Information 
Technology Services Agency to reduce to about 10 per cent of its original size 
with the core being retained to advise on the policy implications of developing 
information technology within the department and to manage contracts.
Box D, Revenue raising monopolies
In general the issues facing the agencies in this category may be very similar to 
those being addressed by the agencies in category C with the exception that it 
may be difficult, at least initially, to find contractors to take on large parts of the 
work of the agencies in this category.
Personalities
A further factor which may affect the development of an agency are the 
personalities and outlooks of the people in the key posts. One indicator of this is 
the backgrounds of the chief executives and possibly of other key agency staff.
As Table 3.2 illustrates, again in this respect the case study of the Department of 
Social Security provides a cross section. The Department of Social Security’s 
agencies are headed by chief executives from a variety of backgrounds, some 
within the civil service and some from outside.
The role of headquarters
The introduction to our case study of the Department of Social Security would 
not be complete without an introduction to the department’s headquarters. One 
of the main tasks facing the Department of Social Security has been to define the 
role and structure of headquarters. Questions over the appropriate role of 
headquarters have continued both within headquarters (and within the 
department’s agencies) from the early days of development of Next Steps within
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the department. Often these questions have run deep. What holds the 
Department of Social Security together? Are its "shared values" really shared 
values or a series of statements about its business and aims?
These philosophical exercises at management board ’awaydays’ have led to some 
important questions about the role of headquarters. Should the role of 
headquarters be like a distinct agency with its own discrete functions to perform? 
Indeed, should it have its own framework document and business plan? Should 
the role be to oversee the agencies? To coordinate developments within the 
department to ensure parity and the continuance of social security as a "single 
department"? To act as arbiter in any disputes between agencies (possibly with 
the aim of protecting the interests of the smaller agencies against those of their 
larger opponents with higher grades of staff)? These roles are of course not all 
entirely conflicting. Most of these questions have not been overtly answered 
within the department, although it is apparent that senior headquarters people 
are clearly of the opinion that the department must remain as a "single 
department". These arguments are defended with assertions about agency 
interdependence and political sensitivity but are possibly also influenced by 
factors such as the fact that senior headquarters staff are largely home grown, 
having mainly developed their careers within the department.
The effect of this strong notion of a ’single department* is that the Department of 
Social Security has so far moved from the classic Weberian hierarchy (model A) 
in Figure 3.2 to model B rather than to model C, where the agencies would have 




figure 32: Possible roles for Headquarters
Headquarters has now been reorganised in recognition of the fact that it 
performs three main functions: policy work in support of ministers; corporate 
management of the department as a whole and legal services. As an aside, the 
legal section operates rather like a separate agency. The departmental 
management board has also been reorganised. The board now consists of the 
permanent secretary, his or her deputy secretaries, all the department’s agency 
chief executives and the non executive directors. The aim is that the agency chief 
executives sit on the board as managers of the department as a whole and not 
primarily in their capacity as heads of agency. They discuss ’strategic issues’ 
about the future development of the department.
Conclusions
Returning to our original assertion, do the Department of Social Security’s 
~~ agencies form a microcosm of the development of executive agencies across the 
board or is there something different about the Department of Social Security 
which may result in its experiences being atypical? Is there a Department of 
Social Security factor?
This chapter has shown that the answer to both these questions is a resounding 
’yes’. The Department of Social Security’s agencies range across the spectrum of 
agency ’types’ and therefore raise issues of wide relevance. There are many 
points raised by the case study which can be applied more generally. However, 
there is also a Department of Social Security factor. The case study also 
identifies distinctive features such as the concern with a ’single department’.
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THE MAIN ORGANIZATIONAL ACTORS IN THE NEXT STEPS POWER 
STRUGGLE
As we have seen Next Steps is about transforming the boundaries of 
responsibilities across Whitehall. The Efficiency Unit report which launched 
Next Steps set out the bare bones of the changes but provided little detail about 
who should be doing what. Such important unanswered questions effectively left 
Next Steps open to manipulation.
This chapter examines the changing roles and relationships between the various 
organizational actors shaping the development of Next Steps. It introduces the 
different players, outlines their stakes in the Next Steps arena and explores the 
influence of each of these players in shaping the development of Next Steps. It 
does this by first introducing the various players and then by examining their 
respective roles in some case studies of Next Steps* development.
Introducing the plavers in the Next Steps arena
There are two main sets of actors in the Next Steps arena - the Whitehall actors 
and the parliamentary actors. The Whitehall actors are those who are either 
responsible for implementing the initiative or whose powers, responsibilities and 
working environments are directly affected by the initiative. The parliamentary 
actors are those who use the executive to carry out their policies and those who 
are responsible for securing the executive’s accountability to Parliament. This 
section sets out who these actors are and briefly sets out their stance in the Next 
Steps arena.
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When Next Steps was adopted as government policy it was placed under the wing 
of the then Office for the Minister to the Civil Service (OMCS) which has 
subsequently been assimilated into the Office of Public Service and Science 
(OPSS). Effectively the OMCS was appointed as Next Steps* champion. Its role 
has been to chivvy departments into identifying possible candidates for agency 
status, to aid the establishment of these agencies and to ensure that agencies 
have the appropriate freedoms to allow Next Steps to develop.
The Treasury’s first priority continues to be the control of public expenditure. 
This overriding concern creates a tension between the OPSS and the Treasury. 
The OPSS are keen to launch agencies and give them freedoms whilst the 
Treasury want to be sure about agencies’ track records and reporting 
arrangements before it is willing to take a hands off approach.
Parent departments also have an interest in resisting the development of Next 
Steps on the grounds that it could erode their empires and powers. The basic 
premiss of Next Steps is to devolve power from the centre and to leave agency 
managers free to run the day to day operations of their agencies. Particularly as 
Next Steps develops to the stage where most operational functions are devolved 
to agencies this raises questions over the appropriate roles and powers of those 
remaining in headquarters.
By contrast, the expectation would be that chief executives and agency staff 
would regard Next Steps as a major coup. Next Steps is about taking power from 
the centre and devolving it to the new agencies. The term ’chief executive’ 
suggests that the new heads of the agencies are responsible for running their own 
empires relatively free from the traditional Whitehall constraints of upwards 
reporting.
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The other main Whitehall actors involved in the development of Next Steps are 
the trade unions. There has been a fundamental difference in the approaches 
taken by the three main civil service unions to Next Steps - the First Division 
Association (FDA), the Civil and Public Servants Association (CPSA) and the 
National Union of Civil and Public Servants (NUCPS). The FDA and the CPSA 
declared their neutrality on the Next Steps programme whereas NUCPS opposed 
the changes. The unions have put in a bid to influence the development of Next 
Steps but this stake has been marginalized by careful management on the part of 
other Whitehall players and the fact that the trade unions' stronghold on the civil 
service has steadily reduced over the last 10 years.
The parliamentary actors in the Next Steps arena include ministers, Members of 
Parliament, the Public Accounts Committee supported by the National Audit 
Office and the Select Committees. Ministers can play an important, if 
sometimes subtle, role in shaping the development of Next Steps as their 
personalities, interests and political stance can act to influence the initiative's 
progress in their departments. Members of Parliament can exert their power on 
the development of Next Steps either through House of Commons debates or 
through the use of oral or written parliamentary questions. The Public Accounts 
Committee and the Select Committees can exert their power through examining 
the progress of the initiative.
Shaping the development of Next Steps
The Office for the Minister to the Civil Service (OMCS) /  Office of the Public 
Service and Science (OPSS)
The OMCS was staffed by bright young civil servants on secondment from their 
departments and headed by Peter Kemp. The early role of OMCS was to 
actively encourage departments to identify possible candidates for agency status 
and to aid the establishment of these agencies. Peter Kemp had a high profile
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and was by no means a traditional Whitehall civil servant. As Colin Hughes of 
the Independent put it,
Anyone who needs a fast acting antidote to the received Yes Minister 
image of senior career civil servants need only spend an hour with Peter 
Kemp. His quickfire speech is as brisk as a racing commentator’s.
Rarely, if ever, does he duck or sidestep a question. And - perhaps the 
biggest shock of all - if he does not know the answers, he says so /
Peter Kemp became commonly regarded (at least in Whitehall circles) as a main 
reason for Next Steps effectively taking root. His job was to get Next Steps off 
the ground and to overcome any Whitehall resistance. The Next Steps team was 
actively involved in encouraging departments to identify agency candidates and 
in establishing the executive functions as agencies (after first considering prior 
options, that is, whether privatization or contractorization would be a more 
appropriate course of action). OMCS issued guidance to departments on issues 
such as identifying candidates for agency status and on thinking about what 
should be in their framework agreements.
OMCS also played a role in reviewing options to maintain the momentum of 
Next Steps. The Efficiency Unit report of 1991, commonly known as the Fraser 
report, focused on relations between departments and their agencies^. The 
report documents how OMCS’s aims were tempered by other powerful 
Whitehall interests, notably by parent departments and by the Treasury. One of 
the main recommendations of the Fraser report was,
The objective should be to move to a position where agency Framework 
Documents establish that, within the overall disciplines of the cash limits 
and targets set managers are free to make their own decisions on the
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management of staff and resources except for any specifically reserved 
areas. The exclusion of any area from the Chief Executive’s authority 
should be positively justified. In order to achieve further progress in 
delegation, a first objective should be to revise Framework Documents on 
these lines at the first three year review of each agency. This does not 
rule out an earlier review if the Chief Executive or sponsor Department 
considers it timely. The Order in Council should be amended at the 
earliest opportunity to permit such delegation/
In other words, the Fraser report aimed to provide agencies with maximum 
delegation through only specifying in their framework documents what the 
agencies cannot do rather than what they can do. The recommendation was a 
recognition of the unsatisfactory nature of the existing status quo for the future 
development of Next Steps. Agencies were not being allowed the necessary 
freedoms.
The Order in Council was not amended to allow for the development of these 
’upside down’ Framework Documents. Following the Efficiency Unit’s 
recommendation, a team from the Civil Service College was commissioned to 
investigate the feasibility of introducing upside down framework documents.
The team identified some practical difficulties with the notion of the Framework 
Documents specifying everything that an agency could not do. The team also 
found considerable resistance to the idea from parent departments and from the 
Treasury. The Efficiency Unit report was not popular amongst some 
headquarters people. One senior headquarters official informed me that the 
Efficiency Unit report was ’the worst thing ever to have come out of the 
Efficiency Unit’/ .
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By contrast, the report was generally popular amongst agency officials. Feelings 
seemed to be summed up by a senior agency official who said that the Fraser 
report was ’a missed opportunity’/
After the 1992 general election, Next Steps, along with the Citizen’s Charter, the 
Market Testing initiative and the Efficiency Unit were moved together to create 
the Office of Public Service and Science under the ministerial direction of 
William Waldegrave. The rationale was to bring together the reform initiatives 
under one roof. The new department is much bigger than the old OMCS which 
is reflected in the budget which changed from some £100m a year to some £1.2 
billion. Shortly after this reorganization, there was a shuffling of senior civil 
servants with the outcome that the Permanent Secretary, Sir Peter Kemp was 
replaced by a traditional civil servant, Richard Mottram from the Ministry of 
Defence. Two reasons have come out of Whitehall for the demise of Kemp.
The first is that there was a personality clash between the new minister, William 
Waldegrave and Kemp. The second explanation is that Kemp had the right skills 
for launching Next Steps and had achieved this goal but did not have the right 
skills for the next stage of the initiative or for running a large department.
The change of leadership could have potentially changed the balance of power 
between the Whitehall actors in shaping the development of Next Steps. Next 
Steps no longer has Kemp or an equivalent as a champion to defend it from 
’traditionalists’. Mottram is not so directly involved in Next Steps as his 
predecessor. The Next Steps team say that they had at least daily contact with 
Kemp whereas they do not normally have daily contact with Mottram. The Next 
Steps team do not however see the loss of Kemp as a particular problem because 
they see that the initiative now has its own impetus.
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The Treasuiy
OMCS made friends as well as enemies in Whitehall. At least in the early days 
of Next Steps the main source of resistance was OMCS’s neighbour, the 
Treasury. As holder of the purse strings and employer of the cream of 
Whitehall, the Treasury has always been the great power of Whitehall. The 
Treasury was initially rather reticent about Next Steps. It was concerned that 
allowing agencies autonomy and flexibility could have adverse effects on its 
financial control and ultimately its power base. It did not take too long however, 
for this reticence to change to cautious support. The change occurred when the 
Treasury began to realize that, handled correctly, Next Steps should bring about 
better value for money which is in everybody’s interests but more importantly, 
that it could also help establish better control arrangements. As one Treasury 
official pointed out, ’Ironically the process of launching something as an agency 
often results in us being more involved in the detail of that operation’.^
Role of the Treasuiy in developing monitoring arrangements
Before an executive function can be launched as an agency, the Treasury must be 
satisfied that the financial and management information systems and reporting 
arrangements are adequate. This provides them with the opportunity to review 
the adequacy of the information they require. The Treasury expects to be 
involved from the early stages of agency development: in drafting Framework 
Documents and planning and developing of performance measures and key 
targets. The Treasury’s officials suggested two possible explanations as to why 
the Treasury has become so involved in the detail of developing agency 
performance measures. The first is that departmental headquarters may have 
difficulty initially in fulfilling this role, partly because significant in-house 
expertise on performance measurement is being passed to agencies and 
consequently there may be insufficient expertise remaining within many 
departmental headquarters for monitoring performance. The second is that
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department headquarters ’may be adopting an overly hands-off approach to this 
role, at least regarding agency technical questions’/  Whatever the explanation 
for their intense involvement, it means that Treasury officials play a central role 
in shaping the development of Next Steps.
The Treasury has the role of ensuring that all the necessary structures are in 
place before an agency can be launched. This role includes advising on whether 
the accounting systems can be bought up to scratch. The Department of Social 
Security’s Information Technology Services Agency was nearly not launched as 
an agency in April 1990, as planned, because of the Treasury’s concerns about 
the department’s and its own capabilities for monitoring the success of the 
agency. The Treasury expressed two main concerns: first, there was no means of 
measuring efficiency improvements and second, existing systems were limited in 
the extent to which they could measure achievement. These concerns were 
magnified by the fact that the Information Technology Services Agency had clear 
ideas on how it saw its development and the Treasury and the Department of 
Social Security’s headquarters were concerned about having the means to 
monitor adequately the new agency’s performance. The management 
consultancy firm, Price Waterhouse, had been commissioned by the Department 
of Social Security to report on appropriate performance measures and targets for 
the Contributions Agency and the Information Technology Services Agency. 
Price Waterhouse believes that its work provided the necessary assurances to the 
Treasury to enable the development of adequate performance measures and 
monitoring arrangements and to allow the Information Technology Services Unit 
to become an agency.
Equally, once agencies are up and running, departments and agencies must agree 
with the Treasury what monitoring information on their agencies’ performance 
measures and targets will be made available to the Treasury. For all except the
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most significant agencies, the Treasury does not formally approve these 
measures and targets but informally plays an important role in influencing the 
information produced and reported.
Role of the Treasury in approving agencies’ financial and personnel flexibilities
The Treasury also has the role of adjudicating the scope and form of the 
financial and personnel flexibilities to be delegated to agencies. Normal practice 
is for agencies and departments first to agree and outline the extent of desired 
flexibilities and for the Treasury to evaluate the proposals and to make the 
ruling. Examples of the areas for which agencies have been negotiating 
additional flexibilities include the financial flexibilities to carry over money, to 
move money between budgets and to make capital purchases without prior 
consultation; to recruit up to certain grades and to establish their own pay and 
grading arrangements. Concentrating on the delegation of pay and grading 
decisions illustrates the pivotal role of the Treasury in the negotiations.
The arrangements for negotiating pay and grading flexibilities have evolved since 
1988. Originally departments and agencies had the job of formulating proposals 
and presenting these to the Treasury. The Treasuiy is now taking a more active 
role in encouraging agencies and departments to devise proposals for such 
arrangements. The Treasury deals directly with Agencies and with Agencies' 
departmental headquarters and decide, on the basis of the agency's investment 
appraisal, whether proposals for new pay and grading arrangements will bring 
about overall savings (resulting from greater efficiency). The Treasury makes 
the decisions in these negotiations and confesses to being more cautious where 
agencies are totally dependent on the Treasury funding and face few competitive 
pressures.
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These examples illustrate that Next Steps has not, as the Treasury initially 
feared, weakened central financial controls or undermined its powers. The 
Treasury has carved itself out a central role in ensuring that the planning and 
management systems are in place before agencies are granted additional 
flexibilities. The examples illustrate that the Treasury has slowly been allowing 
agencies greater flexibility as Next Steps has developed and it seems likely that 
the next stage of development will see a significant increase in agency autonomy 
and flexibility. If the Treasury does grant significant additional ,flexibilities, it 
will in part be due to pressure from OPSS but it seems likely that it will also 
reflect the Treasury’s recognition of agencies’ ability to cope with the additional 
flexibilities and confidence in the reporting arrangements.
Departmental headquarters
There has clearly been some resistance to Next Steps by departmental 
headquarters. In the case of the Department of Social Security, some of this 
resistance has been packaged up as the need for the Department of Social 
Security to remain as a single department and for departmental headquarters to 
continue to play an active interventionist role in order to protect staff mobility 
and the smaller agencies. This approach is outlined in the Department of Social 
Security’s 1993 annual report:
While seeking to take maximum advantage of the freedoms offered by 
central initiatives such as Next Steps, the Department remains a single 
organisation with interlinked businesses and a shared set of management 
purposes and aims which underpin the wider aims and objectives of the 
social security programme...
Belonging to a wide group brings advantages. The Departmental Board, 
chaired by the Permanent Secretary sets the strategic direction for the
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Department as a whole and develops common policies, e.g., on 
purchasing and market testing. It is taking a coordinated approach to the 
development of a departmental information systems strategy. The 
business units of the Department have also agreed a common approach in 
a number of personnel areas. These guiding principles provide a 
framework within which business units can develop their own personnel 
practices taking account of the wider interest of the Department and the 
career development needs of its staff.^
It is difficult to disentangle the motivations behind these arguments but loss of 
personal power by senior headquarters people is clearly shaping the arguments 
and consequently the future development of Next Steps. It is not however 
possible to talk of 'headquarters’ as a single entity. Different views and different 
approaches have emerged from the various parts of headquarters. Again 
drawing on the experience of the Department of Social Security it seems the 
finance division have been the most concerned about allowing too much 
flexibility without first ensuring that ’sufficient’ checks are in place.
The resistance to Next Steps is not however as strong amongst senior 
headquarters civil servants as could be expected. Peter Kemp provided two 
explanations for this. First, he argued that there is a new breed of people in the 
top echelons of the civil service. This new breed joined in the 1960s and grew up 
to think differently from their predecessors. They are more aware of costs and 
more open to change. He said that by contrast, those who were in senior posts at 
the time of Fulton had joined the civil service in the 1930s/40s and had 
developed their careers in the honeymoon time following the Second World war 
where economic constraints did not dominate the agenda. Second, he argued 
that the changes throughout the 1980s paved the way for Next Steps by 
developing an appropriate management culture.^ Possibly departmental
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headquarters see Next Steps as an inevitable and not unexpected development 
which is to be treated not with scorn but rather as an exercise in damage 
limitation.
The executive agencies
Certainly the Department of Social Security’s agencies have been generally very 
favourable to Next Steps and this has caused some tensions with departmental 
headquarters. Indeed, a senior department of social security official explained 
the permanent secretary’s, Sir Michael Partridge’s, fixation with the idea of a 
single department as a reaction to, ’some potentially embarrassing go-it-alone 
gung-hoery by the Benefits Agency recently’/ ^
The chief executive of the Benefits Agency, Michael Bichard, has had to sign up 
to this idea of a single department but it is clear that he sees it as a real threat, 
because it could stifle the kind of corporate identity and initiative that he regards 
himself as there to foster. Indeed, one of the other Department of Social 
Security agency chief executives asserted that the term single department is ’code 
for watching people’^ .
Perhaps not surprisingly there have been some tensions between the Department 
of Social Security’s agencies and headquarters. Some of these have been 
teething problems in establishing the new structures and defining respective 
responsibilities. An example of this relates to the review of the Contributions 
Agency’s high level targets. The Department of Social Security’s headquarters 
and the Contributions Agency were agreed that there was a need for a review 
because earlier targets had in some cases become inappropriate and because 
existing targets did not reflect some important aspects of the work of the agency. 
The Contributions Agency began the work of reviewing the targets and devising 
new ones with the intention of agreeing this with headquarter’s Corporate
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Management Division. Meanwhile, headquarter’s Corporate Management 
Division carried out a review of the targets and placed an item on the 
Contributions Agency management board agenda to agree to these targets. The 
headquarter’s intention was that the Contributions Agency would sign up to 
those targets at that meeting. The Contributions Agency was not happy with this. 
It did not agree with the targets themselves but more importantly it was 
displeased that responsibility for reviewing the targets had switched from the 
Contributions Agency to headquarters and that headquarters had put an item on 
the Agency Management Board’s agenda. The Contributions Agency actually 
won this battle on a point of procedure - the fact that headquarters should not 
have tabled the item on the Agency Management Board agenda.
There are however clear differences between the agencies in their starting points 
and expectations for development and consequently the nature of their relations 
with the Department of Social Security’s headquarters. This point is illustrated 
by a comment from the chief executive of the new Child Support Agency who 
said that in drawing up the agency framework document, ’I want to get my toe in 
the door in the area of flexibilities but I don’t want to seek too much at this stage 
as there is much else to do.’^  The chief executive pointed out why she feels 
differently from the other Department of Social Security agency chief executives 
on the issue of flexibilities:
Most agencies have inherited staff and structures and therefore seek 
flexibilities to bring about change. I have inherited an Act of Parliament 
and a small project team. The Child Support Agency still has some 
enormous constraints but it does not regard them in the same way. One 
needs to be pragmatic within the system.
7 5
In addition to the tensions between headquarters and agencies there have also 
been some tensions between agencies. Feelings have been running so high 
between the agencies that some apparently fairly trivial issues have risen to high 
levels for resolution. An good example of this is how the telephones should be 
answered at the large Newcastle Social Security site which now houses staff from 
the Benefits Agency, the Contributions Agency and the Information Technology 
Services Agency. The switchboard (which is a part of the Benefits Agency but 
which also provides the service for the other agencies on site) used to answer the 
telephone, ’Department of Social Security’. After Next Steps was launched, to 
the annoyance of the other agencies, the switchboard answered the telephone, 
’Benefits Agency’. There was much discussion between the agencies on the 
issues and eventually the issue went up to the level of Permanent Secretary for 
arbitration. Those phoning the Newcastle agencies will now be greeted with, 
’Benefits Agency, Contributions Agency and Information Technology Services 
Agency’ ! Other teething problems between agencies have related to issues of 
accommodation, car parking and also to territorial issues of responsibilities for 
functions.
There has been some movement of functions between the Department of Social 
Security’s agencies but one incident where there was disagreement between the 
agencies related to the responsibility for payment of overseas pensions. These 
were dealt with by the Contributions Agency but the Benefits Agency then made 
a pitch for the work. Again, headquarters acted as arbiter and ruled that the 
work should remain with the Contributions Agency. Many of the tensions 
between agencies and others cited here are clearly teething problems but there is 
a longer term issue about the appropriate role of the department both in its 
relations to its agencies and in its involvement in relations between agencies.
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Trade unions
In so far as Next Steps is a power struggle between the organizational actors it 
seems that the trade unions have lost. The efforts of the National Union for 
Civil and Public Servants (NUCPS), the civil service union which explicitly 
opposed Next Steps, and of the Civil and Public Servants Association (CPSA) 
had little effect in arresting or influencing its development and overall, Next 
Steps resulted in a loss of union power.
Certainly in the case of the Department of Social Security, there was little 
disruption in the way of industrial action or ’work to rules’ and the emerging 
shape of Next Steps hardly appears to reflect the trades unions interests. 
Agencies have been established, reviews are well underway to develop separate 
agency pay and grading structures, more people are being appointed from 
outside on short term appointments and the market testing programme is well 
underway with the Department of Social Security agencies due to report on the 
decisions on whether they plan to contract out their support services by the end 
of 1993. Closer to home, the amount of facility time available to trade union 
representatives has been drastically reduced. In 1990 the Department of Social 
Security had over 90 trade union representatives with 100 per cent facility time, 
that is, they worked entirely on trade union business. Now, all trade union 
representatives are required to work at least 50 per cent of their time on official 
duties and they must report how they have used their facility time.
With the exception of market testing, there has been relatively little opposition 
to these changes from the trade unions. For example, the days lost to industrial 
action in the Benefits Agency had drastically reduced from around 30,000 a year 
to 1,600 in 1992/93. The Benefits Agency personnel director explained that the 
fall,
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'can be explained at least in part by the state of the economy and the 
declining influence of unions generally. But it was also a result of the 
Benefits Agency restructuring. By removing the regional tier, 
management and unions now discuss matters at the point where people 
are empowered to make decisions. All this has been possible because, up 
until recent events, the majority of staff have not been greatly concerned 
with the changes’^
In summary then, it appears that the trade unions have so far not been a major 
player in the Next Steps power struggle mainly because staffs main concerns 
have been whether or not they will continue to have a job tomorrow rather than 
the ins and outs of the Next Steps agreements. As demonstrated recently (in July 
1993), when around 30,000 staff took industrial action, the market testing 
programme has created renewed enthusiasm amongst staff for trade unions 
because of the possibility that it could put staff jobs in jeopardy.
The parliamentary actors
The parliamentary actors in the Next Steps arena include ministers, Members of 
Parliament, the Public Accounts Committee supported by the National Audit 
Office (NAO) and the Select Committees. This section outlines the varying roles 
played by these people in shaping the development of the Next Steps initiative.
Departmental ministers clearly play an important and sometimes subtle role in 
shaping the development of Next Steps. Their personalities, interests and 
political stance can act to influence the initiative's progress in their departments. 
For example, ministers can influence which chief executives are appointed. 
Although formally ministers are not involved in the recruitment procedure they 
are notified of the short list of candidates and the favoured option. Ministers can 
influence the selection by making their preferences known. Equally, ministers
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can influence the Departmental approach in relation to its agencies. The former 
Secretary of State for Social Security, Tony Newton, said that Next Steps had not 
reduced the number of managerial issues he dealt with because of the high 
political profile of social security which pushes management issues into the 
political arena. ^  He saw that his involvement in management issues was 
unlikely to reduce as Next Steps develops because of the political nature of social 
security. The finding that the political sensitivity of an area can in effect 
undermine the Next Steps aims of devolvement is an important finding to which 
we will return in chapter 5. The current Secretary of State, Peter Lilley, is 
apparently taking a more ’hands off approach than Tony Newton. He is keen on 
the principles of Next Steps and on the new market testing initiative and has 
been involved in the setting the high level targets for the agencies and in the 
reviews of agency performance against targets. Peter Lilley, deals directly with 
the Benefits Agency and the other agencies are delegated to junior ministers.
Members may shape the development of Next Steps either through House 
debates, lobbying or by asking parliamentary questions. Chapter 6 details the 
extent of their activity and influence. For the purposes of this chapter however, 
only one point is important, that is that they have not effectively acted as a 
powerful influence in shaping the development of Next Steps.
The most active Select Committee has been the Treasury and Civil Service 
Select Committee, which has been monitoring and reporting on the development 
of Next Steps. The other departmental committees have, as yet, not specifically 
examined the development of Next Steps in their departments but have raised 
issues such as whether they should be shown draft agency framework documents. 
These committees have kept the development of Next Steps in the public eye.
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The other powerful body of parliamentary scrutiny is the Public Accounts 
Committee which is supported by some 800 National Audit Office staff. The 
NAO is not a part of the civil service but has the role of authorizing and auditing 
government expenditures. The head of the NAO is the Comptroller and Auditor 
General who is an officer of the House of Commons. He has a statutory duty to 
certify the accounts of all government departments and a wide range of other 
public sector bodies and also has statutory powers to ’carry out, and report to 
Parliament on, examination of economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the use 
of resources by those bodies he audits or to which he has rights of access’^ *
The development of Next Steps could have important implications for the role of 
the National Audit Office. At one extreme it could mean that the NAO has a 
smaller domain because agency functions are privatized or contracted out and it 
loses its access to these functions. At the other extreme it could mean that the 
NAO’s domain expands as it becomes increasingly involved in advising agencies 
on their accounting arrangements, departments and agencies on the selection 
and use of performance measures and targets. It could also expand to take on 
more of an active management consultancy type role, for example, by producing 
good practice guides. This scope for expansion has however been checked by the 
combination of its statutory powers and by its relations with the other Whitehall 
actors, notably the Treasury.
There have been some jealousies and tensions between the Treasury and the 
NAO in carving out areas of responsibility. An example of this relates to the 
advice being sought by agencies on their new accounting systems and procedures. 
The NAO regards advice on agency accounting systems as an area of expansion 
and sees that itself as the main player. An NAO director summed up why the 
agencies come to it for advice: ’they [agencies] don’t want to come to NAO for 
assistance but then they find that they need to. In effect, NAO advice on agency
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accounts is compulsory because Treasury do not want ill founded accounts that 
NAO will qualify.’^
The Treasury’s view, on the other hand, is that it is the only government body 
giving advice not only on agency accounts but also on good practice guides and 
advice to departments. The NAO became more involved in developing 
’alternative outputs’ in the form of advice to departments and other forms of 
guidance but the Treasury did not like the NAO performing this function and 
attempted to check its activities in this direction. A further area from which the 
NAO has been excluded as been the selection of agency performance measures 
and targets. The NAO do see however, that they may question the validity of a 
particular performance measure or of the quality of targets as a part of a value 
for money investigation. The NAO has not yet done this but no doubt any 
attempt to do so would bring them into further conflict with the Treasury.
In fact it seems that Next Steps has not helped to endear the NAO to any of the 
other Whitehall players. The Office for the Minister to the Civil Service 
effectively gave the NAO a verbal warning not to bridle the progress of Next 
Steps. Sir Peter Kemp gave a talk at the NAO soon after the launch of Next 
Steps in which he argued that the NAO should allow Next Steps to develop by 
not reporting on particular aspects of departments or agencies which were 
undergoing change. So, has the NAO been heeding Kemp’s advice?
The first NAO report on Next Steps certainly set out to be uncritical and to act 
as a bolster to the initiative. The NAO reported in June 1989 on the 
arrangements for implementing Next Steps in the Office of the Minister for the 
Civil Service, the Treasury and five other departments: the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food; the Department of Health; The Department of 
Trade and Industry; the Department of Transport and the Department of Social
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Security.^ The report clearly set out to be positive and consequently came to a 
positive if superficial conclusion,
’Consistent with Government’s priorities for the initiative [Next Steps], 
the first three Agencies have been given additional financial delegations 
and additional responsibilities for staffing matters, including the 
introduction and extension of staff pay linked to performance, subject to 
Treasury agreement. These additional freedoms should enhance their 
abilities to operate independently within their policy and resources 
framework documents, and to achieve the more demanding financial and 
other performance targets that have been set for them upon their agency 
status. And, in the longer term, as an agency becomes more experienced 
in the conduct of its business, the Treasuiy expect it to be given further 
delegated powers where this is expected to deliver further improvements 
in value for money from the agency. If continued, the early demonstrated 
commitment on the part of parent and central departments to the thrust 
of the initiative should augur well for the success of Next Steps’/ ^
Subsequent reports on the work of particular agencies have been rather more 
analytical, if not critical, so it seems that the watch-dog has not been entirely 
muzzled. For example, the NAO examined the progress of the Vehicle 
Inspectorate as the first executive agency and found that
The Inspectorate have found it increasingly difficult to make the savings
required to meet their targets. Although targets have been exceeded,
there is a discernible downward trend in the size of the savings. It is
questionable whether more large improvements can be made without
further development of the Vehicle Inspectorate’s agency 
20arrangements.
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A further interesting point arising from this report was the fact that the NAO, 
who must agree on the facts in its reports with the audited body before 
presenting them to Parliament, had to agree its report with two bodies, the 
Department of Transport and the Vehicle Inspectorate. Agreeing reports has 
always been a long winded task but the new dimension of having to agree the 
reports with both parent departments and with agencies will make the work of 
the NAO even more difficult as the departments and the agencies will clearly not 
always agree with each other. There is a danger that the NAO could become a 
tool in internal departmental disputes.
Conclusions
As Next Steps develops, so too does the importance of the issues about relations 
between the various organizational actors. Next Steps is now at a crucial stage in 
its development. Although, to a certain extent it has its own momentum with 
agencies and departments busy sorting out their respective responsibilities and 
developing appropriate mechanisms to support the new arrangements, this 
momentum would soon dry up if the Treasury were not to agree to the financial 
and personnel flexibilities necessary to the further development of Next Steps. 
Next Steps would then become another Financial Management initiative, 
shelved, not because of its principles but because the freedoms were not there to 
put the principles into practice as the Treasury becomes increasingly confident 
that agencies are establishing sound control and monitoring arrangements.
There are signs now however that the Treasury is being converted. It was 
initially cautious in allowing any financial or personnel flexibilities but is now 
showing signs of loosening up. This loosening up is in part a reflection of the 
pressure for change that has come from the Office for the Minister to the Civil
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Service and now from the Office for the Public Service and Science. It reflects 
the slow alignment of the Treasury to the Next Steps principles.
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CHAPTER 5
THE MOVE TO CONTRACT GOVERNMENT
Next Steps is about creating a series of client/contractor relationships to replace 
existing systems of reporting and control. The creating of a client/contractor 
divide for existing civil service functions involves defining who should be 
responsible for what and how to ensure that contractors have the freedom to get 
on with the job whilst being held accountable for achieving the desired ends 
within budget. Putting these issues another way brings us back to two of this 
book’s main themes; how do we separate ’policy’ and ’operational* issues and 
how do we balance autonomy and accountability? Public administration 
literature tells us that we cannot separate ’policy’ and ’administration’ and that 
there is a tension between autonomy and accountability.
This chapter asks whether public administration literature has been right about 
these issues or whether Next Steps has found a way round these dilemmas in its 
move to contract government. The chapter examines how Next Steps is applying 
the concept of ’contract government’ to existing civil service functions, it 
considers how the market testing initiative takes the move to ’contract 
government’ a step further, from management by contract to the idea of 
management of contracts and it considers the implications of the changes for the 
development of Next Steps and for the future of the civil service.
NEXT STEPS’ MOVE TO ’MANAGEMENT BY CONTRACT 
The notion of managing or controlling by the use of ’contracts’ is the backbone of 
Next Steps. This section considers how Next Steps is introducing ’contracts’ to 
the civil service, details what is in these ’contracts’, how they have been working 
and how they have been evolving.
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Introducing ’Contracts’
One of the basic principles of Next Steps is that executive agencies are provided 
with the freedom and the tools to get on with their 'businesses’ and that in return 
agencies must deliver certain outputs or standards of service within the available 
resources. This basic principle is enforced through a series of ’contracts' which 
essentially specify what freedoms an agency has, how much money it has and 
what ends the agency must achieve. The documents forming these overall 
agency 'contracts’ are the agency framework documents which at present must be 
reviewed around every three years, the annual business plans and the three or 
five yearly corporate plans.
At a more detailed level, agencies contract agencies through 'service level 
agreements' to perform particular functions such as computer services, providing 
contribution record data or accommodation services. In other words, the 
'contractor' becomes a 'client' organization which must manage its dealings with 
other contractor agencies. Individual staff are also contracted to achieve the 
agency aims. Agency chief executives are contracted to meet the agency targets 
and a proportion of their pay is dependent on them meeting those targets. The 
chief executives are employed on a short term basis with the renewal of their 
contract also being dependent on their performance. Some other senior agency 
staff are also employed on a short term basis and some also have their pay linked 
to the performance of the agency. At a lower level, the general staff of the 
agency are also in effect contracted to achieve the agency aims and, in 
recognition of this, may receive pay bonuses when targets are met.
DEVISING THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENTS
The framework documents, as their name suggests, define agencies' operational 
frameworks. All the new executive agencies have a framework document with
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five main ingredients: the aims and objectives of the agency; the nature of its 
relations with Parliament, ministers, the parent department (unless the agency is 
a separate department), other departments and other agencies; the agency’s 
financial responsibilities; how performance is to be measured; the agency’s 
delegated personnel responsibilities and the agency’s role and flexibilities for 
pay, training and industrial relations arrangements. These framework 
documents must be revised at least every three years.
This section considers the process of devising the framework documents and the 
extent to which this explains the differences in the final documents. It then 
evaluates how the framework documents have been working in practice, in 
particular, how effective they have been in providing agencies with autonomy 
within a framework of accountability and how effective they have been in clearly 
distinguishing between ’policy’ and ’operational’ issues.
The process of devising the original framework documents involved lengthy 
negotiations between central departments, agencies and other interested parties 
such as the trade unions. Certainly in the cases of the Department of Social 
Security’s Benefits Agency and Contributions Agency many trees were sacrificed 
in the negotiations over the framework documents wording.
The bare bones of what was to be in the framework documents was set out in 
guidance issues by the then Office for the Minister to the Civil Service. The 
early framework documents closely follow this guidance and in some instances 
use the same or similar forms of words, in particular, when tackling potentially 
difficult issues such as distinguishing between the responsibilities of ministers, 
departments and agencies. However, underneath some apparently similar 
wording is hidden some important differences in the powers of an agency. One 
example of this relates to the respective responsibilities of all those involved in
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an agency agreement - the agency itself, the department, Treasury, the Office for 
the Minister to the Civil Service and other agencies.
Accounting officer responsibilities
From looking at the framework documents it seems that the respective 
accounting officer responsibilities are a key factor in determining the theoretical 
nature of the relationship between all those involved in an agency agreement. 
Accounting officers are answerable to Parliament (and may be called to appear 
before parliamentary committees) for the efficient and effective use of resources 
within their department or agency.
The framework documents establish the accountability responsibilities of the 
agency chief executives. The agency chief executives are all appointed as 
accounting officers for their agencies. They may either be appointed by the 
Treasury as a second accounting officer with their own separate vote, that is 
where they have their own direct allocation of funding, for example, as is the 
chief executive of the employment service, or they may be appointed by their 
parent department as either an additional or second accounting officer, but not 
with their own votes. There is an important distinction between the two when it 
comes to deciding on their appropriate relationship. Both ’types’ of accounting 
officers are responsible for the propriety of spending within their agencies, but 
those agency accounting officers without their own vote are only responsible for 
the administrative costs of running their agencies whereas second accounting 
officers with their own votes also have policy responsibilities.
It appears that where an agency has its own vote it also has ’policy* 
responsibilities. Where it does not have its own vote the Next Steps theory is the 
departmental headquarters accounting officer (usually the Permanent Secretary) 
is responsible for all ’policy’ issues and the agency chief executive is responsible
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for the ’day to day operations’ of the agency. The framework documents support 
this dichotomy.
On the whole, agencies with their own votes have a restricted set of policy 
responsibilities. For example, the Social Security Benefits and Contributions 
Agencies have the role of providing information and policy (in the case of the 
Contributions Agency, directly to the Secretary of State) but there is no explicit 
proviso that they, in turn, should be consulted about policy proposals.
The Chief Executive contributes to the Department’s policy and 
evaluation activities by providing information on the operational 
implications of current and alternative programme characteristics and by 
providing, to an appropriate level of quality, such data as Ministers and 
the Permanent Secretary may require to support the monitoring, 
evaluation and development of policy and the monitoring and forecasting 
of benefit expenditure/
The Agency contributes to the Department’s policy development and 
evaluation activities by providing information on the operational 
implications of current and alternative policies and by providing 
information to support the monitoring and forecasting of NIC 
collection...The Chief Executive may make proposals to the Secretary of 
State for changes in the policies and programmes operated by the Agency 
which are designed to improve the effectiveness with which the Agency 
meets its overall objectives. In doing this, the Chief Executive consults 
the Permanent Secretary to ensure that any proposals submitted to the 
Secretary of State are consistent with the overall policy objectives of the 
Department. She advises the Secretary of State of any activity which 
significantly affects the Agency’s ability to perform effectively^.
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By contrast, many of the agency accounting officers without their own votes have 
more limited specified roles. A number of agencies such as the Department of 
Social Security’s Resettlement Agency and Information Technology Services 
Agency have no specified role in policy development^. The wording in the 
Resettlement Agency’s framework document is fairly typical;
"Department of Social Security Ministers will be responsible for 
determining the broad policy and framework within which the Agency will 
operate. However Ministers and the Department will not normally be 
involved in the day to day management of the Agency or Units"/*
The framework documents therefore contain some variations on the respective 
roles of departmental and agency accounting officers and consequently 
departments and agencies but by and large, often using the same words, outline 
that departments remain responsible for ’policy’ issues whilst agencies should be 
exclusively responsible for day to day operations.
How well the agency is established
The first Employment Service framework document, like some of the other 
framework documents, states that the chief executive can provide policy advice 
but goes much further in specifying, ’The Chief Executive is consulted before any 
policies affecting the Agency are put to the Secretary of State.’^  This one line is 
an important coup for the chief executive of the Employment Service in terms of 
autonomy to manage his ’business’. It in part reflects the fact that when Next 
Steps was announced the Employment Service was already fairly well established 
along the path of developing as an semi autonomous body. It was created in 
October 1987 from the network of unemployment offices and job centres.
Indeed, Mike Fogden, the Chief Executive of the Employment Service describes
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Next Steps as, ’an enabler which sets some parameters and provides a central 
push for the Employment Service in negotiating its flexibilities and freedoms’.^
By contrast, those agencies which were not well developed like the Child Support 
Agency had different aims in drafting their framework documents. For example, 
because the Child Support Agency is at an early stage of development its 
priorities are to build up an organizational structure rather than to develop its 
autonomy.
Respective powers in the drafting process
Returning to the Employment Service, a second reason why it was able to secure 
its interests in the initial framework document was because senior agency staff 
played a major role in drafting the framework document. In sharp contrast with 
other framework documents, the first Employment Service framework document 
was written by the department and the agency and then sent to the Office for the 
Minister to the Civil Service and the Treasury to be agreed. The more usual 
pattern was for the framework documents to be drafted by ’committee’ with the 
Central Departments of the Office to the Minister for the Civil Service and 
Treasury taking a front seat in the proceedings.
The House of Commons’ Departmental Select Committees also put in their bid 
to play a part in drafting the framework documents in their request to see and to 
comment on the draft framework documents. The main problem with such an 
arrangement would be in deciding which draft should be submitted to the 
committees. Certainly in the case of the Department of Social Security 
Whitehall was true to form in the myriad of draft framework documents 




The degree of autonomy an agency has at its launch and the role it has played in 
the drafting of its framework documents have affected the amount of autonomy 
delegated to agencies in their first framework documents. The third factor 
influencing the amount of autonomy delegated to agencies in the first framework 
documents relates to how the agency is funded. Returning to our typology in 
Chapter l t it is clear that those agencies which raise money from their goods and 
services and are therefore not entirely dependent on Treasury funding (for 
example, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office (HMSO) and the Central Office of 
Information) were initially given more freedoms than those agencies which are 
entirely dependent on Treasury money such as the Social Security Benefits 
Agency. The reason was simple; the Treasury was reluctant to agree additional 
financial or personnel ’flexibilities’ to agencies which may not be able to handle 
the new freedoms and guarantee no resulting increase in public expenditure.
In summary, drafting the initial agency framework documents has been a costly 
drawn out business with the final documents, in various mixes, reflecting a 
compromise between the interests of the Treasury, the Office for the Minister to 
the Civil Service, the department and the agency. The substance of the 
documents for example on the extent of an agency’s autonomy for financial and 
personnel issues, also reflects the stage of an agency’s development, the nature of 
its business and in particular whether or not it is entirely dependent on Treasury 
funding and most likely, its degree of political sensitivity.
WORKING WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS 
This section considers how the framework documents have been working in 
practice as ’contracts’ by which agencies can be ’managed* at arm’s length. It 
focuses on two areas covered by the agency framework documents: the division 
of responsibilities between the various parties involved in an agency agreement
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and the extent to which the personnel and financial freedoms delegated to 
agencies in the framework documents have allowed them to get on with their 
jobs in the most efficient and effective way. The section then considers how the 
framework documents are likely to develop.
The theoretical difficulties with the division of responsibilities between 
departmental headquarters and agencies have been well documented ^. The 
main difficulty is that despite their attempts at clarity, the framework documents 
fail to paint a black and white divide in respective responsibilities because of the 
lack of a clear dividing line between ’policy’ and ’day to day operational issues’. 
The scope for departmental headquarters to become involved in detailed agency 
activities by classifying them as ’policy* is highlighted by Robert Maclennan MP 
who, in debating the National Audit Act stated,
I believe that it is possible to go right through the decision making process 
in any Department, Authority of Body which could be subject to 
examination and at almost any point seek to cover the subject under 
investigation by the claim that it is an issue of policy....Policy is not 
determinable either as a matter of fact or as a matter of law. It can be 
determinable only as a matter of judgement by those called upon to 
distinguish it.^
There may be an incentive for departmental headquarters to define polity issues 
downwards into operational issues because ministers remain ultimately 
responsible for all of the activities of their departments and as such may be 
reluctant to devolve responsibility to their agencies.^
Classifying detailed agency activities as ’policy* provides departments with the 
rationale for close involvement in agency day to day affairs. This downward
93
defining of ’policy’ is more likely to happen in areas of political sensitivity such as 
social security. Clearly the day to day activities of the benefits agency are more 
likely to incite political interest than the activities of something like the 
Meteorological Office executive agency. For example, decisions about the layout 
of local social security offices are clearly operational but the questions are of 
considerable political interest. Should the wall to floor bullet proof screens be 
removed to make the offices more friendly or would this put staff at risk?
Should the offices have private areas or rooms where people can talk about then- 
financial affairs out of the earshot of their neighbours? MPs all have social 
security staff and recipients in their constituencies many of whom have strong 
feelings about such issues.
In practice it seems that these fears have been realized. Despite the Next Steps 
rhetoric, as we have seen from the previous chapter, Tony Newton, when he was 
the Social Security Secretary of State, found that the number of managerial 
issues he dealt with had not reduced and he saw that the high political profile of 
social security meant that this was unlikely to change (’depending on the future 
of social security’!).
The political nature of the Social Security Benefits Agency may also explain why 
it was the only executive agency examined by the Treasury and Civil Service 
Committee in 1991 for which a departmental spokesman (a deputy secretary) 
accompanied the agency chief executive to the committee hearing. Indeed, Mr 
Montagu, the then deputy secretary who attended the hearing, was asked by the 
committee chairman whether he was in attendance in order to ’mind the 
Agency’. Of course he replied that he was ’absolutely not’ there to ’mind the 
Agency’.
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It does seem, therefore, that the framework documents have not been entirely 
successful in ensuring that the parties to an agency agreement all play their parts 
in ensuring the success and development of the agency. Certainly initially, some 
departments have been exploiting the blurred border between policy and 
operations in order to become more involved in agency affairs. As we have 
already seen, this was also the conclusion of the Prime Minister’s Efficiency Unit 
who undertook a study in 1992, commonly known as the Fraser report, which 
examined the relationship between departmental headquarters and their 
agencies^. The main thrust of the recommendations was that departments 
should reduce their level of involvement in agency activities.
Personnel and financial freedoms
This section considers whether the freedoms granted in the initial agency 
framework documents have directly resulted in changes to existing personnel and 
financial management practices. Overall, the initial agency framework 
documents have not in general granted much in the way of personnel or financial 
freedoms. On the personnel side, agencies were initially contracted to stay 
within the overall civil service pay and grading arrangements. These 
arrangements did allow certain flexibilities for example, to recruit staff directly 
but only up to relatively low levels (in most cases to clerical officer and in only 
seven cases out of the first 34 agencies, to lower middle management levels - 
grades 6 and 7) and to pay some staff group bonuses and individual performance 
bonuses^. Equally, with regard to the new financial arrangements, the first 
agency framework documents only allowed limited freedoms: for example, in the 
amounts that they could transfer between current and capital budgets, in how 
they could use any revenue they generate or efficiency savings they make or in 
the amounts or surplus they can cany between years.
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This cautious start led to agencies experiencing some frustration and to some 
poor financial practices. For example, on the personnel side, Ros Hepplewhite, 
the chief executive of the Child Support Agency said that the personnel 
constraints meant that she was limited in her ability to match skills to jobs:’ In a 
market place there is a free flow of labour but if I advertise a grade 7 post, I can 
only have grade 7 people apply even if there are other people at more junior 
levels more suited to the particular post’. ^
Equally, within the benefits agency, the system of assessing staffs suitability for 
promotion and then sending them for interviews to promotion boards without 
full regard to the numbers of vacancies at the more senior level available, 
continued throughout the early days of the agency. Again staff were not being 
matched to jobs. It also meant that it was difficult to keep and to motivate good 
staff as all the emphasis was on promotion rather than on development within a 
job and possibly being paid higher salary for doing a job well.
On the financial side, there have been some examples of poor financial 
management resulting from the half delegation of financial freedoms. An 
example relates to the freedom for the Benefits Agency to carry over to the 
following year any underspend. At present the benefits agency can carry over 
only 0.5 per cent of its total current budget if it underspends. The incentive, 
contrary to the aims of Next Steps, is therefore to find ways of spending any 
money over and above this 0.5 per cent before the end of the financial year or it 
will be lost!
The initial personnel and financial freedoms as specified in the first framework 
documents were therefore cautious and this caution has led to some difficulties. 
As we have seen from Chapter 3, however, the agencies are now in the process of
96
negotiating with their departments and with the Treasury for additional 
personnel flexibilities and there are also calls for greater financial flexibilities.
Developing the framework documents
This section has shown that the framework documents have not been entirely 
successful in structuring the relationships between the various parties involved in 
an agency agreement or in ensuring that agencies have the autonomy to 
maximize their efficiency and effectiveness. Returning to our main theme of the 
division between ’policy' and ’operational’ issues, the failure of the Next Steps 
framework documents to clearly divide the responsibilities of ministers, 
departments and agencies and the reluctance to address this obfuscation of 
responsibilities suggests that administrative theory was right and that ’policy’ and 
’operational' issues cannot be clearly divided.
Two possible options for the future of the framework documents have been 
aired. As we have seen in Chapter 4, the Fraser report came up with the 
suggestion of ’upside down’ framework documents, i.e. where the documents 
specify everything that an agency cannot do rather than everything that an 
agency can do. The idea has not entirely been laid to rest but in addition to the 
opposition to the idea, for example, from some department of social 
headquarters people, there are clearly also practical difficulties in devising a list 
of everything that an agency cannot not do.
The second, and most probable scenario is that the blurring of responsibilities 
will not be directly addressed and framework documents will increasingly fade 
into the background as Next Steps develops with the agency business plans 
becoming more important in also setting out any changes in the environment in 
which an agency must operate. Certainly the Department of Social Security has 
decided that reviewing the framework documents every three years for the very
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large agencies is inappropriate;* The Secretary of State will look at the 
Framework Documents every three years and see if anything needs changing, but 
if not, the review period in which it must be revised will be much longer.’^ .
The following section looks at the agency business plans and considers how these 
have developed to take on this new role.
The agency business plans and corporate plans/strategic plans 
The yearly business plans set out, amongst other things, the agency’s 
performance indicators and targets for the coming year. These plans ’contract* 
agencies to achieve specified targets within the specified resources and the 
measures are mechanisms by which central departments can ensure that agencies 
remain on course to meet the required ends. The future development of 
agencies is outlined in the annual corporate plans or strategic plans which set out 
the agency’s agenda for the coming three or five years. The corporate/strategic 
plans, which are not published, are essentially the business plans combined with 
the predictions for the coming three to five years and the expenditure estimates.
The initial business plans were very much top down, written under the guidance 
of the Office to the Minister of the Civil Service by departments and senior 
agency staff with Treasury input. Like the agency framework documents, the 
business plans also go through numerous drafts which are passed back and forth 
between departments and agencies.
Within the Benefits Agency the system for devising the annual plans has been 
developing to make the plans more of a ’bottom-up’ process. The aim is to move 
to a situation where the business plans are less of a bidding document requesting 
resources and more of a planning document which shows how much each section 
within the agency has spent in the previous year and, taking into account
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workloads and expected efficiency savings, how much they are likely to spend in 
the following year. The eventual aim is then to allocate the required resources 
to each of these "sections* which will be contracted to carry out their functions 
within their budgets.
Agency performance measures and targets
One of the most important features of the business plans is that it sets out what 
the agency must achieve and the resources it will have to do this. The business 
plans set out how an agency’s performance is to be measured and the targets it 
must achieve. The experience of the Department of Social Security and its 
agencies indicates that deciding on what would be appropriate measures of 
agency performance is not a simple task. There are a number of barriers such as 
limitations in existing data and political sensitivities. There is also the issue of 
arbitration between agencies and parent departments and other central 
departments on the nature of the information that agencies should report.
In facing these questions and difficulties in preparing for the launch of the 
Information Technology Services Unit and the Contributions Unit (which was to 
become an agency in the following year) the Department of Social Security’s 
branch responsible for launching the executive agencies commissioned a firm of 
management consultants to consult with the various parties involved and, in 
effect, to arbitrate on some of the issues by drawing up a proposed framework 
for monitoring the agencies. Table 5.1 below shows the outcome from the 
negotiations of devising the initial performance indicators. It shows the 
Department of Social Security’s executive agencies first performance measures 
and how these relate to the agency objectives.
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TABLE 5.1
Limitations in existing data in part explain why there are some agency objectives 
for which there are not performance measures. Examples where there are no 
performance measures for objectives relate, first, to the provision of policy 
advice. All the Department of Social Security’s agencies have an objective 
relating to the provision of good quality policy advice. The main reason for the 
lack of performance indicators in this area is perceived difficulties of 
measurement. It would be possible only to devise qualitative measures, for 
example, by asking parent departments and/or ministers whether or not they are 
happy with the policy advice they have received. In New Zealand policy advice is 
treated as a commodity to be purchased and evaluated, just like most other 
aspects of the government ’business’. The quality of policy advice is routinely 
assessed by ministers and chief executives (heads of departments). Discussions 
are taking place in Britain as to whether similar measures would be appropriate.
A second area where limitations in existing data explain why there were 
difficulties in devising initial agency performance measures and indicators is 
highlighted by the fact that there are some ’process’ objectives and an even 
larger number of ’process’ indicators. For example, the Resettlement Agency 
has the process objective of identifying and establishing criteria and standards or 
yardsticks to measure the quality of service provided by the resettlement units. 
Equally, it has the process objective of developing a methodology for defining 
and measuring resettlement. The need for this objective has arisen because at 
the time of agency launch, there existed only a few measures of the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the resettlement units. The lack of earlier measures was
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Output: Economy Quantitative Qualitative
and efficiency
♦ Average cost per person 
per occupied bed day
* Conduct of agency business 
within financial target
Objective 2
To establish, spread and develop best practice in resettlement 
units
Process * Establish minimum sets of
standards for quality of service
* To develop a methodology for 
defining and measuring resettlement
Objective 3
To implement a programme for closing resettlement units"
Output: Quantitative Qualitative
Effectiveness
* closure of units
Objective 4
To identify and arrange staff management and staff training for 
resettlement agency staff "
Process: # Date for implementing agency's training 
strategy
Objective 5
Gain approval for RSA strategic direction for period 1992/95"




To develop an efficient customer— orientated benefit service, 
which is accessible, accurate, propt, helpful and cost effective 
and which does not discriminate on the grounds of race, sex, 
religion or disability" (FD para 2.3.1)
Output: Economy Quantitative Qualitative
and Efficiency
* Benefit clearance times
* Accuracy of assessments 
for SF, IS, INCAP, FC, WPs







to provide comprehensive information to the public on social 
security benefits in accordance with guidance from the Secretary 
of 5tate so that they are informed about their entitlements and
enabled to claim and receive benefits; provide cledar explanations 
of how decisions on claims are reached; and provide clear






" Ensure that the correct amounts of benefit are paid on time with 




% Savings from fraud 
work
* Amount of overpayment 
recoveries





to the Department's policy development 
provide information on the operational 
current and alternative programme characteristics 
an appropriate level of quality,
Permanent Secretary may require 
evaluation and development of 




and provide to 
such data as Ministers and the 
to support the monitoring, 
policy and monitoring and 
(FD 2.3.4)
"Provide related services to the public on behalf of other 
government departments and agencies in a responsive and efficient 
manner " (FD 2.3.5)
Output





"To maintain and operate existing computerised benefit and 
administrative systems and IT infrastructure, cost effectively and 
to specified standards of service" (FD 2.2)
To deliver on time, too full planned functionality and 
budget, the operational strategy” (FD 2.2.2)
within
To provide computer services - including planning, project 
development, hardwear and softwear systems and systems maintenace 





% to complete work programme 
within cash allocation
* to carry out certain services 
within vote allocations
* Reduce costs - average per work 
hour and of chargable hours for 
softwear development




% The utilisation of mainframe 
capacity
# average on line response 
time
% Average availability level
Objectives 4 and 5
"To provide advice and guidance on opportunities to exploit 
current or emerging technologies in pursuance of customers' 
business objectives " (FD 2.2.3)
" To contribute to D S S 's policy development and evaluation 
activities by pr-oviding information on the operational 




"Ensuring to the maximum extent economically feasible, compliance 
in respect of national insurance contributions levied a n  
employers, employed earners and the self employed " (FD 2.2.1)
Process: * Number of self-employed (class 2) contributors
identified








# Complete work within budget
Objective 2
" Maintaining comprehensive and accuracy of individuals' national 
insurance contributions and credits so that benefit entitlement 
and rebates/ incentives can be properly determined" (FD 2.2.2)
Output: Economy and
Efficiency Quantitative Qualitative
# number of end of year 
returns posted by 31 December
# 7. of personal pension 
applications registered 
within 28 working days
Objective 3
" Contributing to the DS5's policy development, monitoring and 
evaluation activities by, for example, providing information on 
the operational implications of current and alternative policies" 
(FD 2.2.3)
Objective 4
Providing an accurate and responsive information service to 
members of the public, employers, other Government departments and 
agencies " (FD 2.2.4)
Output: Economy and
Efficiency Quantitative Qualitative
# Clearance time for benefit 
queries handled
# Cleaance time for employer, 
contributor and personal 
pension enquiries
1 0 0
likely a reflection of the relatively low priority accorded by the Department of 
Social Security to the resettlement units.
Limitations in existing data also explain the continuing overall emphasis on 
quantitative efficiency indicators: ’this reflects a general weakness in the PI 
systems that sprang up in the wake of the FMI: the paucity of effectiveness Pis, 
particularly regarding any measures of quality and consumer satisfaction’/ ^  It 
could also reflect a change in priorities. The importance of "customer 
satisfaction" has increased over the last decade. Now, with Next Steps placing 
considerable emphasis on customer satisfaction, and with the Citizen’s Charter 
adding its force to this emphasis, it is no surprise that limitations in existing data 
on customer satisfaction became an issue for many of the Department of Social 
Security’s agencies.
The second reason why there are some agency objectives for which there are no 
measures is the political sensitivity of publicizing the current state of play. The 
Contributions Executive Agency has two primary objectives which are to collect 
national insurance contributions and to keep accurate national insurance 
contribution records. The agency’s initial performance indicators largely 
measured the success of the agency in achieving the first of its objectives but 
there were no measures of the success of the agency in keeping accurate national 
insurance contribution records. There are two likely explanations. The first is 
highlighted by the findings of the recent National Audit Office report on the 
collection of national insurance contributions that indicated that the records 
contained a large number of errors/-^ It would be politically unacceptable to 
publicize widely the high proportion of inaccuracies in national insurance 
contribution records through new performance measures and targets. The 
second explanation is again limitations in existing data - there had not previously
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been a measure of record accuracy and it would take time to devise and set up 
the necessary statistical checks in order to compile such information.
In addition to the difficulties in agencies and central departments agreeing on 
appropriate performance measures and indicators, they faced the task of 
agreeing on the required standards of performance and the performance targets 
which the agency should meet. This creates particular difficulties where new 
measures have been devised and there are few indicators of what would be an 
acceptable level of performance. The process of target setting therefore again 
involved lengthy negotiations between central departments and agencies. The 
negotiations inevitably involved balancing the Treasury’s requirement for greater 
efficiency savings with the Office for the Minister to the Civil Service’s 
requirement to make Next Steps look a success by not making targets too 
challenging.
Since the time of these initial indicators and targets, the Department of Social 
Security and its agencies have been busy developing, refining and agreeing 
agency indicators and targets. One of the main reasons for these developments 
is that agency objectives change over time, in part, to reflect policy changes but 
also because they can be refined from process to output or outcome objectives. 
The agencies most likely to experience changing environments are those that are 
increasingly having to compete for work with the private sector. For example, 
the Information Technology Services Agency initially had a centrally allocated 
budget but it is now funded by customers and is increasingly having to compete 
with private sector bodies for its work.
Equally, as is to be expected, performance indicators and targets have been 
developed to adjust to the new environment. For example, the Contributions 
Agency had the ever-tightening target of collecting arrears of ’class 2’ national
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insurance contributions (the contributions paid by the self-employed) but of 
course, the more efficient they were at achieving this target, the less the 
outstanding arrears. This made it increasingly difficult to achieve the target and 
consequently the target has been revised.
What is surprising is that some agencies have been going back to first principles 
in looking again at the ways in which they measure performance. This has been 
particularly true for the Benefits Agency which should, on face, have less ground 
work to do than other agencies. The Department of Social Security’s measures 
and indicators, going back some 20 years and mainly related to the operations 
which have now passed to the Benefits Agency. The impetus for the rethink 
comes largely from the Citizen’s Charter but it also a reflection of the 
department and the agency taking the opportunity of climate of change to iron 
out shortcomings in existing data.
The Benefits Agency has taken a fresh look at the way in which it measures, 
records and reports clearance times. In looking at the measuring of clearance 
times it was found that different offices had been using different criteria to judge 
the date on which a claim was made and steps have been taken to create some 
uniformity in the methods used even though these could, if existing levels of 
performance continued, result in an increase in recorded clearance times. The 
agency has also taken a fresh look at the ways in which it records and reports 
clearance times. It has moved from average clearance times based on a sample 
to statements that a certain percentage will be cleared in a specified number of 
days (for example, 95 per cent will be cleared in five days).
In summary then, the business plans are the crucial documents in an agency 
agreement which hold the agency to deliver certain goods or services within a 
certain budget. There were difficulties with developing the first business plans
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because of the need to develop adequate performance measures covering the 
main aspects of agencies' activities and because the information was not 
available to know what the services of each part of an agency costs. The first few 
years of Next Steps have witnessed a considerable amount of work in developing 
this information.
'Service level agreements'
A further way in which Next Steps is applying the notion of 'contract 
government' is in the agreements between agencies where one agency carries out 
a service for another. The service level agreements cut across the straight 
client/contractor divide as agencies who are 'contracted' to deliver certain 
services or goods through their framework documents and business plans 
become 'clients' in contracting others to perform certain services or functions.
The interconnecting functions of the Department of Social Security's agencies 
means that there are numerous "service level agreements" between the different 
agencies. For example, the Contributions Agency provides information to the 
Benefits Agency on the contribution records of people who put in a claim for 
~~ benefits. The Information Technology Services Agency provides computer 
services to all the arms of the department who have 'service level agreements' 
with the computing agency for each task performed. The Department of Social 
Security agencies' service level agreements are drawn up between the agencies 
but with headquarters shaping the priorities within which they are framed.
Within the Department of Social Security’s agencies, the aim is to move to a 
situation where all services are paid for by 'client' agencies. The department is 
in the process of developing a computer software programme which will 
calculate the level of charges and arrange for one account to debit another. It 
was not possible for money to be involved in all service level agreements from
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the outset because in many instances the information was not available to know 
the costs of particular services. There has therefore been a considerable amount 
of work underway in developing this information.
The Department of Social Security’s agencies’ service level agreements have, on 
the whole, been viewed in a fairly favourable light by both ’clients’ and 
’contractors’. In particular, contractor agencies have said that they like the 
agreements because, ’the agreements ensure that the "customer” agencies fulfil 
their part of the contract’ and because, ’they make customers more cost 
conscious’. ^
An example of the agreements making customers fulfil their part of the contracts 
relates to the contract which the Information Technology Services Agency had to 
develop a departmental index. There were problems with what Information 
Technology Services Agency produced because the workload was far higher than 
the customers predicted. The fact that the Information Technology Services 
Agency had this written agreement meant that they could then show it to their 
customers and show that the difficulties arose from the contract specifications 
rather than from the actual work that was done. An example of greater 
’customer’ consciousness also relates to the computing services. Client branches 
have now ceased practices such as switching on all the computers at the week­
end to finish a small piece of work.
One of the main criticisms arising about the service level agreements is that to 
date there have been no penalty clauses so that if a service is not provided within 
the specifications, the ’client’ has little in the way of recourse. The ultimate 
penalty clause is currently being developed in the shape of the Market Testing 
initiative which will take all these internal agreements one step further. The 
Market Testing initiative will mean that if a contractor fails to produce the goods
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then he is unlikely to win the contract to provide the service when it is next put to 
tender.
Individual staff Contracts’
The further way in which Next Steps is introducing contracts throughout the civil 
service is in the form of individual staff contracts linking their pay to the 
performance of the agency. As we will see in Chapter 7 more staff (notably at 
senior levels) are being recruited to agencies on short term contracts, pay is 
increasingly linked to performance with the pay of senior agency staff being 
directly linked to the achievement of agency targets as specified in the yearly 
business plans, and, more generally, other agency staff may receive a group 
bonus if the agency meets its targets.
This chapter has therefore shown that contracts are being introduced throughout 
the civil service as a part of the Next Steps programme to replace existing 
hierarchies and lines of reporting. For example, no longer do members of 
agencies have direct line reporting responsibilities to more senior members of 
their department in headquarters. Instead, central departments manage 
agencies by contracts - they contract them to achieve certain ends and grant them 
freedoms about how they go about achieving those ends. At a lower level, 
agencies manage other agencies by contracts - they contract them to provide 
them with goods and services. And finally, staff are also increasingly managed by 
contracts; for example, the future employment of some senior agency staff is 
dependent on their agency achieving its targets.
THE MOVE TO MANAGEMENT OF CONTRACT
The next stage in this development of management by contract is the move to 
management of contract. The market testing initiative is about putting work 
being done by ’contractors’ within the current regime out to open competition
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with the private sector. This move to management of contract would not have 
been possible without first establishing the necessary infrastructure - the lines of 
distinction between 'clients’ and ’contractors’, the information on the costs of 
services and the culture and skills for ’clients’ to specify their requirements. In 
this respect then, the market testing programme is a logical progression from 
Next Steps.
IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGE
Many of the implications of this introduction of the client/contractor divide are 
applicable to other areas of public service delivery which have introduced quasi 
markets - health, education, personal social services, housing and a number of 
local government services such as refuse collection. One of the most important 
features of these quasi markets is the client/contractor divide with the ’client’ 
being responsible for purchasing services and ’contractors’ being responsible for 
providing the required service - possibly competing with other providers from 
either the public or private sectors for the contract. Next Steps’ application of 
the client/contractor divide throughout the entire existing civil service and to the 
core of government is a major test of the structures and principles of quasi 
markets in public services.
The first lesson from Next Steps is that public administration theory was right 
and that it is not easy to separate ’policy’ and ’operational' issues, particularly in 
politically sensitive areas which are close to the core of government.
The second important finding from the experiences of Next Steps is that the 
creating of these new hierarchies and the structures to support the new 
arrangements does not come cheap. The transitional, periodic and permanent 
transaction costs are high. The devising of the contracts is a long and costly 
process involving large numbers of people and copious drafts. Clearly this will
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be a more cumbersome process in the early days of Next Steps but it is an 
ongoing process as ’contracts’ need to be revised and renegotiated. Information 
systems and reporting arrangements have also needed to be developed and this 
has required considerable efforts and resources, largely in the form of buying 
expertise from management consulting firms. Some of this work was already 
underway but Next Steps has its own particular needs which have required 
further developments and refinements. Again, much of the costs are up front or 
transitional but resources will continue to be required to run, maintain and 
refine the new systems. The aim is that Next Steps will result in a more efficient 
and effective civil service but any assessment of its success in achieving this aim 
should take into account the additional costs of the change.
Third, civil servants are being required to learn and to use different skills. The 
skills of drawing up contract specifications and write tenders are relatively new to 
the public sector and on the whole, civil servants have had little experience in 
requesting tenders, writing or monitoring contracts. Equally, they have had little 
experience in marketing their wares and submitting proposals competing for 
work. Civil servants are currently in the process of quickly acquiring these skills, 
with the help of management consultants. This acquisition of skills again 
inevitably involves costs in terms of the time and money devoted to devising, 
monitoring and evaluating the contracts, not least the costs of the management 
consultants engaged in advising departments and agencies on these activities.
A fourth effect of this move to contract government is the effect on 
responsiveness to environmental and policy developments. The contracts are 
changing the character of day to day relations and liaisons within the civil 
service. They require all parties to agree what is required, within what resources 
and by when and to stick with that commitment. ’Clients’ can no longer 
incrementally change their requirements to match changing assumptions or
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priorities. Contracts reduce the flexibility to adapt to the changing environment 
and policy requirements. If assumptions or priorities change ’clients’ must 
explicitly decide what to do with the original contract and possibly devise and 
agree new contracts.
Agencies’ annual business plans establish the targets which the agencies must 
achieve within the specified level of resources but they make no allowance for 
the fact that the assumptions or priorities, on which these plans are based, may 
change. One example of where this has created difficulties that are now being 
addressed concerns the estimates underpinning the business plan. Departments’ 
and agencies’ assumptions for example on level of unemployment, inflation and 
rates of growth are provided by the Treasury and usually err more on the side of 
hopefulness than accuracy. The effect of using the Treasury assumptions in 
forecasting workload and developing the agencies’ business plans has meant that 
the Benefits Agency was ’contracted’ to achieve certain targets within an 
environment where fewer people would be claiming benefits than proved to be 
the case. If assumptions proved to be wrong then the agency could put in for a 
supplementary bid from the Treasury but this money could only come at two 
points in the year and is not therefore sufficiently responsive. The Treasury and 
the Benefits Agency are therefore about to introduce a system of ’workload 
funding’ which will automatically adjust budgets (upwards or downwards) to take 
account of workloads.
Despite the efforts to overcome some of the difficulties of inflexibility, other 
obstacles are more problematic. The business plans may frustrate responsive 
policy innovations. The yearly contracts reduce the scope to introduce new 
operations within the year. This could result in operations which are less 
responsive to change. This will be particularly true where operations are 
contracted out to private bodies. These bodies will be more likely to hold
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departments (their clients) to rigid contracts. Also private bodies will most likely 
demand some longer term security of contract in order to warrant their 
development of an activity in a particular area.
This chapter has examined the Next Steps’ creation of a series of 
’client’/ ’contractor’ divides to replace the traditional civil service hierarchy with 
its vertical arrangements of reporting and control. In effect there have been two 
stages of change. The first stage has been the move to ’management by contract’ 
whereby activities are specified in a ’contract’. These ’contracts’ have taken 
three main forms: the contracts establishing the parameters in which agencies 
must operate - the agency framework documents, business plans and corporate 
plans; the ’contracts’ between departments and agencies or between agencies 
where one party provides a service to another - the ’service level agreements’ 
and the introduction of individual staff contracts such as the chief executives 
contracts. The second stage of change has been the move to ’management of 
contract’. This second stage will, particularly as the market testing initiative 
developments, increasingly involve departments and agencies contracting and 
controlling private sector firms. To date the experience of Next Steps in 
developing quasi markets has taught us two lessons. First, it has taught us that 
’policy’ and ’operational’ issues cannot be clearly divided. Second, it has taught 
us that the move from hierarchy to contract is an expensive one, which, if the 
overall aims of achieving of Next Steps are to be achieved, must continue to be 
offset by greater efficiency and service improvements. As we increasingly move 
into the next stage of reform, the stage of moving to management of contracts, 
two further lessons are becoming apparent. First, civil servants are having to 
learn new skills in developing, controlling and working to contracts. Second, the 
changes may reduce the ability of the civil service to be responsive to 
environmental and policy developments.
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CHAPTER 6
PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY
Public and parliamentary accountability are important parts of a democratic 
system as they avert public service corruption and extravagance. The traditional 
wisdom has been that parliamentary accountability is the tool by which the 
British public, in theory at least, have been able to check the actions of the 
executive. It is about Parliament, on behalf of the public, ensuring that the 
executive is doing what it is supposed to be doing and is spending money in 
accordance with Parliament’s wishes. Ministers may be asked parliamentary 
questions about the activities of their departments or they may be called upon to 
defend their departments in House debates. Ministers or senior civil servants in 
their capacity as departmental accounting officers may also be called as 
witnesses before select committees or in the case of civil servants, the Public 
Accounts Committee.
Next Steps and the related Citizen’s Charter initiative are resulting in changes to 
the ways in which public and parliamentary accountability are being discharged. 
Next Steps faces the dilemma of how to allow autonomy within the existing 
framework of parliamentary accountability. As we have seen, its solution is to 
combine autonomy and accountability by attempting to define clearly the roles of 
the various parties involved in an agency agreement in the framework documents 
and business plans. Despite the theoretical difficulties of separating ’policy’ and 
’operational* issues, Next Steps aims to overcome the potential conflict between 
autonomy and accountability through drawing a clear distinction between ’policy’ 
and ’operations’. Agencies are delegated the autonomy to carry out the 
functions they are designated and they are accountable to both central 
departments and directly to Parliament for carrying out these duties.
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This chapter examines what changes Next Steps and the related Citizen’s Charter 
initiative have introduced to the arrangements for securing parliamentary and 
public accountability and how these are working in practice.
Next Steps and parliamentary accountability
The Next Steps theory is that Next Steps will not change the fundamental 
principles of parliamentary accountability but will change the mechanics of how 
it is executed. The government’s reply to the Treasury and Civil Service Select 
Committee sets out the aims of the new arrangements,
The Government does not envisage that setting up Executive Agencies 
within Departments will result in changes to the existing constitutional 
arrangements... Establishing Executive Agencies within Departments will 
however involve some developments in the way in which external 
accountability is discharged/
In other words, the theory is that the existing constitutional framework will 
continue to apply and that ministers will remain ultimately accountable to 
Parliament for the activities of all of their departments. Next Steps has however, 
overtly introduced some changes to the mechanics of how parliamentary 
accountability is to be enforced with the aim of strengthening existing 
arrangements.
There are two main changes which Next Steps has introduced to the mechanics 
of how parliamentary accountability is executed. First, agency chief executives 
are appointed as accounting officers directly answerable to Parliament for the 
operations of their agencies. As the previous chapter has shown, the framework 
documents aim to define clearly the respective responsibilities of the new agency
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accounting officers, the departmental accounting officers and ministers. The 
Next Steps premise is essentially that ministers and departmental accounting 
officers are responsible for all ’policy’ issues and that chief executives are 
accountable for the ’operations’ of their agencies. Chief executives may be 
called as witnesses to select committee hearings and they are now responsible for 
answering any parliamentaiy questions which relate to the ’operations’ of their 
agencies. The aim of this change is to allow Members to have more detailed 
replies to their questions from the chief executive who is closer to the issues than 
a Minister who was theoretically responsible for gll the activities of a 
department. The myth of the old system was that ministers were omnicompetent 
beings who knew everything about the operations of his or her departments.
The second change to the mechanics of parliamentary accountability results from 
more detailed and robust information about agencies’ operations being widely 
available to Parliament and the public through the published agency framework 
documents, business plans and annual reports. The Citizen’s Charter has also 
pushed for better information to be more generally available.
The Citizen’s Charter and public accountability
The much publicized Citizen’s Charter essentially aims to make the executive 
more directly accountable to the consumers of public services. It aims to ensure 
that the consumers have more information about the performance of public 
services. The Prime Minister, John Major makes the bold statement that it is 
about, ’giving more power to the citizen...it is a testament of our belief in 
people’s right to be informed and choose for themselves’. Similarly bold the 
Charter itself states its aims as, ’to raise quality, increase choice, secure better 
value, and extent accountability’.^
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The theory behind the Citizen’s Charter is that providing consumers of public 
services with better information about the performance of those services will 
increase consumers’ demands for a better quality of service and thereby will 
result in service improvements. The Citizen’s Charter, which has much wider 
coverage than Next Steps in that it also includes government services and utilities 
such as British Rail, Electricity and Gas, overlaps with Next Steps in the aim of 
improving the quality of service to customers of central government goods or 
services. Indeed, the Office for the Public Service and Science regard Next Steps 
as, ’the vehicle for the delivery of the Citizen’s Charter within central 
Government via those Agencies which serve the public’.^
The theory is that the Citizen’s Charter is improving the way in which external 
accountability is executed by introducing measures to make the executive 
provide the public with more information in order to make it more directly 
accountable to the public. As we have seen in the previous chapter, this Citizen’s 
Charter’s push for a better quality of service to the customer has encouraged 
public service providers to publicize the standards of service that consumers of 
those services can and should expect and in some instances, ensures 
compensation for consumers when the published standards of service are not 
met.
Next Steps and the Citizen’s Charter are therefore resulting in more accessible 
and more usable information, particularly information about the performance of 
executive operations, being available to Parliament. For example, departmental 
select committees have more information on which to base their enquiries and 
questioning. Unlike the Public Accounts Committee, which is supported by the 
National Audit Office with its access to departmental records, the departmental 
select committees have been limited in both the extent of their resources and 
information and have largely depended on the information available in annual
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departmental reports. These departmental reports did not contain anything like 
the same amount of detail about departmental operations as the agency business 
plans and therefore the departmental select committees have less material on 
which to base their enquires.
It would seem that these two main changes to the mechanics of parliamentary 
accountability have strengthened existing arrangements. Next Steps has however 
also resulted in some modifications in Parliament’s powers to scrutinize the 
executive’s activities. Some of these changes are overt reforms which are 
resulting from the evolving status of those agencies which are developing 
’business’ type accounting systems and are having some or all of their functions 
transferred to the private sector. Other changes are less explicitly intentional but 
are a consequence of the difficulties in separating ’policy’ and ’operational’ 
issues.
Explicit changes to parliament’s powers
Despite the Next Steps rhetoric that it will not affect the fundamental principles 
of parliamentary accountability, Next Steps and the market testing initiative 
explicitly introduce two main changes to Parliament’s rights of scrutiny. Both of 
these changes are a direct consequence of agencies developing as ’business’ 
units.
The first explicit change to Parliament’s powers relates to the new agency 
accounting systems. An agency’s accounting system is important in determining 
the extent of its flexibilities and freedoms. Gross accounting is basically where 
all receipts and expenditures are presented in the accounts and net accounting is 
where receipts are netted off against expenditures and only the final figures are 
shown. Trading funds are essentially net accounting systems operating 
independently of the supply system, that is, the system by which Parliament
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provides and receives money. As agencies develop many are changing their 
accounting systems from gross accounting to either net accounting or trading 
fund status so as to allow them greater financial flexibility to serve their new 
semi-autonomous status.
This increase in agency financial flexibility means a change in Parliament’s 
methods and role in controlling agencies’ finances. If an agency moves to net 
accounting or trading fund status then Parliament has less ability to structure 
how an agency should divide and use its budget and it relinquishes the right to 
see all of that agency’s receipts. The Next Steps rhetoric is that this loss of direct 
Parliamentary control is balanced by departmental and treasury strategic controls 
on agency expenditure and ultimately by the requirement for the agency to 
balance its own books.
Contracting out and privatization of central government activities also affect 
parliamentary access and therefore have implications for existing traditions of 
parliamentary accountability. The drive for market testing is an increasingly 
important change and has major implications for the development of Next Steps. 
Market testing is not new and indeed features throughout the 1980s but the 
current rigour with which market testing is being pursued, since the 1992 
election, is new.
The Next Steps rhetoric always insisted it was not a precursor to privatization. 
Before departments establish an agency they first had to consider ’prior options’, 
that is, whether the activities should be privatized, ’contracted-out’ or not done at 
all. In practice, however, some activities were not ready to be privatised or 
’contracted-out’ but shaping them as Next Steps agencies has now made them 
ready. The main question is whether Next Steps did change direction. Was it
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originally, as it professed to be, about better management inside government qt 
was this a way of packaging Next Steps for the Opposition and trade unions?
Whatever the case, market testing and Next Steps are now closely related. They 
are both overseen by the Office for the Public Service and Science and certainly 
within the Department of Social Security, there is a direct relationship between 
market testing and Next Steps. The new Minister for Social Security, Peter 
Iilley is very keen on market testing and has set out three criteria that are to be 
used (in priority order):
1. security of supply
2. high quality
3. cost.
The order of priorities is worth noting as it could result in contracting out even if 
it could not be justified in terms of value for money. The Department of Social 
Security is currently running a huge market testing programme involving about 
10,000 staff in both agencies and headquarters.
There are different degrees of contracting out or ’privatizing’ executive activities 
as is broadly shown in table 6.1:
Table 6.1 Degrees of privatization
Type 1: Privatization of management-management privatized but 
receiving public money and run by civil servants.
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T^pe 2: Component privatization-contracting out of executive functions 
such as procurement, finance, personnel, computing services or on a 
larger scale of core activities such as the collection of national insurance 
contributions and the payment of social security benefits.
Type 3: Pure privatization-the privatization of a complete executive 
function or of an executive agency.
Type 1: Privatization of management
An example of this type of privatization is the privatisation of the management in 
the Department of Employment’s Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs). 
They receive public money, but are managed by private businesses although they 
continue to be staffed by civil servants. The effect of this arrangement on 
parliamentary accountability has been that Parliament can continue to look at 
the transfer of money going to the TECs. In other words, it can question the 
Department of Employment about the amount which it is paying the TECs, but 
beyond that, Parliament has no rights of access to question the heads of the 
TECs about their day to day activities or the propriety of their expenditure. All 
it can do is refer to the TECs internal auditor’s reports and accounts.
Type 2: Component privatization
’Type 2’ privatization is likely to expand most as a result of the recent push for 
contracting-out. The Department of Social Security’s Information Technology 
Services Agency is a good example because it competes with the private sector 
for a large proportion of its work. Some 70 per cent of the Information 
Technology Services Agency’s work is now contracted-out. Other possible future 
examples include the privatization of the Department of Social Security’s 
headquarters’ solicitors. They are actively involved in market testing and have 
service level agreements for all their dealings with the department. In addition,
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they have already subcontracted some of their work when it has been beyond 
their capacity to take on the required work at a particular time. Other 
possibilities include the collection of national insurance contributions from the 
self employed which could be carried out by a private collector; and the payment 
of certain social security benefits through private bodies such as banks and 
building societies. Moving away from social security, an obvious example of 
’type 2’ is the Vehicle Inspectorates and Driver and Vehicle Licensing Centre’s 
computer service.
The effect of component privatization on parliamentary accountability is that 
Parliament has access to the contracts which departments draw up with the 
private providers but would not be able to question the providers about these 
activities.
'type 3: Pure privatization
An interesting example of ’type 3’ privatization is the Department of Social 
Security’s Resettlement Agency. The Resettlement Agency was established with 
two apparently conflicting objectives:
to manage the facilities for temporary board and lodging provided by the 
Secretary of State for people without a settled way of life with the aim of 
influencing them to lead a more settled life;
to implement the government’s policy of closing Resettlement Units and 
handing over responsibility for providing alternative facilities to local 
authorities and voluntary organisations"/
The Resettlement Agency therefore has the role of ’privatizing’ its functions to 
local authorities and voluntary bodies. As an aside, the agency has decided to
12 0
transfer their remaining units as going concerns either to management through 
buy-outs or to local authorities or voluntary organizations, rather than closing 
them down as originally intended. The Department of Social Security will retain 
the responsibility for paying grants to those bodies which provide the 
resettlement services. Most likely, the department will also pursue some kind of 
quality control work, a regulatory function, to ensure the grants are spent 
appropriately. This function will probably fall to the Department of Social 
Security’s headquarters or to the Benefits Agency and the Resettlement Agency 
will cease to exist.
Other possible candidates for ’type 3’ privatizations include other relatively 
uncontroversial revenue raising agencies such as the Central Office of 
Information, the Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre, the Civil Service 
College, the National Engineering Laboratory and the Vehicle Inspectorate.
Both the National Engineering Laboratory and the Vehicle Inspectorate were 
earlier candidates for privatization. It is seems that they are being presented 
again, but this time under a different guise.
~ If functions are completely privatized then Parliament ceases to have any rights 
of access or scrutiny of those functions. If however, the functions continue to 
receive public money, then Parliament will have the right to look at the propriety 
of the transfer of the money but will not be able to look at how the money is 
being spent.
Privatization in whatever form, therefore, removes some of Parliament’s rights of 
access. The issue is whether this loss matters. Clearly, if it is accepted that a 
function is not a legitimate public sector function and is privatized, then this 
creates few difficulties. It is when the privatizations reach closer to the heart of 
government, for example, to some of the ’type 2’ privatizations of government
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department services under the current contracting out initiative, that the reduced 
parliamentary access to information becomes rather more contentious. For 
example, if the collection of national insurance contributions or the payment of 
social security benefits were contracted out, then Parliament may be rather more 
concerned about the resulting limits on their access.
Covert changes to Parliament's powers
The covert changes to parliamentary accountability are direct results of the two 
tensions which are both inherent in Next Steps and which have now become 
familiar dilemmas-the tension between "policy’ and ’operations’ and the tension 
between accountability and autonomy.
’Policy* and ’operations’
As we have already seen, Next Steps is founded on the assumption that ’policy’ 
and ’operational’ issues can be clearly distinguished. With regard to 
parliamentary accountability the theory is that ministers and permanent 
secretaries are accountable for all ’policy’ issues and chief executives are 
accountable for all ’operational* issues. But, as the previous chapter also asked, 
how are we to distinguish between ’policy’ and ’operational’ issues? Does ’policy* 
stop at the high level of agenda setting or are the tools with which policies are 
implemented, the policy instruments, also to be defined as ’policy’? Equally, who 
is to be held accountable for ministers acting on poor quality policy advice-the 
ministers for taking that advice or the civil servants for providing it? Despite the 
attempts at clarity, under the new arrangements it is not clear who is to be held 
accountable for what.
As we have seen, the theoretical difficulties of dividing policy and operational 
issues have been well documented and yet Next Steps is apparently founded on 
the premise that a clear distinction can be drawn between the two. The lack of a
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clear dividing line between policy and operational issues results in an obfuscation 
of responsibilities in the Next Steps arrangements between ministers and 
departmental and agency accounting officers. None of the parties know precisely 
where their responsibilities begin or end.
Again, the problem is not a new one. Under previous arrangements there was 
also some uncertainty as to the precise division of responsibilities between 
ministers and departmental accounting officers. The Next Steps arrangements 
do nothing to overcome these existing uncertainties as nowhere is there any 
attempt to distinguish clearly between the roles of ministers and departmental 
accounting officers. Indeed, the Next Steps arrangements add a further 
dimension to existing confusion by introducing chief executives, a further tier of 
players in the division of responsibilities.
In addition to the House of Commons Committees not knowing who to call to 
account under the new arrangements, the National Audit Office, which serves 
and produces value for money reports for the Public Accounts Committee, faces 
the additional difficulties. The National Audit Office must present agreed 
reports to the Public Accounts Committee, that is, the facts presented in value 
for money investigations must be agreed with departments. The establishment of 
agencies now means that the National Audit Office must agree reports both with 
departments and with the agency concerned. The process of agreeing reports 
was previously notoriously long (and costly) and the creation of executive 
agencies could make the process even longer as departments and agencies may 
not agree with each other over certain facts.
The problem of knowing who to call to account is a particular problem in areas 
of political sensitivity such as social security where operational issues are more 
likely to reach the political agenda and ministers and permanent secretaries are
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more likely to become involved in agencies' detailed operations. One example 
where ministers have become involved in what is clearly an operational issue 
relates to the layout of local social security offices. Clearly the layout of social 
security offices and whether or not there should be glass screens and the amount 
of privacy required are 'operational' issues but ministers have taken an active 
interest in these issues because of their political sensitivity.
A further example of lack of clarity about responsibilities and accountability 
relates to the action taken to remedy a problem resulting from a case ruling 
which opened the doors for backclaims to 1948. The Department of Social 
Security introduced a cut off date for backclaims with the result of creating a 
'closing down sale' with thousands of applications flooding in. Headquarter's 
'policy' answer to this problem was to bring forward the cut off date to the next 
day, which they did without consulting the Benefits Agency. Meanwhile, without 
having consulted with headquarters, the Benefits Agency had come up with an 
'operational' solution. They had struck a deal with the social services 
department concerned that all claims would be presented two days after the cut 
off date for backclaims. If Parliament had wanted to know about all this, who 
would they have asked, the chief executive, the permanent secretary or the 
minister ? In theory, it could either be the chief executive or the minister. The 
chief executive could be questioned as the issue could be defined as an 
operational problem or the minister could be questioned as he remains 
ultimately accountable.
Similar questions have been raised by the furore over the Next Steps 
arrangements for parliamentary questions. The Next Steps' arrangements for 
parliamentary questions are that ministers answer any oral or written questions 
relating to 'policy' and chief executives answer any questions relating to the 'day 
to day operations' of their agencies. Originally ministers' questions continued to
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be aired in the House and published in Hansard but the chief executive’s 
questions, answered by personal letter, were not aired in the House or published 
in Hansard. There are three issues here. First, in practice the new arrangements 
undermine the overall Next Steps premiss, set out in the government’s 
reassurance to the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee, that ministers 
would retain overall accountability: ’The further delegation of authority to 
managers inherent in the Next Steps concept concerns internal accountability 
within departments and does not conflict with the external accountability of 
Ministers to Parliament’.^
Some concern was raised notably amongst some Labour Members of Parliament 
such as Gerald Kaufman, Dave Nellist and Robin Maxwell and amongst 
academics that ministers were using the new arrangements to abdicate their 
responsibilities of parliamentary accountability. In a newspaper article Gerald 
Kaufman commented,
Bichard [Chief Executive of the Benefits Agency] keeps writing to me, 
and I want him to stop. Whenever I have a constituency case involving a 
social security problem, I write about that case to the government 
minister responsible... Members of Parliament have no power and only 
two rights. One is the right of privileged speech within Parliament. The 
other is the right of access to ministers. We exercise those rights not for 
ourselves but on behalf of our constituents. If ministers seek to eliminate 
one of those rights, as they are doing by delegating cases to agencies, units 
and officials, they are diminishing the rights of our constituents and the 
rights of Parliament. They are diminishing democracy/
This issue was taken up by the House of Commons Select Committee on 
procedure which reported,
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Mr. Nellist pointed out that if a Member’s question was referred to the 
chief executive of an agency, the resultant reply took the form of a letter 
which was not printed and therefore ’not available to those who consult 
Hansard’. Only by contacting the Public Information Office of the [House 
of Commons’] Library could a member of the public or interested 
organisation obtain a copy of the letter from the chief executive, a process 
described by Mr Nellist as ’enormously cumbersome’.
We share Mr. Nellist’s view that this is an unsatisfactory state of affairs. 
We appreciate that one of the main purposes of establishing Executive 
Agencies was to remove their day to day operation from the direct 
responsibility of Ministers. Nevertheless, the fact remains that most 
Members expect to be able to read in the Official Report the answer to a 
question on a matter such as, for example, the management of local social 
security offices, which is of importance to their own constituents just as 
much as to those of the Member who happens to have tabled a question 
on the subject. So long as questions relating to Executive Agencies 
remain in order, as we trust they will, Members should be entitled to 
receive a reply in the normal way by written answer.^
The committee went on to recommend that future replies from agency chief 
executives in response to parliamentary questions referred to them by ministers 
should appear in the official report. It suggested that ministers should introduce 
chief executives’ letters.^ It has now been agreed that questions answered 
directly by chief executives will be published weekly in an appendix to Hansard 
but despite this agreement, these appendices have yet to be produced.
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The second issue raised by the Next Steps arrangements for answering 
parliamentary questions again stems from the fact that it is not possible to 
distinguish clearly between ’policy’ and ’operational’ issues. The Next Steps 
procedures for answering parliamentary questions created the incentive for 
’policy’ to be defined downwards so as to prevent contentious issues from being 
bought to the attention of Members other than the person asking the question or 
to the attention of the general public. Despite this incentive, there is little 
evidence that many policy issues have been defined as operational issues so as to 
prevent such questions from appearing in Hansard. Paul Flynn MP collated 
chief executives’ replies and published them in a monthly bulletin Open Lines. 
Analysis of the parliamentary questions which were answered by the chief 
executive of the Benefits Agency shows that, on the whole, the questions referred 
to the chief executive quite clearly related to ’operational’ issues.
However, the third issue raised by the new arrangements for parliamentary 
questions is that the level of questions aired in the House and currently 
published in Hansard is being raised from the particular (Members asking 
parliamentary questions about the experiences of individual constituents about 
certain offices) to the more strategic. Table 6.2 shows the breakdown of 
parliamentary questions relating to the Department of Social Security in the 
Parliamentary session 1991-92. Overall the table shows that the majority of 
questions were answered by the minister.
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Table 62: Breakdown of who answered parliamentary questions relating to 
social security issues between 15 April 1991 and 16 March 1992
Questions answered in full by Ministers 2,118
Questions answered by Benefits Agency
Chief Executive 189
Questions answered by other Chief Executives 32
TOTAL 2,339
Next Steps is resulting, therefore, in some changes to the tools for ensuring 
parliamentary accountability. Despite government reassurances to the contrary, 
it seems that it is also to have some effect on the fundamental principles of 
parliamentary accountability. Some of these effects are probably temporary and 
are a reflection of the time of change but more importantly, others could have 
longer term implications. The furore over the Next Steps’ arrangements for 
dealing with parliamentary questions and some of the early mix ups over the 
respective responsibilities of departments and agencies are probably teething 
problems to be resolved. The restriction in Parliament’s access, for example, to 
contracted out or privatized functions and the muzzling of the watch-dogs are 
however much more worrying.
Accountability and autonomy
The effect of the tension between accountability and autonomy on existing 
principles of parliamentary accountability have been evident in two areas both 
relating to the work of the House of Commons’ committees. The select 
committees, the Public Accounts Committee and the National Audit Office have
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expanded empires and have more work than ever. In addition to their traditional 
tasks of securing the accountability of government departments they now have 
the task of securing the accountability of agencies. The National Audit Office 
has undertaken considerable work in advising agencies on their new accounting 
systems and the form of their accounts. The Treasury and Civil Service Select 
Committee have been particularly active in pursuing the progress and the issues 
raised by the Next Steps initiative. The Public Accounts Committee has also 
examined the progress of a number of agencies. Some of the select committees 
have held enquiries which have focused on the work of the new agencies. There 
is also more ready information to aid the committees and the National Audit 
Office in their work. Agencies have brought a considerable amount of literature 
into the public domain, there are the agency framework documents, the business 
plans and the annual reports.
However, Next Steps is a time of fundamental change in pursuit of the initiative's 
desired agency autonomy, flexibility and freedom to manage. The traditional 
roles of the select committees and the Public Accounts Committee, which is 
served by the National Audit Office, are to examine the propriety of 
departments' expenditures in particular areas. Particularly at the early stages of 
agency development, when departments and agencies are still in the stages of 
establishing new structures and agency corporate identities, committee reports 
may undermine the efforts of departments and agencies in pursuing Next Steps' 
goals. An example is the National Audit Office report on the collection of 
national insurance contributions. Most of the fieldwork was completed before 
the Contributions Agency was established but the chief executive and the agency 
directors were still concerned that the report would be 'a kick in the teeth' for 
staff and would undermine some of the Contributions Agency's Next Steps 
achievements. The result is likely to be pressure particularly on the National 
Audit Office but also on the Public Accounts Committee and the select
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committees to be less critical of agencies, particularly at their early stages of 
development.
It is probably no coincidence that in 1991/92 the National Audit Office was 
subject to an external Price Waterhouse review of its approach and relations with 
departments. The main thrust of the report was that the National Audit Office 
should take a more positive and helpful approach, with departments advising on 
appropriate areas for investigation and the National Audit Office reporting on 
where departments have done something well in addition to reporting 
difficulties. The review also recommended that not all of the National Audit 
Office’s value for money investigations should result in a report to the Public 
Accounts Committee and a Public Accounts Committee hearing. The National 
Audit Office is adopting most of the review’s recommendations. There is a 
danger that the watch-dogs may lose some of their teeth.
This fear is supported by the tone of the Citizen’s Charter white paper which is 
an intriguing document both for what it does say but also for what it doesn’t say. 
The Charter doesn’t really mention parliamentary accountability or the 
traditional role of Members of Parliament to call public servants to account on 
behalf of their constituents although it does mention the National Audit Office- 
once, alongside the Audit Commission. The tone suggests that the primary 
function of the National Audit Office should be to inform the public, not 
parliament.
The National Audit Office audits central government and a number of 
organisations which receive government funding. The Audit Commission 
is the principal auditor for local government and, with the National Audit 
Office, the NHS.
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Both these organisations provide a financial audit. But they also do 
important work in improving value for money. The National Audit 
Office, in its value for money studies, tends to examine aspects of 
individual departments in depth. The Audit Commission has specialised 
in comparative studies which examine value for money in the services 
provided by a large number of local authorities.
We want to see informed, hard hitting and imaginative audit applied as 
widely and openly as possible. This would help the public to understand 
better how good and how efficient local services are. Much of the 
comparative information produced by the Audit Commission has helped 
to do this. It has given a powerful incentive to many authorities to 
improve performance. 10
Equally the introduction to the Citizen’s Charter talks about external 
accountability totally in terms of direct accountability to the consumer rather 
than through parliamentary representation.
In a free market, competing firms must strive to satisfy their customers, or 
they will not prosper. Where choice and competition are limited, 
consumers cannot as easily or effectively make their views count. In many 
public services, therefore, we need to increase both choice and 
competition where we can; but we also need to develop other ways of 
ensuring good standards of service"/^
The combination of the changes to Parliament’s powers resulting from the Next 
Steps initiative and the Citizen’s Charter’s efforts to increase consumer power is 
pushing the balance of external accountability from parliamentary to direct 
public accountability.
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Members* interest in changes
One key factor in ensuring that parliamentary accountability is upheld 
particularly in a climate of change is the extent of parliamentary interest in the 
changes. One indicator of this is the numbers of MPs asking parliamentary 
questions about the changes. Table 6.3 outlines percentages of Members asking 
parliamentary questions, between 1988 (when Next Steps was launched) and 23 
May 1991, relating to the development of Next Steps. (It excludes questions 
about detailed agency operations which were answered by chief executive 
personal letter). Table 6.3 shows that interest was fairly high with one in 10 
Members asking something about Next Steps. This interest will at least have 
acted to keep Next Steps on the political agenda and to keep its development in 
check.
Table 63: Percentage of Members of Parliament asking parliamentary
questions on Next Steps between 1988 and 23 May 1991
%
Any question 11
On civil service terms 4
Process of establishing agencies 4
Effect on parliamentary accountability 2
Privatization 1
The picture becomes even more interesting when we consider which Members of 
Parliament have been most involved in asking questions about the development 
of Next Steps (Table 6.4).
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Table 6.4: Numbers of parliamentary questions aksed by Members of 









Many of these Members also have other hats. Who is John McAllion? He is 
Labour Member for Dundee East but more importantly he is the National Union 
of Civil and Public Servants’ (NUCPS) Parliamentary Consultant. Tim Smith is 
Parliamentary Consultant for Price Waterhouse; John Garrett, Graham Allen 
and Dale Cambell Savours are or were members of the Public Accounts 
Committee or of the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee and John 
Marek was the opposition spokesman on Treasury matters.
Conclusions
Next Steps’ blurring of responsibilities between those accountable to Parliament 
is not a new problem but Next Steps’ apparently scientific approach to defining 
responsibilities has resulted in a further tier of the existing confusions. Despite 
government reassurances that it attaches, ’great importance to the continued full 
accountability of Ministers to Parliament for the whole of their Departments, 
including agencies’, ^  this chapter has shown that Next Steps indirectly and 
directly affects both the ways in which parliamentary accountability is upheld and 
the fundamental principles of parliamentary accountability. First, Next Steps
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overtly creates new structures for upholding the traditional principles of 
parliamentary accountability with agency chief executives being appointed as 
accounting officers, directly accountable to Parliament for the day to day 
operations of their agencies. Second however, early difficulties with the new 
structures created the scope for ’unintentional’ changes to parliamentary 
accountability. For example, ministers had the scope to define contentious 
parliamentary questions as operational issues so as to prevent such questions 
from being aired in the House or published in Hansard. Third, the fundamental 
principles of parliamentary accountability are being challenged by privatizations 
and in particular, the recent drive for market testing and contracting out. It 
could be argued that there is no problem, as the newly privatized functions, 
possibly controlled by government contracts, are not legitimate roles of 
government and so Parliament should not have access to them. Parliament does 
not have direct access to the BBC or to the electricity companies so why should it 
have direct access to the activities of a privatized agency such as the National 
Engineering Laboratory? The National Engineering Laboratory or other 
’consultancy’ or ’production’ type agencies create few difficulties. However, as 
the market testing programme develops we may be applying the same issues to 
agencies or parts of agencies close to the heart of government, such as social 
security. Once the programme has developed to this stage the fact that 
contracting out or privatization restricts parliamentary access will most likely 
raise more concerns.
This chapter has shown that there is a move away from parliamentary powers to 
direct public powers to secure the accountability of public service providers 
thought the Citizen’s Charter. The Citizen’s Charter can supplement 
parliamentary accountability in so far as standards of service but it cannot 
replace it. The public do not have the organization, possibly the technical
expertise or the teeth of Parliament to call public spenders and service providers 
to account.
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THE CHANGING CIVIL SERVICE
For our ethos is easy to crack:
With no contract, we can’t get the sack,
We fear no election;
We’ve pension protection, -
And there’s always the Crown at our back/
Next Steps and the related Market Testing initiative are transforming the British 
civil service and this transformation has implications both for the future 
organization and traditions of the civil service and for its constitutional role as a 
politically neutral instrument serving Parliament. The creation of executive 
agencies from the operational arms of government, the delegation of freedoms 
to these agencies to organize themselves in ways most suited to meet their 
’business’ needs and the possible contracting out of existing civil service functions 
is indeed a ’revolution’ in terms of the future development of the civil service 
and its role.
This chapter considers the implications of the Next Steps and Market Testing 
changes on the future organization and traditions of the civil service and then 
considers the wider implications of these changes for the future of the civil 
service and for its constitutional role.
The divide between ’policy’ and ’operational’ people
One of the main things that is changing are civil servants’ working environments 
and the nature of their day to day jobs. The characterizing feature of Next Steps, 
the creation of executive agencies from the ’operational’ arms of government, 
reinstigates the policy versus administration cultural and skill divide which 
Fulton tried so hard to remove. The structure of Next Steps formalizes the 
divide between the ’operational’ agency people and the ’policy’ people in
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headquarters. This structural reform has required agencies and headquarters to
organize themselves so that they have distinct organisational hierarchies and in
some cases, in the light of experience, to re-organize themselves again to best
suit their new roles and ’business needs’. For example, the Information
Technology Services Agency experienced ’considerable movement and
reorganization in its top management structure because the structure was pretty
well set up from scratch and has inevitably been revised in the light of 
2experience.
Some agencies had more work to do than others at the outset to develop distinct 
organizational structures. Those agencies which already operated either as 
distinct branches of departments or indeed as separate departments (such as 
HMSO) clearly had less work to do in developing the essential ingredients: 
complete organizational structures, management and financial management 
information systems and distinct organizational identities with which staff relate. 
Other agencies had considerably more work to do. The close relationship and 
interdependency between the various arms of the Department of Social Security 
meant that its agencies had considerable work to do in developing organizational 
structures.
Next Steps also required departmental headquarters to consider their roles and 
to reorganize themselves. As Chapter 3 has shown, the Department of Social 
Security headquarters has defined its main functions and reorganized itself in 
recognition of its evolving roles. This structural divide encourages agency and 
headquarters staff to apply and develop different skills and consequently to 
develop different outlooks.
Agency civil servants are being encouraged to be more innovative and pro-active 
rather than reactive and indeed are being financially rewarded for coming up
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with ideas and actions to develop the work of the agencies in accordance with 
their overall aims. For example, the Vehicle Inspectorate Executive Agency 
introduced Saturday testing of vehicles in its attempt to make its services more 
accessible and the social security Benefits Agency is currently thinking about 
whether it could sell some of its training courses to local authorities. By contrast, 
headquarters people, particularly in finance departments, retain their primary 
concerns with costs and propriety and have little to encourage them to be 
innovative.
Although, at least within the Department of Social Security, there is a slight 
unease at this separation going too far and there are plans for those on the fast 
stream career paths to spend at least some time in agencies as a stage in their 
career development, any movement between headquarters and agencies or 
between agencies within a department will become more difficult as agencies are 
increasingly delegated additional freedoms. The separation of ’types’ of people 
within headquarters and agencies is likely to become more entrenched as 
agencies develop and are allowed more freedom to organize their pay and 
grading structures and recruitment and promotion practices to suit their own 
requirements.
Existing civil service uniformity
Although the civil service has been characterized by a certain diversity in the 
range of functions performed by the different branches, based in very different 
settings, there has been a high degree of uniformity in departments’ hierarchies, 
terms and conditions of employment and traditions. The delegation of freedom 
to agencies to organize themselves in the way best suited to their ’business needs’ 
is increasing diversity. Increased diversity is a direct intention of Next Steps.
The original Efficiency Unit report which launched the initiative saw that,
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the advantages which a unified Civil Service are intended to bring are 
seen as outweighed by the practical disadvantages...the uniformity of 
grading frequently inhibits effective management and ...the concept of a 
career in a unified Civil Service has little relevance for most civil 
servants. .
Pay and grading
Next Steps is introducing two main changes to existing pay and grading 
arrangements. First, it is encouraging agencies to use its scope for bonuses and 
performance pay within existing civil service pay agreements to motivate their 
staff and second, agencies are increasingly being granted the freedom to break 
entirely from existing civil service pay and grading structures and to negotiate
with the Treasury in establishing their own arrangements (see Chapter 4, pp.----
—). These changes are increasing the diversity in arrangements between the 
different parts of the civil service and are making it more difficult to move 
between its different arms.
As noted earlier, the Next Steps aim is to encourage agencies to be more 
efficient through paying financial incentives to staff such as group bonuses if 
agencies meet their targets and individual performance bonuses. In addition, 
senior agency staff have their pay linked to the achievement of agency targets. 
This use of incentives has been creating differences in the employment packages 
available to staff who used to work side by side as a part of the same 
organization. For example, the Department of Social Security’s Information 
Technology Services Agency staff received a group bonus (of about £40 each) in 
the first year of its operation whereas no such bonus was available to the staff 
who came under the management of the Benefits Agency. More importantly 
however, agencies are increasingly being granted the freedom to bargain for 
their own pay and grading structures. This freedom will provide agencies with
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considerable scope to move away from centrally determined arrangements 
toward different ways of organising themselves.
The way in which agencies bargain for their own pay and grading structures has 
evolved since the early days of Next Steps. Originally, the Treasury’s approach 
was to ensure that agencies had watertight financial bases for changes to their 
pay and grading structures. More recently, the Treasury states that its starting 
premiss is that change is normal and, if there is better way of doing something, 
agencies should be encouraged to follow this path. Agencies still must provide a 
business case which demonstrates the improvements which the change is 
expected to bring about.
The original system was that agencies came up with a package which consisted of 
job evaluations of the people in their agencies, supporting decisions on how 
much those people should be paid. These submissions to the Treasury had to be 
accompanied by an evaluation of where savings could come from to offset any 
immediate costs arising from the introduction of the new pay and grading 
package. An example of an agency which did bring in new pay arrangements 
under this regime was HMSO which, since October 1990, pays its staff on 
average 5 per cent more on the understanding that financial productivity would 
increase and the increase in the salary bill from increased earnings would be 
offset by staff savings. Few other agencies were successful in negotiations for pay 
and grading arrangements and even for those that were, the negotiations were 
long winded. The HMSO negotiations took two years and HMSO was in a 
strong position because it had been operating as a trading fund for a number of 
years and had a good track record.
The system of the day was not working. The Next Steps aim of increasing 
delegation was being frustrated by the lack of success of most agencies in
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negotiating any agreements for additional pay and grading flexibilities. The 
Treasury has now changed its tactics. This is in part because of a recognition by 
the Office of the Minister for the Civil Service and by the Treasury that things 
were not working. The Office of the Minister for the Civil Service put pressure 
on the Treasury to relax existing arrangements and the Treasury was willing to 
do this because it was now more confident with the controls for monitoring the 
activities of the new agencies. The Treasury therefore stated that it is taking a 
more pro-active role because, ’it is consistent with the philosophy of Next Steps 
and, it [the Treasury] wanted to allow more freedom’/* It also saw that it would 
result in a more cost efficient use of the pay bill and better value for money 
because it would help the way in which departments and agencies are run.
The Civil Service Management Functions Act was passed in 1992 which eased 
restrictions on what delegations could be made to agencies. From April 1994 the 
largest agencies will take on their own pay bargaining, including the Department 
of Social Security’s Benefits Agency, Information Technology Services Agency 
and the Contributions Agency.
The Treasury do not have a set pattern for whether they will negotiate with 
departmental headquarters, directly with agencies or with both. The Treasury 
informed me however that they would not be prepared to agree to changes to an 
agency’s pay and grading arrangements if they were the subject of a dispute 
between the agency and the department. The Treasury state that they would 
expect such disputes to be resolved before it was approached. The Department 
of Social Security’s headquarters is much of the view that the department and its 
agencies must operate as a "single department" so it is likely that it will continue 
to be the department negotiating with the Treasury on the agencies’ behalf. One 
of the concerns of the Department of Social Security’s headquarters is that there 
should continue to be parity in the pay and grading arrangements between its
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own agencies. This parity would ensure that staff could still be moved between 
the department’s agencies with a minimum of difficulty. More importantly, it 
ensures that staff in the smaller agencies with less bargaining power and scope 
for efficiency savings do not become the poor relations of the larger agencies, 
with their staff being paid less.
On the whole agencies are in the relatively early stages of negotiating their own 
pay and grading structures and are still at the stage of addressing sensitive issues 
about which staff are more marketable and valuable and should be paid more 
and which are more dispensable. But once these delegations are further down 
the track they will raise the scope for considerable divergence from existing civil 
service commission arrangements so long as agencies remain within their 
cost/benefit analysis projections of pay and grading which they presented to the 
Treasury. The scope for moving away from uniform civil service arrangements 
will be further increased if agencies are allowed to use a proportion of their 
efficiency savings in the salaries budget.
Recruitment
This increasing diversity between the different arms of the civil service has also 
been accelerated by the revised arrangements for recruitment. There have been 
two main changes to existing recruitment arrangements: agencies have increased 
powers to recruit directly the staff they require and short term appointments are 
increasingly being used to recruit people externally to senior civil service 
appointments.
The power of an agency to recruit up to a specified level directly breaks the 
levelling influence of the civil service commission in decisions on the type of 
skills and characteristics that are desirable across the breadth of the civil service. 
This freedom for an agency to recruit (and train) the ’type’ of staff it requires in
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terms of (specialist) skills and personalities could lead to an increasing 
divergence in staff characteristics between agencies and between agencies and 
departmental headquarters. The new child support agency has recently been 
carrying out its own recruitment and has had some freedom to seek people with 
particular skills, although this freedom have been limited by the fact that the new 
agency has had to recruit most of its staff from other Department of Social 
Security agencies needing to shed staff. At present, certainly within the 
Department of Social Security’s agencies, most posts have to be (usually 
internally) advertised at a particular level, for example, grade 7, and only people 
either currently working at that grade or who have been promoted to that grade 
may apply. This is changing,however, particularly as more posts are being 
opened up to people from outside the civil service.
This leads us to the second change to existing recruitment practices, the 
increased use of short term appointments, particularly at senior levels, which 
appears to be having a more consequential effect on the traditional civil service. 
All chief executives, both internally and externally appointed, are on short term 
contracts as are many other of the senior agency staff. The arrangements vary 
between agencies and have been developing over time . More posts are now 
being externally advertised and even if a chief executive’s performance has been 
satisfactory, his or her post may be externally advertised at the end of the 
contract and the chief executive may have to apply for his or her own job. This 
happened to Mike Fogden who is the chief executive of the Employment 
Services agency who did retain his job but said that the process was, ’by no means 
a walk-over.’-^
Before being appointed as chief executive of the Employment Service when it 
became an executive agency, Mike Fogden was in effect already doing the job 
and so was an internal candidate. On the whole, chief executives who were
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internal candidates for the job have the choice of sacrificing their civil service 
privileges, notably their rights to membership of the civil service pension scheme 
and to ’tenure’. If they sacrifice these privileges they are able to earn more in 
performance bonuses whereas if they retain them they have a reduced capacity 
to earn these bonuses, Chief executives without ’tenure’ can earn up to 20 per 
cent of their pay in performance bonuses whereas those with tenure and pension 
rights can only earn up to 5 per cent. Many of the internal candidates have 
chosen to retain their civil service privileges (mainly because of their age and 
their pension entitlements).
Again returning to the example of Mike Fogden, the chief executive of the 
Employment Service, he did not sacrifice his ’tenure’ for higher performance 
bonuses but said that the security this gave him was only notional as it was 
outlined by, ’some woolly wording in my contract about another job being found 
for me in the civil service if a suitable appointment were available’.  ^ Clearly the 
issue of what to do with those chief executives who were internal candidates but 
who are not to remain in post at the end of the contracted period is a difficult 
one. There are likely to be difficulties of readjustment if they are offered 
alternative appointments within the civil service.
The implications of this increasing use of short term contracts for senior posts 
and the rise in direct recruitment from outside the civil service are twofold.
First, the direct recruitment from outside will clearly change the characteristics 
of those dominating the senior civil service posts within the agencies and possibly 
ultimately within departmental headquarters. Second, it will change the career 
patterns and promotion expectations of aspiring civil servants. The other effect 
will be to reduce the extent of movement between different arms of the civil 
service. This latter point was made by Peter Kemp (the former civil servant 
responsible for implementing Next Steps) when he outlined the Next Steps plan:
144
’to extend the use of period appointments and to reduce the extent of movement 
within the civil service’/
At present the direct recruitment of people to senior levels from outside the civil 
service has been concentrated within the executive agencies. This has meant that 
the ’new blood’ has all gone into the agencies whilst departmental headquarters 
are still run by ’old blooded’ civil servants. For example, the Department of 
Social Security’s Benefits Agency has ’outsiders’ holding its key posts - the chief 
executive and the finance director (the finance director’s number two has also 
come from outside the service).
As Next Steps has effectively created a two way flow of people in and out of the 
civil service it also follows that the most effective way to top posts may not 
necessarily be to join the service as a fast stream graduate or as a direct entrant 
grade 7 and to follow the traditional service fast stream career route. Chief 
executives are being recruited to levels as high as grade 2 (deputy secretary) and 
it follows that existing high grade civil servants, who may have had their ideas of 
promotion quashed by such an external recruitment, may increasingly look 
beyond the perimeter fence of the civil service for their next move.
In summary then, Next Steps is increasingly changing existing uniformity between 
departments and agencies and these changes have implications for movement 
between the different arms and for the idea of the civil service as a career job for 
life.
Civil service job security
A further factor which is affecting the notion of the civil service as a secure 
career is the fact that it no longer guarantees a job for life. Indeed, Peter Kemp, 
the former head of the Next Steps unit, outlined the Next Steps aim: ’to
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TABLE 7-1 : The size of the civil service
Y e a r N u m b e r s  o f  c iv i l  
s e r v a n t s  in  p o s t
P e r c e n t a g e  o f  
1 9 7 9  f ig u r e
1 9 7 9 7 3 3 , 1 7 6 1 0 0
1 9 8 0 7 0 7 , 6 2 0 9 7
1 9 8 1 6 9 5 , 0 7 0 9 5
1 9 8 2 6 7 5 , 4 2 4 9 2
1 9 8 3 6 5 2 , 5 3 4 8 9
1 9 8 4 6 2 3 , 9 7 2 8 5
1 9 8 5 5 9 9 , 0 2 6 8 2
1 9 8 6 5 9 4 , 3 6 5 8 1
1 9 8 7 5 9 7 , 8 1 4 8 2
1 9 8 8 5 7 9 , 6 2 7 7 9
1 9 8 9 5 6 9 , 2 1 5 7 8
1 9 9 0 5 6 2 , 3 8 8 7 7
Source: Adapted from the Civil Service Statistics.
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encourage civil servants to build their own careers and to move in and out of the 
civil service’.  ^ It has been no secret that one of the desires of the current 
Conservative Government has been to reduce the size of the public sector and 
equally, it is no secret that Next Steps and the Market Testing programme will 
serve this desire.
Table 7.1 shows how the number of civil servants has declined by nearly a 
quarter since the beginning of the present Conservative Government’s first term 
of office from 733,176 in 1979 to 562,388 in 1990. These statistics mainly reflect 
the various mergers, divides and transfers of functions from the civil service to 
elsewhere, including non-departmental public bodies, Public Limited 
Corporations (for example, the Royal Ordnance Factories), and other bodies 
(responsibility for the Department of Health’s special hospitals was transferred 
to health authorities). We will now however increasingly witness real reductions 
as the Next Steps and Market Testing programmes mature. The combination of 
Next Steps’ restructuring to increase efficiency coupled with the increasing 
contracting out of existing civil service functions under the Market Testing 
programme all against a background of other environmental changes such as the 
development of technology, will increasingly require both voluntary and 
compulsory redundancies.
Learning to deal with ’management bv/of contracts’
A further main change to the work of the civil servant is that the nature of their 
jobs is changing to be increasingly dominated by ’contracts’. As chapter 5 
documented, civil servants are now engaged in a series of contractual relations, 
at some points as the contractor (the client) and at others as the contracted (the 
contractor). As we have also seen this requires them to learn new skills in 
drawing up tenders, proposals, contracts and in working to contracts which will 
change Furthermore, the move to contracts is changing the way in which the
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civil service operates including its flexibility and responsiveness to respond to 
policy or to other environmental developments.
Implications for the future of the civil service
The changes outlined above have some important implications for the future of 
the civil service. First, the service is clearly going to be much smaller and more 
diverse. The term ’civil servant* will become increasingly meaningless and 
people will instead identify more with their particular role, for example as an 
employee of a particular agency. Although the changes to date have primarily 
affected those civil servants in agencies, the headquarters* mandarin class will 
not remain entirely unscathed. As we have seen their expectations for 
promotion may be undermined by those coming into agencies at senior levels 
who may move on to take posts in headquarters and there may soon be some 
direct appointments at senior levels within headquarters.
The civil service will largely be concerned with contracting, controlling and, at 
least initially, competing for contracts. Clearly, once civil servants have lost a 
tender to carry out a particular function it is unlikely that they will continue to be 
around to compete when the contract next comes up for competition. 
Departmental headquarters are currently involved in ’contracting* as ’clients* for 
agency services and increasingly may be involved in ’contracting* as a ’contractor* 
for example, if headquarters are ’contracted* (by Ministers?) to provide certain 
services such as the provision of policy advice.
The changes have profound implications for the renowned civil service 
characteristics of security and loyalty. More people will be moving in and out of 
the civil service at all levels and there will be less job security. This may erode 
the ’public service ethos* where people profess to be willing to work for less
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money than they could command outside in return for their job security and 
satisfaction.
Implications for the constitutional role of the civil service 
The role of the civil service in the British political system is renowned for two 
main features: its political neutrality and its anaesthetizing influence on radical 
reform. The Next Steps’ changes raise questions about both of these features.
The characteristic political neutrality of civil servants could be threatened if the 
appointment of people from outside the civil service to senior posts on a contract 
basis also developed to apply to headquarters posts. Although formally ministers 
are not currently directly involved in making the decisions on who should or 
should not be appointed, they are informally asked for their opinions of the short 
list of candidates and can therefore influence the choice. Clearly there is a 
danger that each change in government could be accompanied by a change in 
senior civil servants, as and when the contracts come up for renewal. Also, Next 
Steps may change the nature of the relationship between civil servants and 
ministers as those civil servants on short term appointments may be more 
committed to the task of pleasing their ministers than to servicing the civil 
service traditions.
The wish to please may also reduce the anaesthetizing effect of the civil service 
on radical reform. Senior civil servants and chief executives on short term 
contracts will be anxious to make an impression during their contracted years 
with the consequence of increasing dynamism, willingness to move with the times 
and to please.
The other factor which may reduce the anaesthetic is the increased infiltration of 
the civil service by the ideas of people from other walks of life. This infiltration
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is likely to make the civil service increasingly pro-active and less resistant to 
change. As we have seen external recruits are being directly appointed to senior 
civil service posts and also importantly, management consultants are increasingly 
used to carry out both discrete blocks of work (for example in ’managing the 
change or in developing information or personnel strategies) and to work 
alongside existing staff for example in the Information Technology Services 
Agency to offset any short term difficulties of understaffing. People with 
experience of business, the city and industry have been appointed as advisers on 
departments’ and agencies’ boards. These ’outside’ influences are changing the 
culture of the service to more of ’why not?’ rather than ’why?’
This change will make it easier for government to implement policies directly 
with little civil service resistance or distortion. In turn this has considerable 
implications both for the new relationship between governments and the civil 
service and for what governments are able to achieve.
1. Verse from a senior civil servant in the early days 
of Next Steps, 1 October 1991.
2 Quotation from group interview with Information 
Technology Services Agency management team, 30 October 
1991.
3. The Efficiency Unit (1988) Improving Management in 
Government: The Next Steps. London, HMSO, para. 11.
4. Interview with Treasury official, 11 February 1993.
5. Interview with Mike Fogden, chief executive of the
Employment Services Agency, 27 January 1993.
6. Interview with Mike Fogden, 27 January 1993.
7. Interview with Sir Peter Kemp, 28 November 1991.
8. Interview with Sir Peter Kemp, 28 November 1991.
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CHAPTER 8
PUBLIC SERVICE REFORM IN NEW ZEALAND AND CANADA
The experiences of other countries can enable us to answer some important 
questions about central government reform. The current drive to improve 
management in government and to increase efficiency, effectiveness and quality 
of service to the customer is common to many developed countries. The aim of 
this chapter is to see what the experiences of other countries tell us about Next 
Steps. It takes as its examples Canada and New Zealand as they are both based 
on the Westminster model with its conventions of ministerial responsibility.
They have also both taken different directions of reform to each other and to 
Britain but all along the ’new public management’ route. Their reform initiatives 
have similar aims and objectives but some important differences.
The aim of the chapter is not to evaluate the reforms of Canada and New 
Zealand but rather to draw on their experiences to explore whether some of the 
dilemmas inherent in Next Steps (such as the problems of distinguishing policy 
and operational issues and balancing accountability and autonomy) have been 
overcome by other countries* initiatives. The chapter also addresses the 
question of why, when there are a number of similarities in the conditions 
prompting reform, that the three countries should adopt different initiatives. Is 
there something unique to Britain to make it take the Next Steps route?
The Canadian reforms
There are some parallels between the British, Canadian and New Zealand 
environments in which their respective initiatives were launched. The overriding 
environmental factor dominating Canadian public policy has been the fiscal crisis 
which began in 1984. This fiscal crisis coupled with a poor opinion of the
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generally unpopular public service concentrated attention on ways of reducing 
public expenditure through policy changes such as restricting entitlement to 
social welfare benefits and through managerial and personnel changes including 
the freezing of public sector staffing and pay.
Such a background provided fertile ground for public service reform and the 
development of Canada’s Public Service 2000 initiative. Unlike the British Next 
Steps initiative however, the Canadian reforms are about concentrating on 
existing institutions rather than about introducing new types of institutional 
changes. The rationale for this is that the Canadian public service went through 
enormous structural change in the 1970s and now only needs an overhaul, a 
streamlining of internal machinery and a catalyst to change attitudes inside the 
organization.
The Public Service 2000 initiative
The Canadian Public Service 2000 initiative was announced by the Prime 
Minister of the time, Brian Mulroney, in December 1989. Its aim is to ’renew the 
Public Service of Canada’ to ’enable the Public Service to provide the best 
possible service to Canadians into the 21st century’/  Wherever the aims of the 
Public Service 2000 initiative are outlined, the emphasis is very strongly on 
improving service to the public. Indeed, a government briefing note outlined the 
aim as being, ’to make the federal public service a client-orientated 
organisation...to ensure that we are organised, recruited, assigned, trained, and 
motivated towards Service to the Public’/
On announcing Public Service 2000, the Prime Minister outlined some of the 
areas where changes would be made. He said that:
1 5 1
*the government’s employment and personnel management regime will 
be made less complicated and burdensome for managers and employees 
alike;
•central administrative controls will be reduced so as to give Deputy 
Ministers [Public Servants heading departments] greater freedom to 
manage their departments and clearer accountability for results;
•the roles of central agencies and of systems of personnel and 
administrative control throughout the government will be clarified and 
simplified; and
•innovative ways to encourage efficiency and improve programme 
delivery will be developed/
On face then, Canada’s Public Service 2000 initiative looks very similar to Next 
Steps-its aims are to improve efficiency and quality of service and this is to be 
achieved through rationalizing existing procedures, allowing "greater freedom to 
manage" and through refashioning existing accountability arrangements. Despite 
these similarities in aims however there are some important differences both in 
the process of implementing the respective initiatives and in their substance.
The Canadian process of reform
The Canadian process is characterized by extensive review and 
consultation. The rationale for these reviews and discussions is explained 
by John Edwards, the Public Servant Managing the Public Service 2000 
secretariat, who argues, ’the reforms are 70 per cent about attitudinal 
change, 20 per cent about changes in systems and processes and 10 per 
cent about legislative change’/
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The first stage of reform under the Public Service 2000 initiative was to form 10 
’task forces’, each assigned to report on an area where changes were required to 
’renew the public service of Canada’. The people on the task forces included 
senior departmental staff deputy ministers (the public servants heading 
departments), assistant deputy ministers and senior regional officials. The task 
force members talked to people in their own departments for their ideas on how 
things could be changed and surveyed the views of thousands of public service 
employees. The task forces each then produced detailed reports of their findings 
and some 300 recommendations for the future of the public service. Table 8.1 
outlines the some of the main recommendations of the task forces.
Table 8.1: Some of the main recommendations of the task forces 
Consultation and service
* The public service must make consultation a standard operating 
responsibility.
* There must be more efforts to strengthen relations between the private 
and public sectors such as more personnel exchange programmes.
Corporate culture and service
* The task force made several recommendations for a reorientation of the 
public service towards service.
Monitoring service to the public
* The task force recommended that departments institute monitoring 
practices linked to specified acceptable standards of service designed with 
the involvement of front-line staff.
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Information technology and better service
* Departments must use new technology in the wider context of setting 
new goals and in improving the quality of service
Improving public service
* Improvement must be pursued in the context of a basic reshaping of the 
organization’s culture into a reoccupation with client services.
Source: Treasury Board of Canada (1990) PS200: Summaries of the 
Reports of the Task forces. Ottawa, Ministry of Supply and Services.
* The public service must become more accessible and visible, one that 
engages the public in the decision making process.
The task forces’ recommendations were reported to public servants and formed 
the basis of a series of discussions. A year after the task forces had reported, the 
Prime Minister issued the white paper outlining plans for reform/ The main 
thrust of the Canadian white paper is very different from that of the Next Steps 
initiative. The emphasis of the Canadian white paper is weighted to presenting 
the public service as being an emblem of national pride with the 
recommendations for reform (which do not begin until page 62) being very much 
about
streamlining and institutional simplification [which] can be achieved 
without sacrificing, or in any way calling into question, the professional 
and non-partisan character of the Public Service, which is fundamental to 
the integrity and credibility of these reforms/
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Again this shows that Public Service 2000 is very much about reforming within 
and strengthening the public service and is not (neither explicitly nor it seems 
implicitly) about contracting out and privatization.
The white paper recommendations fall under four headings: ’service to Canada 
and Canadians’, ’careers within the public service’, ’a more people orientated 
public service’ and ’accountability’. Many of these recommendations are about 
delegating more freedoms to departments for example, to manage their budgets 
and buy capital items, to manage their staff and to recruit casual employees. 
Unlike in Britain, these powers were all held by the Treasury Board. Also, 
unlike Britain, Canada has a written constitution and much of its public service is 
governed by legislation. The new delegations as outlined in the white paper 
therefore have required legislative change, for example, to the Finance and 
Administration Act, the Public Service Employment Act and the Public Service 
Staff Relations Act. This requirement for legislative change has inevitably 
slowed down the process of reform mainly because it takes a considerable length 
of time to get a slot for Parliament to consider the legislative changes.
The Public Service 2000 initiative is therefore a centrally led reform which is 
essentially about delegating departments more responsibility and freedoms from 
central controls with the aims of improving service to the public, the working 
environment for public service employees and improving accountability 
arrangements.
The Canadian special operating agencies
In addition, as a part of the programme of reform, 15 special operating agencies 
have been established as an ’experiment’. They are mainly bodies that charge for 
their services and are likely to be privatized such as the Canadian 
Communications Group (whose role is rather like HMSO). They are being set
155
up very much as a part of their departments and unlike the British executive 
agencies, the heads of the special operating agencies are answerable to senior 
members of their departments as their line managers. Also unlike the UK 
executive agencies, the heads of the Canadian special operating agencies are not 
directly accountable to Parliament for the agencies’ activities. The departmental 
deputy minister and the minister remain constitutionally responsible for 
reporting to Parliament (although in practice, agency chief executives have also 
been asked to attend House of Commons committee hearings).
The manager of the Public Service 2000 initiative, John Edwards described the 
special operating agencies as, ’orphans and waifs in our institutional structure’. 
He also said that Canada is, ’playing with social operating agencies and is not 
very clear why it is doing it... the real Canadian priority is to reform government 
within the single public service and to adapt the public service into a much more 
service orientated organization”/
Despite this point that the Canadian special operating agencies are only a 
’demonstration project* and are not central to the current programme of reform, 
there are some parallels with the issues faced by these agencies and those faced 
by British Next Steps agencies. For example, the chief executive of the Canadian 
Communications Group argued that he requires more freedoms, for example 
with budgets, to enable him to run his organization effectively. However, the 
Canadian special operating agencies experiment is so far limited in scope in that 
it only extends to revenue raising operational units some of which are candidates 
for privatization. By the end of May 1992 there had been no firm decisions on 




The Public Service 2000 initiative and the creating of the special operating 
agencies is a centrally led umbrella reform, run by the Public Service 2000 
secretariat, which sets the framework and paves the way for departments to 
devise and implement reforms within this major reform. The departmental 
reforms are about applying the framework of the Public Service 2000 initiative to 
operational programmes and using the new delegations to their full effect to 
improve service delivery.
One example of a departmental reform is the Health and Welfare Department’s 
’Income Security Programmes redesign business strategy’. This has involved a 
series of internal departmental reviews and consultations with the aim of 
making sure that the department is organized in the best way to ensure 
’excellence’ in delivery of benefits:
We must provide the right benefit, in the right amount, to the right client, 
at the right address, and on time. We must do this for every one of the 9 
million clients receiving benefit payments, every month of the year;^
’excellence’ in delivery of client services,
we aim to provide one call, one stop shopping (dealing with all of the 
client’s income needs from one office), in a way which is accurate, 
efficient and respectful;^
’excellence’ in accessibility to clients,
we must ensure that we have the resources, tools and planning to ensure 
that a client can reach us when he or she needs to /^
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and ’excellence’ in providing the management support that enables the 
department to achieve its targets for delivering benefits and services.
In summary then despite the similarities in the aims of the Canadian reforms 
there are some important differences in the approaches and substance of the 
British and Canadian reforms. The Canadian approach has the advantage that 
the extensive consultation procedures which have characterized Public Service 
2000 coupled with the fact that Departmental staff are also involved in 
developing and implementing their own reforms means that the large numbers 
involved in the reform process have become the owners of the reforms and 
therefore have a vested interest in their success. The down-side is that all this 
consultation has transaction costs and is slow which can result in a loss of 
momentum.
Comparing the substance of the Canadian reforms and the British Next Steps 
initiative
The effect on the public service
As for the differences between the substance of Canada’s Public Service 2000 
changes as compared with those of Britain’s Next Steps initiative, we have seen 
that the Canadian emphasis is more on creating a unified public service and is 
more about restricting appointments from ’outside’ than encouraging greater 
movement. (The Canadian public service has always had a far greater ability to 
bring in people at all levels-some 20 per cent of executives currently are 
recruited from ’outside’).
158
The move to contract government
Canada has not gone so far down the Next Steps route of ’management by 
contract’ but, similar to in Britain, there have been moves to strengthen existing 
reporting and accountability frameworks. For example, departments had widely 
defined objectives and produced performance information which related more to 
what was measurable than to departmental objectives. Departments and the 
Treasury Board are now working to tighten departmental objectives and to 
develop more useful performance measures.
Regarding a move to management of contract, in many ways Canada has more 
experience in this respect than Britain. Prior to the Public Service 2000 reforms, 
the Canadian fiscal crisis and the uncoordinated attempts to reduce quickly the 
size and expenditure of the public service had resulted in some radical measures. 
One example of this related to the policy of ’person year control’ where 
restrictions were introduced on the numbers of staff which departments could 
employ as public servants and if departments needed any additional staff to do 
anything new or simply in order to perform their statutory roles in implementing 
existing policies, extra hands had to be brought from outside the public sector on 
a contract basis even where it may have been better value for money to employ 
additional ’in house’ staff. From 1992 departments can lapse ’person year 
controls’ if it is more cost effective to carry out work ’in-house’. How this will 
work in practice however is still uncertain. A senior Treasury Board official 
speculated that, ’the political environment with the major aim of reducing the 
public service will keep the focus on the numbers of employees in the public 
service rather than on the number of dollars spent’/^  Canada has therefore 
been going down the track of ’management of contract* but not, like in Britain, as 
a positive policy.
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Dividing ’policy’ and ’operational’ Issues
Although the Canadian reforms have not concentrated on structural changes 
(despite the special operating agencies that have been set up as an ’experiment’), 
the reforms have encountered difficulties in clearly specifying who is responsible 
for what. Canada has attempted to side step the potential conflict between 
’policy’ and ’operational’ issues by restricting its structural reforms. This means 
that the status quo continues. The Canadian status quo is that the Treasury 
Board and its minister are accountable to Parliament for ’policy’ issues (for 
producing and communicating ’good’ policies and for identifying where a policy 
is not working) and departments are accountable to Parliament for 
implementing those policies. Similar to the arrangements in Britain between 
executive agencies and departments, there is a blurring of responsibilities about 
who is accountable for what.
Autonomy and accountability
In this dilemma, Canada has experienced similar difficulties to those of Britain- 
how to encourage departmental efforts whilst ensuring that they remain 
accountable to central departments (Treasury Board) and to Parliament. A 
senior manager from the Treasury Board said,
There has been an unbelievable push from departments for increased 
flexibilities....Treasury Board were regarded as a fairly major impediment 
to improving management. Many of the controls they had related less to 
good management than to particular Ministers’ concerns. They really 
could not justify the lack of Department’s powers.^
Again the issues are familiar, the granting of the new ’flexibilities’ brings with it 
concerns about how they are going to be balanced with new arrangements to 
ensure the continuing accountability of departments to central departments and
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to Parliament. John Edwards outlines that the approach favoured has been, 
’letting a 1000 flowers bloom and giving time for Public Service 2000 to develop 
strong roots’. He states, ’we have resisted making demands for work plans and 
for regular progress reports. However, it is often tough for Type A personalities 
to be patient’. However he also raises the question about who will be 
responsible if things go wrong: ’Accountability under PS 2000 has yet to be put to 
strong tests. What will happen when reasonable risks are taken and there is a 
failure? What happens if it becomes a public issue?’/ ^
The New Zealand reforms
The New Zealand reforms also grew out of a fiscal crisis. In 1984 a Labour 
Government was elected to face high fiscal deficits. It embarked on a 
programme of reform aiming to balance the books, including the removal of 
price and wage controls and the deregulation of the finance and other service 
sectors of the economy. Attention then turned to the state sector. In 1986 the 
major commercial operations of the government were ’corporatized’ and given 
the principal objective to operate as successful businesses. Beginning in 1988 
were the reforms to improve the performance of the core state sector. The 
objectives of the reform programme are familiar-to reduce public expenditure, 
enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector, improve the quality 
of the goods and services provided by public agencies, and ensure that providers 
are responsive to the needs and interests of their consumers. The methods 
adopted by the New Zealand reformers will also have a familiar ring to Next 
Steps’ followers;
The reforms focused upon generating improvement by clarifying 
objectives and allowing managers freedom to manage within a framework 
of accountability and performance assessment. Improvement was to be 
achieved by better definition of the Government’s strategy, decision
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making based upon clearly specified performance, delegating authority to 
chief executives to manage resources and improved reporting and 
assessment of performance.^
The process of New Zealand reform
In total contrast to the British experience, the main drivers in the New Zealand 
reform programme were the Treasury who drew up the main policy proposals on 
which the programme of reform came to be based. Also unlike in Britain, .these 
proposals were detailed and drew heavily on a range of public administration, 
management and micro economic branches of theory.
The main features characterizing the New Zealand reforms (and again 
distinguishing them from those of Britain) have been the legislative changes.
The two legal changes of most interest for the purposes of this book are:
The State Sector Act of 1988: The purposes of the State Sector Act were 
twofold. It established a framework for a new relationship between the heads of 
departments and their ministers. The concept of a ’permanent head’ of each 
department was replaced by that of a chief executive on a limited tenure contract 
responsible to the minister for the performance of the department. Contracts 
with incentives for meeting performance agreements were also introduced for 
other senior executives. It created a new industrial relations and employment 
regime, giving heads of departments the power to hire and fire staff, and (within 
certain limits) to fix salaries within their departments (these functions used to be 
the responsibility of the central State Service Commission).
The Public Finance Act of 1989: This act gave the legislative framework to the 
financial reforms of: introducing a client/contractor divide into government 
departments; delegating financial responsibilities to departments for their capital
assets; for developing specified ’outputs’ and measures by which departments’ 
success in achieving these ’outputs’ can be measured; to make ministers, not 
departments responsible for specifying what they want from each department 
and what each department must deliver.
The key elements of the New Zealand reforms were summarized in a 
presentation by a New Zealand delegate to a five countries meeting in Canada in 
1990 to discuss the progress of their respective reforms;
1. The clarification of the purposes of each department or agency, with 
each being held responsible to produce defined and measured outputs at 
prices set by government as purchaser.
2. The rigorous definition of the responsibility of each chief executive for 
performance and management, with allied rewards and sanctions 
followed by the spread of this same pattern to subordinate layers of 
management.
3. The abolition of virtually all the detailed input controls traditionally 
administered by the Treasury and the State Services Commission; with 
the chief executives being given the power to hire and fire and to spend 
their allocations in the way which they considered best achieved their 
specified output objectives.
4. The requirement from government as owners to achieve defined rates 
of return, manage cash flows, set up full commercial style accounting and 
management information systems, and meet rigorous reporting 
requirements.
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5. The requirement to lift performance immediately because of cuts in 
net funding.^
Comparing the substance of the New Zealand and British reforms 
The New Zealand reforms have been described as the, ’most ambitious and far 
reaching of their kind in the world’. ^  They have also been described as a 
’culture shock* for the New Zealand public service/^ The principles are very 
similar to Next Steps but the New Zealand reforms are faster and more radical. 
The following section outlines the ways in which the New Zealand reforms have 
tackled the dilemmas inherent in these types of reforms.
The dilemma of how to separate ’policy’ and ’operational’ issues 
In Britain the lack of a clear dividing line between ’policy’ and ’operational’ 
issues results in a blurring of responsibilities between chief executives, 
permanent secretaries and ministers. The radical New Zealand reforms have 
limited these potential difficulties through an extreme solution. The level of 
contracting is higher than in Britain. In New Zealand, ministers remain 
accountable to Parliament for all policy matters and they are also responsible for 
buying all the services required from that department. For example, in the case 
of social welfare the minister is responsible for buying services from three types 
of business units: output delivery business units-the Income Support Service, the 
Children and Young Persons Service, the Community Funding Agency, the 
Social Policy Agency and Ministerial Services; support services business units- 
Information Technology, Legal Services and Corporate Services; corporate 
management business units-Finance, Resource Management, Audit and Security, 
Cultural Liaison. Each of these units has a business plan and the output delivery 
units have a budget and specified targets of the outputs they must achieve with 
that money. The support units must sell their services to the output delivery 
units, who are increasingly free to purchase such services from outside the
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department. The heads of each of the business units are accountable to 
Parliament for the day to day running of their unit-in the case of the Ministerial 
Services unit and the Social Policy Agency, this may involve providing complete, 
reliable and timely policy advice. The minister is responsible for ensuring that 
these business units are doing what they are supposed to be doing and that he or 
she is achieving value for money in his or her purchases. The minister is also 
responsible for any policy decisions. Such a structure avoids the obfuscation as 
to the appropriate role of departmental headquarters and permanent secretaries.
Accountability versus autonomy
The autonomy versus accountability tension has also been evident in New 
Zealand but rather than resulting in restrictions on freedoms it has resulted in 
attempts to specify personal accountability clearly and in a concentrated effort 
on developing ’output* performance information. As we have seen above, the 
fact that the level of contracting is higher means that it is easier to define clearly 
who is responsible for what.
One difficulty with the new arrangements of ministers ’buying’ services from 
their departments is that their workload has increased and that there is little in 
the way of a ’centre’ to support ministers in their role of ensuring that 
departments are doing what they are supposed to be doing. In some ways, the 
New Zealand reforms are now backtracking because of a recognition of this gap 
and the numbers of staff involved in providing this ’central support’ is now 
increasing.
The effect on the public service
The effect of the New Zealand reforms on its public service has been radical.
The service has declined from some 85,000 staff in 1988 to some 33,000 staff in 
1992. As we have seen, similarly to Britain, there has also been an increase in
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the use of ’contracts’ and an undermining of the principle of the public service as 
a secure job for life. There have also been concerns that the changes have been 
undermining the professionalism of the public service and that, for example, the 
quality of its draft legislation is not as good as it was which means that Members 
are now having to spend more time in committee considering the legislation.
Conclusions
Returning to our original questions, the comparisons between the British, New 
Zealand and Canadian reforms show us that there are many similarities in the 
factors prompting the reforms, notably, in the financial difficulties facing each of 
these countries at the time when the reforms were launched. What is interesting 
is that each of the countries responded to similar conditions by adopting 
different strategies. Britain and New Zealand went down the line of structural 
change whereas Canada followed the model of reforming existing structures. 
These differences in approaches can in part be explained by what went before. 
Certainly in Britain, there had already been a series of attempts at reform within 
existing arrangements (with varying degrees of success). By contrast, Canada 
had already tried the course of structural reform and now wanted to move 
towards the existing British model of a unified professional public service. 
Whatever the approach or the reasons for a particular model being adopted, an 
important insight which the comparisons have allowed us to make is that none of 
the solutions adopted by any of the countries have been fully successful in 
overcoming the central difficulties of how to distinguish between policy and 
operational issues or how to balance autonomy and accountability.
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There are many criteria by which Next Steps can be assessed. The first is whether it 
is achieving its specified objectives of ’creating durable improvements in 
management in government and delivering services more efficiently and effectively 
within available resources for the benefit of customers, tax payers and staff. In 
other words, there are three main criteria by which the success of Next Steps in 
meeting its formal objectives can be judged: Is Next Steps resulting in a more 
efficient and effective civil service? Are ’customers’ happy with the service they are 
receiving? Are staff happy with the new arrangements?
The formal Next Steps objectives are not however the only criteria by which it can 
be evaluated. Next Steps can also be judged in terms of what it tells us about 
administrative theory and in terms of its durability and longer term consequences. 
This chapter therefore also analyses what Next Steps tells us about administrative 
theory and considers the future development of Next Steps and its wider 
implications.
The ’sucess’of Next Steps in achieving its formal objectives 
Of course the real world is not a perfect research laboratory and there is no perfect 
way of evaluating Next Steps in achieving its stated objectives of improving 
efficiency, effectiveness and quality of service. The ideal way of judging ’success’ 
using these criteria would by using consistent measures of efficiency, effectiveness 
and customer and staff attitudes which stemmed from before Next Steps and 
continued into the future. In the ideal laboratory all other factors which may affect
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the chosen measures should also be held constant so that we could be sure that any 
changes in efficiency and effectiveness or in attitudes were a direct result of Next 
Steps. Since we are lacking the ideal data and the ideal research conditions this 
chapter examines what data central departments and agencies have been using to 
evaluate changes in efficiency and effectiveness and changes in ’customer’ and staff 
attitudes and considers what this data tells us about the success of Next Steps.
Improvements in efficiency and effectiveness
Next Steps resulted in some major changes to departments’ and agencies’ reporting 
and informations systems including some important changes to their selection of 
performance measures and targets. Chapter 5 has outlined how agency 
performance indicators and high level targets were selected and revised (by central 
departments and agencies) to reflect agencies’ newly reviewed agency objectives and 
’business’ aims. Most agencies’ performance measures therefore either measure 
different things or measure the same things on a different basis than earlier 
departmental measures of the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations. So, we 
cannot yet simply look at changes in agencies’ high level measures of efficiency and 
effectiveness to assess whether Next Steps has directly resulted in some 
improvements.
What we can do is look at how successful agencies are being in meeting their new 
key performance targets. In some instances it was difficult to set these targets where 
there was little existing information on performance in particular areas. However, 
most of the targets are based on existing information about how efficiently and 
effectively departmental operations performed particular functions in the pre-Next 
Steps days. Many of the targets are also fairly tight as they also assume that
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agencies will achieve efficiency savings over and above the 1.5 per cent expected 
from all departments.
The Office for the Public Service and Science have pulled together the success of 
the agencies established to date in meeting their targets in the 1991/92 year. Table 
9.1 summarizes the results of all the agencies.
Table 9.1: The percentage of key performance targets achieved by executive 
agencies in 1991-92
Quality Financial Efficiency Throughput
targets targets targets targets
% % % %
79 73 76 76
Source: adapted from OPSS The Next Steps Agencies Review (1992) Cm 2111. 
London, HMSO.
It shows that overall agencies met about three out of four of their targets. The area 
where performance was least good overall however was in meeting the financial 
targets. Richard Mottram, the current Next Steps project manager, is clearly 
pleased with the overall results. He refers to them saying,
in general, the results are good. Around three out of four targets have been 
met, a similar picture to last year. For those Agencies which have existed for
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more than a year, the key targets will have become more demanding over 
time and the figures indicate continuing improvement in performance.^
Table 9.2 compares the overall performance of agencies in general in meeting their 
targets with that of the four Department of Social Security agencies which were up 
and running at that time-the Benefits Agency, the Contributions Agency, the 
Information Technology Services Agency and the Resettlement Agency.
Table 9.2: The percentage of key performance targets met by all agencies in 1991-92 




Oualitv Financial Efficiency Throughput
Targets Targets Targets Targets
% % % %
79 73 76 76
93 83 100 90
Source: adapted from OPSS (1992) The Next Steps Agencies Review 1992. Cm 
2111. London, HMSO.
It shows that the performance of the Department of Social Security’s agencies, as 
judged by these criteria, was above that of the average of the other agencies. The 
following section considers some examples in more detail of what the performance 
of the Department of Social Security’s agencies in achieving the key performance 
indicators tells us about the success of Next Steps.
I l i a .
T a & l c  9 * 3 :  B c m c f i t s  fc a c w jc y : K c>  PcfLPo*»M*i*ctf T a m c t s  a * *  Rjc&uct& \3 3 \-*
Service delivery Target 91-92 Result 91-92
Social Fund, community care  grant clearance 7  d a y s 5 . 9  d a y s
Social Fund, crisis loans c learance s a m e  d a y s a m e  d a y
Social Fund, proportion of g ross loan expenditure to be  
covered by loan recoveries (a) £ 1 4 3 m £ 1 4 7 . 5 m
Social Fund, live within g ross allocation for loans and grants £ 2 7 7 . 4 m £ 2 7 6 m
Income Support, claim s c learance 5  d a y s 4  d a y s
Income Support, a c c u ra c y (b) 9 3 % 9 5 .7 %
Sickness and  Invalidity Benefit claims c learance 9  d a y s 7  d a y s
Incapacity benefits, accu racy 9 6 .5 % 9 6 .5 %
Family Credit, claim s c learance (c) 6 0 %  in  1 8  d a y s  
8 5 %  in  3 5  d a y s
6 4 .4 %
8 9 .2 %
Family Credit, fastpath  claims 9 0 %  in  5  d a y s 9 2 .1 %
Family Credit, accu racy 9 3 % 9 1 .5 %
War Pensions, disablem ent claims clearance 7 5 %  in  1 9 5  d a y s 7 1 .3 %
War Pensions, widowhood claims 8 0 %  in  9 0  d a y s 8 0 .9 %
Liable relatives, annual benefit savings £ 3 0 0 m £ 2 8 3 . 9 m
Liable relatives, % of lone paren ts on IS 
receiving m aintenance 2 7 % 2 1 %
Fraud, g ro ss  annual benefit savings £ 3 8 2 m £ 4 1 6 m
O verpaym ent recovery, g ross cash * £ 1 8 m £ 2 4 . 2 m
Efficiency, ach ieve cumulative running costs  efficiency 
savings reflected in net budget figure of £  1 8 8 . 3 m £ 1 9 6 . 2 m
Finance, living within budget • * £ 1 , 7 7 2 . 6 m £ 1 , 7 6 9 . 6 m
Custom er satisfaction, proportion of custom ers 
expressing  satisfaction with the service they have 
received (%) 8 5 % 8 6 %
(a) This target was originally set as a % recovery figure but was amended during the year.
(b) The target outturns reported here are based on line management returns. They are tested by internal audit and the National Audit Office (NAO) and recent
evidence indicates there are some differences between the results of management and audit. These differences are being pursued.
(c) The target definition was changed from a calculated average to a formula based clearance time.
( 4) The figure of £1,707.5 million quoted in the business plan was the amount initially allocated by ministers. The final allocation of £1.772.5 million takes
account of internal transfer during the year and additional resources allocated to the Agency because of increased workloads.
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The Benefits Agency
Table 9.3, taken from the Department of Social Security’s annual report for 1993 
shows, in more detail, the key performance results of the benefits agency.
Table 9.3: Benefits Agency: Key performance targets and results 1991-92
The results look impressive with only three targets not being met-the efficiency 
savings, family credit accuracy and the percentage of lone parents receiving 
maintenance. On close inspection, a fourth target was also not met-the finance 
target of living within budget. The original budgetary allocation and target was for 
£1,707.5 million but this was supplemented during the year because of increased 
workloads and increased to the shown £1,772.6 million. The effect of external 
factors on the success of agencies in meeting their targets was highlighted in 
Chapter 5 but it is important to raise again in evaluating the success of agencies. 
The Department of Social Security’s annual report argued that the Benefits Agency 
targets missed were ’particularly affected by external factors such as higher than 
anticipated workloads and unexpectedly high unemployment’.
In an attempt to overcome this difficulty the department is now looking at new ways 
of workload forecasting and finding a more flexible way of matching available
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resources to workloads. The Department of Social Security do however accept that 
problems with workload forecasting were not the only reasons for some of the 
Benefits Agency targets not being met.
The Contributions Agency and the Resettlement Agency
The Contributions Agency and the Resettlement Agency were the most successful of 
the Department of Social Security’s agencies in terms of meeting their ’key 
performance targets’ in 1991-92. As we saw in Chapter 5, there were some 
particular problems in devising performance measures and targets for the 
Resettlement Agency as the work had always been given a relatively low priority 
and consequently little information was available, for example, on the effectiveness 
of the agency in terms of ’resettling’ its clients. Some of the key Resettlement 
Agencies’ performance measures were therefore ’throughput’ measures, for 
example, of devising measuring standards by a particular date rather than of actually 
measuring the effectiveness of the units in resettling their residents. The fact that 
the agency achieved all its targets therefore tells us nothing about the success of 
Next Steps in improving the effectiveness of the agency or the quality of service 
provided by the units. The measures do however tell us that the Resettlement 
Agency has been a Next Steps success in terms of being more efficient by living 
within budget and by achieving efficiency savings over its target.
Table 9.4, again taken from the Department of Social Security’s annual report, 
shows that the Contributions Agency met and in most cases, exceeded its targets in 
1991-92.
/ 1 3
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Target
Financial
Complete work programme within budget £121,45m
Achieve cumulative efficiency savings . £3.40m
Compliance
Increase collection of arrears (excluding central payments
section) by 10% of 1990-91 outturn £218m
Increase class 1 arrears identified from survey by 35% £17.5m
Increase identified in-year class 1 adjustment by 35% £16.3m
Increase the number of new class 2 contributors identified 60,000
Increase the number of surveys by 10% 88,000
Records maintenance
Post x% of available end of year returns by 31 December 98%
Clear x% of benefit enquiries handled ... 99%
clerically in 3 working days of y% accuracy 98%
Customer service/information provision
Register x% of acceptable personal pension applications in 28 working days 90%
Answer x% of employer, contributor and personal pension enquiries
within 10 working days 95%















Table 9.4: Contributions Agency targets and results 1991-92
What these results actually tell us about the success of Next Steps is however 
limited. They do tell us that the agency has stayed within budget and has achieved 
efficiency savings but beyond that all the results tell us is that the agency has 
successfully been rectifying previous shortcomings by identifying and collecting 
outstanding arrears. The choice of indicators and targets for the Contributions 
Agency will have to change because the ’pot’ of outstanding arrears reduces when 
the agency is successful in collecting the outstanding contributions. The 
Contributions Agency results tell us nothing about the effectiveness of the agency in 
keeping accurate national insurance contribution records or in providing a good 
quality of service to customers. These shortcoming are, at least in part, now being 
rectified as the agency has introduced two new targets for 1992-93 - the level of 
customer satisfaction and the ’clearance of rejected items’ (rejected items refer to 
national insurance contributions paid for that the agency cannot identify the records 
on which they should be recorded).
These examples of Department of Social Security agencies which appear to 
demonstrate that Next Steps has been a great success in terms of achieving its 
formal objectives therefore show that these overall results should be treated with 
caution. Although the results tell us that the agencies have been largely successful 
in meeting their specified targets it does not necessarily follow that Next Steps has 
been achieving its formal objectives of improving efficiency, effectiveness and 
quality of service. What the targets are measuring and how they are set is still
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developing and also, factors other than the introduction of Next Steps may affect an 
agency’s performance. First, it is possible that Next Steps may experience a 
’Hawthorne honeymoon’ where performance improves as a direct consequence of 
the fact that it is a time of change but the improvements are not a result of what the 
changes actually are and will fade over time. Second, we have already seen how the 
problem of unemployment rising affected the success of the Benefits Agency in 
achieving its financial targets. Other external factors which may affect an agency’s 
performance, either positively or adversely, include other organizational changes 
(such as the full implementation of the social security computerization-the 
operational strategy) or policy changes such as the introduction of the new disability 
benefits.
So, at present it would be misleading to assess whether Next Steps is working in 
terms of achieving its formal objectives of improving effectiveness and efficiency by 
evaluating it in terms of agencies’ success in meeting their key performance targets. 
Other considerations also must be taken into account including the fact that targets 
are still developing and that other, external factors, may also affect an agency’s 
performance. In addition, there is always the possibility that targets are being set 
low so as to make Next Steps a public relations success both within and outside 
Whitehall. The key performance targets are however the only available overall 
measures of the success of Next Steps in meeting its formal objectives and they 
appear to suggest that, on the whole, agencies have been achieving their targets.
Improvement in quality of service
One of the central planks of Next Steps which has been given added weight by the 
Citizen’s Charter is the aim of improving quality of service to the ’customer’. 
Customer opinion surveys are by no means new to the civil service and they are not
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new to the Department of Social Security. The Department of Social Security 
introduced reviews of ’customers” experiences of claiming social security benefits in 
1984 and these reviews were revamped in 1987 and 1988. The introduction of Next 
Steps has however witnessed many more changes to the ways in which the 
Department of Social Security and its agencies have been reviewing customer 
satisfaction. The department’s agencies have all taken the responsibility for their 
own customer opinion surveys.
The Benefits Agency’s customer opinion survey was introduced in 1991. The sample 
is drawn nationally from 159 districts. The main change from the old quality 
assessment package is that it is a centrally conducted survey and it is not now 
possible to disaggregate the data to see how the performance of each district or 
local office compares. This gap is however partly being filled by local surveys with 
districts conducting their own surveys.
The main point about the introduction of the new surveys is that the method of 
assessment has changed which means that it is not possible to evaluate how 
customer opinions have changed since the introduction of Next Steps. There has 
even been a change in the Benefits Agency’s 1992 customer opinion survey as 
compared with their 1991 survey. There have been changes to the ways in which the 
samples are weighted in an attempt to capture people who move on and off income 
support. The rationale behind the change was to make the survey more robust but 
one adverse effect of the change is that the results of the 1992 survey will not be 
directly comparable with the results of the 1991 survey.
In summary then, within the Department of Social Security, it is not possible to carry 
out a ’before’ and ’after’ evaluation of how Next Steps has affected ’customers”
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perceptions of the services they receive. The Department of Social Security 
agencies have been concentrating on developing and improving their customer 
opinion surveys which, if these are continued on the same basis, will lead to some 
comparability of opinions over time but, as yet, this is not possible.
Staff attitudes
Again, there are no before and after surveys to evaluate how Next Steps has affected 
staff attitudes within the Department of Social Security’s agencies. However, 
against the background of the development of Next Steps and other changes within 
the organization of operation of the department, for example, resulting from the 
computerization of social security benefits, the Department of Social Security did 
commission the Institute for Manpower Studies (IMS) to find out:
* how well staff coped with the change;
* how they feel about the way they are managed, the work they do and their
prospects;
* how motivated they are in their jobs;
* how they view their future.*^
Some 120 staff took part in semi structured detailed interviews and group 
discussions prior to the questionnaire design so as to ensure that the questionnaire 
addressed issues of concern to them. The department’s agencies and headquarters 
were also consulted to ensure that they were happy with the questionnaires and that 
questions specific to each were included. After testing the questionnaire with some 
initial interviews it was sent to 12,000 staff in the Department of Social Security’s 
agencies and headquarters. It is not possible from the survey’s results to assess 
whether or not staff are ’happier’ under the new post-Next Steps regime than they
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were before but there are some interesting findings. To quote directly from the 
digest of the research findings which was circulated to Department of Social 
Security staff:
Staff were asked a number of questions aimed at establishing how they felt 
about a number of features of working in the Department. They rated a 
number as being of particular importance to them... When the extent to 
which staff said they had actually experienced these features positively are 
examined, some important discrepancies emerge. In particular, ’good pay*, 
’having job satisfaction’ and ’promotion based on merit’ are felt to be 
important by staff, yet do not register very high levels of ’experience’.
On several other aspects of work, staff are moderately satisfied. ’Good job 
security’ was a source of satisfaction, along with ’having an approachable 
boss’, ’working in a friendly atmosphere’ and ’flexible working hours’. There 
was less satisfaction with ’working for a well-managed organisation’, the 
number of ’promotion opportunities’ and ’opportunities to train and 
develop’/*
What is interesting is that some of the key elements of Next Steps do not rate well 
on the survey. ’Having job satisfaction’ was rated as important by staff but was not 
always experienced. The aim of the Next Steps delegation of responsibility was to 
free those on the coal face to get on with their work which should, at least in theory, 
increase their job satisfaction. Another factor of concern raised by the survey was 
that staff did not appear to be satisfied with the management of their organization. 
These feelings could be influenced by the fact that staff have been experiencing a lot 
of change and that once the dust has settled they may feel happier with their
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management regime. A further finding from the staff attitudes survey of particular 
interest was that staff ’were not motivated to work harder by performance pay*. As 
we have seen, the Next Steps thrust towards group bonuses and individual 
performance pay is predicated on the belief that pay is an compelling factor in 
motivation. This Department of Social Security staff attitude survey may suggest 
that this conjecture is ill founded.
In summary, the Department of Social Security’s staff attitude does not tell us 
anything about the effect of Next Steps on staff attitudes as again, we have no 
’before’ and ’after’ picture of how attitudes have changed. As Next Steps is still in 
its incubation period, the survey comes too early to tell us about how staff will feel 
in a post Next Steps regime once the dust has settled. The existing survey does 
however highlight some concerns which need to be considered and addressed.
Contribution of administrative theory to Next Steps and of Next Steps to 
administrative theory.
Next Steps raises a number of issues relating to administrative theories which have 
been explored throughout the text. Chapters 1 and 2 asked whether the ideas 
behind Next Steps are new and where they have come from. They concluded that 
the ideas are not new but are rooted in theory and in practice. The ideas are a part 
of a line of reforms which have come to be commonly known as the ’new public 
management’. In turn, this line of reforms is rooted in public choice theory and 
agency theory. In addition, other more traditional branches of administrative theory 
informed other themes which have been explored throughout the text - the 
difficulties in distinguishing ’policy’ and ’operational’ issues; the apparent dichotomy 
between accountability and flexibility; and the move to contract government. This 
section draws together the theoretical themes which have been raised throughout
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the book and evaluates their contribution to Next Steps and, in turn, the 
contribution of the Next Steps experience to administrative theory and its 
application to other areas of public policy.
The client/contractor divide
One of the key features of Next Steps is the development of contracts to manage 
operational activities to be carried out either by the public sector or increasingly, 
particularly as the market testing initiative matures, by the private sector. Next 
Steps is about the move to management by contract and has now, with the 
introduction of the Market Testing initiative, also come to be about the move to 
management of contract. There are parallels with these developments and the 
current move to develop quasi-markets which is common to many areas of public 
sector service delivery including health, personal social services, education, housing 
and a number of local government services such as refuse collection. Next Steps* 
application of the client/contractor divide throughout the entire existing civil service 
and right to the core of government is a major test of the structures and principles of 
introducing quasi markets into public services. So, what does Next Steps tell us 
about the client/contractor divide and its application to other areas of public policy?
The first finding is that the introduction of a client/contractor divide into areas of 
public policy transforms the character of the administrative body. In the civil service 
the main implications of this move to management by contract and of the move to 
management of contract have been for the existing organization, culture and for the 
skills required by civil servants.
In the civil service there have been two phases of change. Phase one has been the 
introduction of management by contract with the Next Steps* structural change of
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creating agencies and of managing these agencies through a series of ’contracts’ (the 
framework documents, business plans and corporate plans). A part of this move to 
management by contract has also been the arrangements between agencies (through 
’service level agreements’) where one party ’contracts’ another to provide certain 
goods or services within a specified level of resources. Civil servants are now either 
’clients’ or ’contractors* and some may be both. For example, an agency may be 
contracted to its minister but it may also be the ’client’ of another agencies’ services- 
for example, the Social Security Contributions Agency is ’contracted’ to collect 
national insurance contributions, to keep the national insurance contribution 
records and to provide the information to other agencies but it is also the ’client’ of 
the computer services provided by another of the department’s agencies, the 
Information Technology Services Agency.
The introduction of these new arrangements has required agencies to establish 
distinct organization structures and for headquarters also to review their roles and 
organization. It has resulted in agencies being provided with greater freedoms to 
become more effective ’contractors’ in meeting with the demands of their business 
plans. These ’flexibilities’ have in turn, undermined the existing uniformity in civil 
service organization within departments and in pay and grading arrangements. The 
introduction of the client/contractor divide has also required civil servants to learn 
new skills. It has resulted in pressures for central departments (the Office for the 
Minister to the Civil Service, Treasury and departmental headquarters) to become 
professional ’clients’ in terms of learning how to draw up ’contracts’ and to manage 
these ’contracts’ which, in turn, have resulted in greater demands for better 
performance information. Until recently the tendering, controlling contracts and 
writing contracts was the undisputed territory of the private sector.
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The second phase of change in the civil service has been the move to management 
of contract which has largely been precipitated by the recent Market Testing 
initiative. The Market Testing initiative means that civil service ’contractors’ are 
increasingly having to compete with the private sector in securing the contract to 
perform provide certain goods or services. This second phase blurs the boundaries 
between the public and private sectors and this ’blurring’ has some important 
implications for the future of the civil service or for other areas of public policy 
which adopt similar strategies.
One implication is that it may undermine public service loyalty. We have all met 
people who work for wages lower than they could command in the private sector 
because of their belief in the public sector. The introduction of private sector values 
into the public service through the client/contractor divide could undermine this 
public service loyalty and, in some cases, their willingness to work for less money 
(particular if civil servants are regularly having to compete with others from outside 
for their jobs). A further consequence which will be particularly important 
especially once the Market Testing initiative is in full swing and is also being applied 
to core functions such as the paying of social security benefits and the collection of 
national insurance contributions, is that it will reduce the ability of administrators to 
respond to environmental or policy developments. Equally, ’clients’ can no longer 
incrementally change their requirements to match changing assumptions or 
priorities. Finally, the most important consequence of contracting out services of 
functions is that the change would be long term and would most likely be 
irreversible. Once services are contracted out of the public service, those public 
service providers are no longer around to compete for subsequent tenders. 
Contracting out will result in a loss of expertise within the public sector.
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Transaction costs
The second finding which Next Steps tells us about the application of the 
client/contractor divide to other areas of public policy is that it involves additional 
transaction costs. As Chapter 2 demonstrated, the branch of agency theory, 
transaction cost analysis, illuminates the additional costs involved in establishing 
and retaining semi-autonomous executive agencies. Transaction cost analysis was 
originally developed to explain the growth of large firms in capitalist societies. 
Essentially the theory is that there are costs involved in a principal controlling an 
agent and that firms expand to minimize these costs. Firms either integrate 
vertically, that is, with those from whom they are purchasing a service or goods, or 
horizontally, that is, with any competitors. Transaction cost analysis contrasts with 
the Next Steps theory that the increased flexibility and autonomy ensuing from 
devolvement will result in greater efficiency and effectiveness. So, do the theories 
of transaction costs analysis only apply to private sector industries and is the public 
sector different?
Chapter 1 has already demonstrated that transaction cost theories are a useful 
model in identifying the additional costs of establishing executive agencies. There 
are clearly three types of transaction costs in any agency arrangement: the 
transitional costs, the periodic costs and the permanent costs.
Transitional costs
The transitional costs of establishing Next Steps have been high. It would be 
extremely difficult however to even estimate what these costs have been as much of 
the information is not available and even that information which could be available 
has not been collected either on a departmental or central department (the 
Treasury or the Office for the Public Service and Science) basis.
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The transitional costs of implementing Next Steps and establishing agencies include 
the costs of establishing the necessary structures, the information systems and the 
reporting arrangements. These may include the costs of relocating staff or of 
moving staff to other agencies and of recruiting new staff. Such costs were incurred 
as a result of the Social Security Contributions Agency centralizing staff who were 
previously dispersed throughout the local office network. Other Next Steps 
transitional costs include the costs of agencies developing ’training strategies’, 
’personnel strategies’ and ’corporate identities’ (through marketing techniques such 
as developing agency newsletters or issuing agency scarves and agency mugs to 
staff). They may also include increasing the pay budget within an agency now in the 
expectation of efficiency savings over a specified period of say five to ten years. On 
a more down to earth note, there were also costs involved in organizing social 
occasions to mark the launch of the agencies.
The information on transitional costs which is not available are those costs which 
are not easily distinguishable from the day to day work of a department or agency 
such as the costs of staff meetings to discuss changes. Amongst the costs which 
could be distinguished are those of civil servants acquiring new skills. This has 
involved the extensive use of management consultants who have been involved in 
advising agencies and departments on how to develop the appropriate structures, 
systems and reporting arrangements. Developing Next Steps has meant big business 




The periodic costs of establishing Next Steps include the costs of reviewing staffs 
and agencies* ’contracts*. For example ’periodic costs’ include the costs of possibly 
advertising externally and interviewing potential chief executives every three to five 
years as a means of ensuring that the agency has the best person for the job - even if, 
after this process, the person in post is reappointed. In addition, the agency 
framework documents which establish the operational structures within which 
agencies may operate, at present, must be "revised" about every three years. 
"Revising" these documents will involve a series of meetings between central 
departments and agencies and therefore ’costs’. The agency business plans have to 
be revised every year and the agency reports also have to be written every year.
Once the Market Testing initiative has taken root and more services are contracted 
out, the costs of tendering and contracting for departmental or agencies’ services 
will also involve costs. The Williamson analysis outlined in Chapter 1 has also 
shown that these ’periodic’ transaction costs are likely to be higher in dealings with 
specialist agencies or service providers. This is because these agencies and service 
providers and their staff are in a strong bargaining position in negotiating their 
contracts, particularly when there are few others competing for their work.
Permanent costs
The permanent costs of the Next Steps arrangements are a direct consequence of 
reverting back to the 1960s belief in small being beautiful. What is lost are the 
economies of scale for example, of running one personnel section and one finance 
section for a large department such as the Department of Social Security.
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The Williamson analysis of transaction costs therefore shows some of the costs 
involved in the developing Next Steps. Although it is not, at present, possible to put 
a figure on these costs, it is clear they are high. This means that Next Steps has a big 
job to do in ensuring that these costs continue to be offset, for example, through 
efficiency savings.
The policy versus operations dichotomy
The application of the client/contractor divide to the civil service also informs us 
that administrative theory was right to insist that ’policy* and ’operations’ cannot be 
separated. As we have seen, Next Steps attempts to separate responsibilities for 
’policy’ and ’operational’ functions and to define clearly the responsibilities of each 
party in the framework documents. The Next Steps experience has shown that there 
is a direct relationship between the ’type’ of agency and degree of difficulty caused 
by the obfuscation between ’policy’ and ’operational’ issues. Again referring back to 
our typology of agencies outlined in Table 1.3, it is those agencies in box 3 in 
particular (the monopoly Treasury dependent agencies) which have caused and are 
likely to continue to cause the greatest difficulties in this respect (agencies in this 
category include the Department of Social Security’s Benefits Agency, War Pensions 
Agency, Contributions Agency and Child Support Agency). The type of work in 
which these agencies are involved is closer to the core of government and 
consequently more politically sensitive. The questions raised are therefore whether 
the Next Steps (public choice theory) principles of separating functions can be 
equally applied across all areas of government or whether they can only be fully 
applied where the degree of political involvement has traditionally been lower, such 
as has been the case for the Department of Social Security’s Information 
Technology Services Agency.
1 8 6
The tension between accountability and flexibility
The conclusion that the Next Steps principles must be applied to varying degrees 
depending on the 'type* of agency is also supported by Next Steps’ experiences of 
balancing accountability and flexibility. Chapter 1 has shown that public 
administration literature has comprehensively addressed the conflict between 
flexibility and parliamentary accountability, ^  and yet inherent in Next Steps are the 
aims of increasing both flexibility and accountability.
The early evidence coming from the Prime Minister’s Efficiency Unit was that 
rather than flexibility and accountability balancing, accountability was triumphing 
over flexibility^. There is also some evidence that the Treasury has been more ruled 
by their traditional concerns of controlling public expenditure than by their wish to 
see agencies developing into semi autonomous bodies (see Chapter 4). The block to 
change raised by the Treasury’s, at least initial reluctance, to play the Next Steps 
game was added to by some legal difficulties over delegating agencies additional 
’flexibilities’ until the Civil Service Management Functions act was passed in 1993. 
Now that this act has been passed and there appears to be a change in the air with 
the Treasury’s officials now apparently actively encouraging agencies to seek 
additional flexibilities (see Chapter 4), Next Steps looks set to run-at least, in some 
areas.
Again an important difference is emerging in how Next Steps is being applied to 
different areas of government and different ’types’ of agencies. The Department of 
Social Security remains fairly reticent about loosening the reins on the politically 
sensitive Benefits Agency. The accountability versus flexibility dichotomy is 
therefore creating more tensions in areas closer to the core of government which 
have a higher political profile than in other, less contentious, areas of government.
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Next Steps’ lessons
The main lesson emerging from Next Steps is that its unintended consequences are 
likely to be more important that the aims set out in any Next Steps policy documents 
or discussed in any formal Next Steps debates.
The main unintended consequence is for the constitutional role of the civil service. 
The political neutrality of civil servants could be threatened by the increasing use of 
short term contracts to appoint people outside the civil service directly to senior 
positions, particularly if these direct appointments are also extended to apply to 
headquarters posts. The longer term implication of this is that each change in 
government could see a change in the outlooks of those holding senior civil servants’ 
posts, as and when their contracts come up for renewal.
Next Steps may also reduce the anaesthetizing effect of the civil service on radical 
reform. First, Next Steps may change the nature of the relationship between civil 
servants and ministers as those civil servants on short term appointments may be 
more committed to the task of pleasing their ministers than to servicing the civil 
service traditions. Second, the infiltration of the civil service by different ’types’ of 
people, with experience of business, finance and industry, is likely to change the 
character of the civil service making it more pro-active and less resistant to change.
A second effect of Next Steps is to raise the question of what is a ’department’ and 
how ’departments’ and ’agencies’ should be represented in the Cabinet. As agencies 
increasingly develop as semi autonomous bodies the rationale for what holds a set of 
agencies together under the umbrella of one department comes increasingly into 
question. When asked about what holds a ’department’ together one senior official
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said that it was the public expenditure round. If this is the case then this rationale 
will increasingly reduce as agencies are increasingly responsible for carrying out 
their own bidding in the public expenditure round and in some cases are 
increasingly expanding in new markets which may not directly relate to the work of 
their ’department’.
A third apparently unintended but nevertheless important consequence of Next 
Steps is that it is changing existing traditions of parliamentary accountability. Next 
Steps both directly and indirectly affects the fundamental principles of 
parliamentary accountability. The main threat is being posed by the Market Testing 
initiative which involves contracting out existing government functions. At present 
the Market Testing initiative is concentrating on service functions but as it develops 
to also include tendering core government functions such as the paying of social 
security benefits, Parliament must ensure that it continues to have some rights of 
access to look at how those services are being delivered.
In summary then, this book has demonstrated that Next Steps is an evolutionary 
revolution. It is evolutionary in two ways. First, many of its ideas and features are 
not new but second, it has also evolved from the time of the efficiency unit report 
launching the initiative. Unlike in New Zealand, Next Steps had no set plan of 
where it was going or what it was to achieve by when. It was launched by a report 
with some radical ideas about creating semi autonomous executive agencies but 
many of the other features of the current stages of reform were not made explicit at 
the time of the efficiency unit report. Next Steps has gathered increasing 
momentum and change is now moving fast, particularly now the market testing 
initiative has completed its first phase.
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This chapter has basically asked whether all this change is achieving Next Steps' 
specified formal objective of improving efficiency and quality of service for the 
benefit of customers, tax payers and staff. One success of Next Steps is quite clear, 
that is, its success in achieving change. By 5 April 1993,89 agencies had been 
established and over 260,000 civil servants (45% of all civil servants) are working in 
agencies. The creation of agencies has required departments looking at their 
overall role and their many functions and asking why they are doing certain things 
and whether they are doing them in the most efficient way. Such questions cannot 
be bad.
This chapter has shown however that shortcomings in the date available to date 
make it impossible to confidently say whether or not Next Steps has increased 
efficiency and quality of service and whether staff are now happier. The 
information that is available on efficiency and quality of service does however look 
promising with most agencies achieving the majority of their targets (although this 
does beg the question of whether the targets have been stringent enough or whether 
they were set with the aim in mind of making Next Steps look a success). Equally 
the Department of Social Security’s staff attitudes survey which was conducted in 
1992 is by no means a tale of gloom and despair.
The changes to date are foundations for the major challenges to come. This chapter 
has shown how the market testing initiative, which will increasingly result in the 
contracting out of existing civil service functions to private sector contractors, will 
present the major challenges to the future shape and role of the civil service.
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THE INTERVIEWS
The ’fieldwork’ consisted of individual interviews conducted on lobby terms with 
senior players in the Next Steps reforms and with senior players in the Canadian and 
New Zealand initiatives, of workshops with groups of middle managers working in 
agencies and in attending meetings as an observer. These meetings included the 
regular meetings of the Contributions Agency Management Board. The interviews, 
workshops and observational attendance at meetings served two purposes; to provide 
direct information for the text and to provide contextual knowledge. This means that 
not all the interviews, workshops and meetings are directly cited in the text. Those 
that are directed cited are marked with a star.
The approach involved interviewing the key players in the Next Steps field and the 
Chief Executives at regular intervals. This allowed the project to capture the 
development of Next Steps throughout the period of the fieldwork (January 1991 to 
May 1993). The interviews were conducted on lobby terms as this is the only way of 
being sure of gaining a full contextual picture. Senior civil servants would be unlikely 
to have been as open if they felt that they were to be directly quoted without then- 
prior consent.
Alan Fiander, Director, The National Audit Office, 26 April 1991
Nick Montagu, Deputy Secretary, Department of Social Security, 8 May 1991
* Senior DSS official, 8 May 1991
Alexis Cleveland, Director, Information Technology Services Agency, 17 June 1991 
Meetings with ITS A management teams, 17 June 1991
Nick Montagu, Deputy Secretary, Department of Social Security, 1 August 1991
* Sir Michael Partridge, Permanent Secretary, Department of Social Security, August
1991 and January 993
Malcolm Dennet, Price Waterhouse, 30 September 1991 (Developed initial 
performance measures for ITS A and the Contributions Agency).
Deborah Williams, Price Waterhouse, 30 September 1991
* The Right Hon. Tony Newton M.P., September 1991
* Group interview with ITS A managers, 30 October 1991
Ann Chant, Chief Executive, Contributions Agency, 31 October 1991 
Contributions Agency Management Board, 31 October 1991 (and every two months). 
Steven Hickey, DSS, 12 November 1991
* Sir Peter Kemp, 28 November 1991
* Senior DSS official, 3 December 1991
Michael Bichard, Chief Executive, Benefits Agency, 3 December 1991 
The Right Hon. Tony Newton, Secretary of State, 29 January 1992
* Ros Hepplewhite, Child Support Agency Chief Executive, 12 February 1992
Sir Michael Partridge, Permanent Secretary, Department of Social Security, 4 March
1992
Steven Hickey, Department of Social Security, 23 March 1992
Alan Fiander, Director, National Audit Office, 23 March 1992
Mike Sparham, National Union of Civil and Public Servants (NUCPS), 24 March 
1992
Steve Heminsley, Finance Director of Contributions Agency and lead in DSS 
efficiency study on market testing, 23 April 1992
* John Edwards, Director Canada State Services Commission, 4 May 1992
Sherry Harrison, Director, Corporate Management Branch Secretariat, Department of 
Health and Welfare, Ottawa, 4 May 1992
Monique Plante, Executive Director General, Income Security Programs Branch, 
Health and Welfare Canada, 2 May 1992
Workshop with Income Security Program (ISP) redesign staff, Ottawa, 4 May 1992
Barry Lacombe, Assistant Secretary, Expenditure and Management Sector, Treasury 
Board Canada, 5 May 1992
Rod Grainger, Director, Policy and Procedures Group, Treasury Board Canada, 5 
May 1992
Francois Pouliot, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Health and Welfare Canada, 5 
May 1992
Andrew Lieff, Senior analyst, Expenditure Management Directorate, Treasury Board 
Canada, 5 May 1992.
* Senior Canadian Treasury Board official, 5 May 1992.
David Good, Assistant Secretary, Social And Cultural Programs, Treasury Board 
Canada, 5 May 1992
Michel Cardinal, Executive Director, Staffing Programs Branch, Public Service 
Commission, Canada, 5 May 1992
Richard Paton, Deputy Secretary, Administrative Policy Branch, Treasury Board 
Canada, 6 May 1992
John Maybe, Director, Evaluation Policy and Practices, Office of the Comptroller 
General, Ottawa, 6 May 1992
Jim McCrindell, Deputy Comptroller General, Accounting and Costing Policy Branch, 
Ottawa, 6 May 1992
David Brown, Assistant Secretary, Employment Equity, Planning and Policy 
Development Division, Ottawa, 6 May 1992
Orvel Marquardt, Director General, Departmental Planning and Financial 
Administration, Corporate Management Branch, Health and Welfare Canada, 6 May 
1992
Ken Chernick, Director, Financial Planning and Analysis, Departmental Planning and 
Financial Administration, Corporate Management Branch, Health and Welfare 
Canada, 6 May 1992
Luc Ladouceur, Director, Financial Policy and Training, Departmental Planning and 
Financial Administration, Corporate Management Branch, Health and Welfare 
Canada, 6 May 1992
Jim Moore, Director General, Departmental Secretariat, Health and Welfare Canada,
7 May 1992
Jim McCrindell, Deputy Comptroller General (2nd meeting), 7 May 1992
Carol Rutherford, Director, Policy, Planning and Human Resources, Canada 
Communication Group, 8 May 1992
Norman Manchevsky, Chief Executive, Canada Communication Group, 8 May 1992
Robert Flemming, Director of Corporate Resources, Canada Communication Group, 8 
May 1992
Raymond Laframboise, Assistant Deputy Minister, Corporate Management Branch, 
Health and Welfare Canada, 8 May 1992
New Zealand Treasury Officials, 30 November 1992
New Zealand State Services Commission Officials, 1 December 1992
Roal Ketko, Corporate Secretary, Department of Social Welfare, Wellington 2 Dec.
92
Workshop with Management Caucus meeting, Department of Social Welfare, 
Wellington 2 Dec. 92.
Robin Wilson, General Manager, New Zealand Children and Young Persons Service, 
Dept, of Social Welfare 2 Dec. 1992
Mike Fitzgerald, General Manager Tritec, Dept, of Social Welfare, 2 Dec. 1992
Richard Wood, Corporate Manager Resource Manager, Dept, of Social Welfare, 2 
Dec. 1992
Ann Clark, General Manager, New Zealand Community Funding Agency, Dept, of 
Social Welfare, 2 Dec. 1992
David Preston and Alan Nixon, Manager Strategic policy and Major Projects and 
General manager, Social Policy agency, 2 Dec. 1992
George Hickton, General Manager, New Zealand Income Support Service, Dept, of 
Social Welfare 2 Dec. 1992
Tony Chamberlain, Chief Financial Controller, Corporate Finance, Dept, of Social 
Welfare, 2 Dec. 1992
Neil Williamson, Chief Legal Advisor, Legal Services Bureau, Dept, of Social 
Welfare, 2 Dec. 1992
Wayne Clowery, Corporate Manager, Audit and Security, Dept, of Social Welfare, 2 
Dec. 1992
Simon Murdoch, Chief Executive, and Peter Rodger, Prime Minister’s Policy Advisor 
on Public Sector Management and Responsiveness, Wellington, 3 Dec. 1992
Ailsa Salt, Deputy Clerk, House of Representatives and Marry Harris, Assistant Clerk 
(Select Committees), Wellington 3 Dec. 1992
Lyn Provost, Assistant Controller and Auditor General, Wellington, 3 Dec. 1992
* Mike Fogden, Chief Executive of the Employment Service, 27 January 1993
John Kenworthy, Chief Executive, Information Technology Services Agency,
February 1993
Sir Michael Partridge, Permanent Secretary, Department of Social Security, 8 
February 1993
Nick Montagu, Deputy Secretary, Department of Transport (moved from DSS), 10 
February 1993
* Treasury officials, 11 February 1993 
Nic Towers
Ros Dunn (pay division)
Duncan Wilson, Industry division
David Batt, Home Office and legal department.
John Fitzgerald, OPSS, 11 February 1993
* George Bardwell, BA personnel director, 26 April 1993 
Michael Bichard, Chief Executive, Benefits Agency, 26 April 1993
Jane Mark-Lawson, Analytical Services Division, DSS/BA, 26 April 1993 
David Riggs, Finance Director, Benefits Agency, 3 June 1993
PRIMARY SOURCES
Next Steps has resulted in an enormous amount of information being generated. In 
addition to the departmental reports, agencies now publish 3 yearly framework 
documents, yearly business plans and annual reports. The Office for the Minister of 
the Civil Service/ the Office of Public Service and Science has also been producing a 
great deal of material in the form of briefing notes and annual reports. The Treasury 
and Civil Service Committee has also been active in its enquiries into the changing 
civil service which have generated some important material. The research strategy 
has been to systematically analyse these documents. Much of the material, 
particularly on relations between the various bodies is drawn from a systematic review 
of the agency framework documents. The research has also made some use of 
unpublished government documents. Again the documents directly used and cited in 
the text are marked with a star. The other documents provided context.
Auditor General of Canada (1991) The Accountability Framework for Crown 
Corporations: Making it Work. Ottawa, Canada Communications Group.
The Audit Office (1989) Central Government Management: A New Approach , 
Wellington, Reports Group, the Audit Office.
Benefits Agency (1991) Benefits Agency Framework Document. London, HMSO
Benefits Agency (1991) Benefits Agency Business Plan 1991/92. London, HMSO
Benefits Agency (1992) Benefits Agency Business Plan 1992/93. London, HMSO
Building Research Establishment Executive Agency (1990) Building Research
Establishment Executive Agency Framework Document. London, HMSO.
* Cabinet Office (PO) and HM Treasury (1985) Non-Departmental Public Bodies: A 
Guide for Departments. London, HMSO.
Cabinet Office and HM Treasury (1991) NDPB Policy: Developing a New Approach, 
unpublished
* Cabinet Office (1991) The Citizen’s Charter: Raising the Standard Cm 1599. 
London, HMSO
S. Cant (1991) Strategic Review of ITSA. Unpublished DSS report
Central Office of Information (1990) Central Office of Information Executive Agency 
Framework Document. London, HMSO, April.
Child Support Agency (1993) Child Support Agency Framework Document. London, 
HMSO
Child Support Agency (1993) Child Support Agency Business Plan. London, HMSO
Child Support Agency (1993) Child Support Agency Charter. London, HMSO
Central Veterinary Laboratory (1990) Central Veterinary Laboratory Framework 
Document. London, HMSO, April.
Civil Service College Executive Agency (1989) Civil Service College Executive 
Agency Framework Document. London, HMSO, June.
Civil Service Management Functions Bill (1992), London, HMSO, HC 51, October
Civil and Public Services Association (1990) Negotiators Guide to Agencies
Companies House Executive Agency (1988) Companies House Executive Agency 
Framework Document. London, HMSO, October.
Contributions Agency (1991) Contributions Agency Framework Document. London, 
HMSO
Contributions Agency (1991) Contributions Agency Business Plan 1991/92. London, 
HMSO
Contributions Agency (1992) Contributions Agency Business Plan 1992/93.. London, 
HMSO
Contributions Agency (1993) Contributions Agency Business Plan 1993/94. London, 
HMSO.
* Department of Employment (1990) Employment Service Framework document. 
London, HMSO.
* Department of Social Security (1989) Agency Study Report. Unpublished.
* Department of Social Security (1989) Resettlement Agency Framework Document. 
London, HMSO.
* Department of Social Security (1990), Contributions Agency Framework Document. 
London, HMSO.
Department of Social Security (1991) The Corporate Role in Personnel Management. 
Internal minutes from DSS awayday, 27 March
* Department of Social Security (1991) Social Security Benefits Agency Framework 
Document, London, HMSO.
* Department of Social Security Report: The Government’s Expenditure Plans 1993- 
94 to 95-96 (1992) Cm 2213. London, HMSO.
Department of Social Security, Research Report 11 (1992) Customer Perceptions of 
Resettlement Units. London, HMSO.
Department of Social Security Benefits Division (1990) Review of the Quality of 
Service Customer Opinion Surveys. Parts I, II and III, Unpublished internal report, 
August.
Department of Social Welfare (1991) The Blueprint Organising around our Services 
and our Clients. Wellington, Government Printer.
Department of Social Welfare (1992) Annual Report. Wellington, Government 
Printer.
Department of Social Welfare (1992) Financial Accountabilities., internal unpublished 
report.
Department of Social Welfare (1992) Corporate Plan. Wellington, Government 
Printer.
Department of Social Welfare (1992) Statistical Information Report. Wellington, 
Government Printer.
Department of Social Welfare (1992) The Year in View. Wellington, Government 
Printer.
Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (1990) Driver and Vehicle Licensing Executive 
Agency Framework Document. London, HMSO, April.
Driving Standards Agency (1990) Driving Standards Agency Framework Document. 
London, HMSO, April.
* Efficiency Unit (1988) Improving Management in Government: The Next Steps. 
London, HMSO.
* Efficiency Unit (1991) Making the most of Next Steps: The Management of 
Ministers' Departments and their Executive Agencies, London, HMSO.
Employment Service (1990) Employment Service Executive Agency Framework 
Document. London, HMSO, April.
Finance and Expenditure Committee (1989) Public Finance Bill 1989 Wellington, VR 
Ward, Government Printer.
Finance and Expenditure Committee (1992) Public Finance Amendment Bill no. 3. 
Wellington, VR Ward, Government Printer.
S. Fraenkel, A. Hudzieczek, K. Sadler and L. Cunnifle (1990) Review of DSS HO: 
Role. Organisation and Functions, unpublished internal DSS report, December.
* Fulton Committee (1968) The Civil Service: Report of a Management Consultancy 
Group: Evidence submitted to the Committee under the Chairmanship of Lord Fulton 
1966-68, Vol. 2. London, HMSO.
D. Gatenby, P. Chandler and V. Curran (1990) DSS Benefits Agency HO. Review of 
functions. Relationships. Structure and Size. Unpublished DSS internal report, 
September.
Government Administration Committee (1989) Departmental Reporting to Parliament. 
Wellington, Government Printer.
* Government of Canada (1990) Public Service 2000: The Renewal of the Public 
Service of Canada. Ottawa, Ministry of Supply and Services, December.
* Government reply to the seventh report from the Treasury and Civil Service 
Committee (1991) session 1991-91, HC 496, Cm 1761. November. London, HMSO.
* Government Reply to the Eighth Report from the Treasury and Civil Service 
Committee
(1988) session 1987-1988, Civil Service Management Report: The Next Steps, Cm 
524, November. London, HMSO.
* Health and Welfare Canada (1990) Income Security Programs Vision Ottawa, 
Ministry for Supply and Services
Health and Welfare Canada (1991) ISP Quality Service Handbook, unpublished.
Health and Welfare Canada (1991) ISP Redesign - Business Strategy Phase, 
unpublished consultancy report prepared by KPMG, February
HMSO (1988) HMSO Executive Agency Framework Document. London, HMSO, 
December.
Historic Royal Palaces Executive Agency (1989) Historic Roval Palaces Executive 
Agency Framework Document. London, HMSO, October.
* House of Commons’ Select Committee on Procedure, Third Report, Parliamentary 
Questions, HC 178, May. London, HMSO.
Hydrographic Office Executive Agency (1990) Hydrographic Office Executive Agency 
Framework Document. London, HMSO, April.
Information Technology Services Agency (ITSA) (1990) ITSA Framework 
Document. London. HMSO
ITSA (1990), ITSA 1990/91 Business Plan. London, HMSO
ITSA (1991) ITSA Strategic Plan 1991/6. unpublished
ITSA (1991) ITSA 1991/92 Business Plan. London, HMSO
ITSA (1992) ITSA 1992/93 Business Plan. London, HMSO
Insolvency Service Executive Agency (1990) Insolvency Service Executive Agency 
Framework Document. London, HMSO, March.
* Institute for Manpower Studies (1993) Survey Results Digest: Staff Attitudes in the 
Department of Social Security. London, March.
Intervention Board (1990) Intervention Board Executive Agency Framework 
Document. London, HMSO, April.
Laboratory of the Government Chemist Executive Agency (1990) Laboratory of the 
Government Chemist Executive Agency Framework Document. London, HMSO, 
October.
Land Registry Executive Agency (1990) Land Registry Executive Agency Framework 
Document. London, HMSO, July.
Meteorological Office Executive Agency (1990) Meteorological Office Executive 
Agency Framework Document. London, HMSO, April.
* National Audit Office (1986) The Financial Management Initiative. HC 588, 
London, HMSO.
* National Audit Office (1987) The Role of the NAO. London, HMSO
* National Audit Office (1989), The Next Steps initiative, HC 410. London, HMSO.
* National Audit Office (1991) National Insurance Contributions, HC 665, London, 
HMSO.
* National Audit Office (1992) The Vehicle Inspectorate: Progress as the First 
Executive Agencies, HC 249. London, HMSO.
National Engineering Laboratory Executive Agency (1990) National Engineering 
Laboratory Executive Agency Framework Document. London, HMSO, October.
National Physical Laboratory Executive Agency (1990) National Physical Laboratory 
Executive Agency Framework Document. London, HMSO, July.
National Union for Civil and Public Servants Agenda for the Future: The Civil 
Service towards the Twenty-First Century. Briefing for trades unionists
National Weights and Measures Laboratory Executive Agency (1989) National 
Weights and Measures Laboratory Executive Agency Framework Document. London, 
HMSO,
Natural Resources Institute Executive Agency (1990) Natural Resources Institute 
Executive Agency Framework Document. London, HMSO, April.
* New Zealand Paper presented to the Five Countries meeting, Canada (1990), 
Special Executive Agencies and the Delivery of Social Security Benefits. Unpublished.
Occupational Health Service Executive Agency (1990) Occupational Health Service 
Executive Agency Framework Document. London, HMSO, April.
Office of the Prime Minister, Canada (1989) Public Service 2000. Press Release, 12 
December.
OMCS (1990) Improving Management in Government - The Next Steps Agencies 
Review 1990. London, HMSO, Cm 1261
OMCS (1991) Next Steps Briefing note, unpublished circulation, 5 October
OMCS (1991) Improving Management in Government: The Next Steps Agencies 
Review 1991. London, HMSO, Cm 1760, November
OMCS (1991) Next Steps Briefing note, unpublished, 19 November.
Open Lines Vols 1-9, Letters sent to MPS by Government Executive Agencies in 
reply to Parliamentary Questions
OPSS (1992) The Next Steps Agencies Review. London, HMSO, Cm 2111
* OPSS (1992) Next Steps briefing note, unpublished, 2 December.
OPSS (1993) Next Steps briefing note, unpublished, 5 August 1993 
OPSS (1993) Next Steps briefing note, unpublished, 15 October
Ordnance Survey Executive Agency (1990) Ordnance Survey Executive Agency 
Framework Document. London, HMSO, May.
Patent Office Executive Agency (1990) Patent Office Executive Agency Framework 
Document. London, HMSO, March.
Price Waterhouse Briefing Notes Executive Agencies 
Part I March 1990 
Part II June 1990 
Part III March 1991 
Part IV June 1991 
Part V March 1992 
Part VI March 1993 
Part VII July 1993
Price Waterhouse (1990) Monitoring Next Steps Agencies, unpublished consultancy 
report on performance measures for ITSA and the CA, March.
* Privy Council Office (1990) PS2000 Briefing Note: PS2000 - What's it all about? 
Ottawa, Ministry for Supplying Services.
Public Service 2000 Secretariat, Canada (1990) PS2000 Information. Briefing notes, 
28 September.
Public Service 2000 Secretariat, Canada (1990) Learning from Success: Exemplary 
Practices in Service to the Public. Ottawa, Canada Communications Group.
Public Service Commission of Canada (1989) Staffing Policies and Guidelines. 
Ottawa, Ministry for Supply and Services
Public Service Commission of Canada (1989) Selection Standards. Ottawa, Ministry 
for Supply and Services
Queen Elizabeth II Executive Agency (1989) Queen Elizabeth II Executive Agency 
Framework Document. London, HMSO, July.
Radiocommunications Executive Agency (1990) Radiocommunications Executive 
Agency Framework Document. London, HMSO, April.
Registers of Scotland Executive Agency (1990) Registers of Scotland Executive 
Agency Framework Document. London, HMSO, April.
Resettlement Agency (1989) Resettlement Agency Framework Document. London, 
HMSO
Resettlement Agency (1989) Resettlement Agency Business Plan 1989/90. London, 
HMSO
Resettlement Agency (1990) Resettlement Agency Business Plan 1990/91. London, 
HMSO
Resettlement Agency (1991) Resettlement Agency Business Plan 1991/92. London, 
HMSO
Resettlement Agency (1992) Resettlement Agency Business Plan 1992/93. London, 
HMSO
Resettlement Agency (1993) Resettlement Agency Business Plan 1993/94. London, 
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